A quantum probability account of order effects in inference

Order of information plays a crucial role in the process of updating beliefs across time. In fact, the presence of order effects makes a classical or Bayesian approach to inference difficult. As a result, the existing models of inference, such as the belief-adjustment model, merely provide an ad hoc explanation for these effects. We postulate a quantum inference model for order effects based on the axiomatic principles of quantum probability theory. The quantum inference model explains order effects by transforming a state vector with different sequences of operators for different orderings of information. We demonstrate this process by fitting the quantum model to data collected in a medical diagnostic task and a jury decision-making task. To further test the quantum inference model, a new jury decision-making experiment is developed. Using the results of this experiment, we compare the quantum inference model with two versions of the belief-adjustment model, the adding model and the averaging model. We show that both the quantum model and the adding model provide good fits to the data. To distinguish the quantum model from the adding model, we develop a new experiment involving extreme evidence. The results from this new experiment suggest that the adding model faces limitations when accounting for tasks involving extreme evidence, whereas the quantum inference model does not. Ultimately, we argue that the quantum model provides a more coherent account for order effects that was not possible before.     

Bringing ethics into focus: How regulatory focus and risk preferences influence (Un)ethical behavior

In four laboratory studies, we find that regulatory focus induced by situational cues (such as the framing of an unrelated task) or primed influences people’s likelihood to cross ethical boundaries. A promotion focus leads individuals to be more likely to act unethically than a prevention focus (Studies 1, 2, and 3). These higher levels of dishonesty are explained by the influence of a person’s induced regulatory focus on his or her behavior toward risk. A promotion focus leads to risk-seeking behaviors, while a prevention focus leads to risk avoidance (Study 3). Through higher levels of dishonesty, promotion focus also results in higher levels of virtuous behavior (Studies 2 and 3), thus providing evidence for compensatory ethics. Our results also demonstrate that the framing of ethics (e.g., through an organization’s ethics code) influences individuals’ ethical behavior and does so differently depending on an individual’s induced regulatory focus (Study 4).     

Individual differences in need for cognition and decision making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Differences in decision making between individuals differing in Need for Cognition (NFC) are examined using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Previous work using normative one time decisions suggests that individual low in NFC process gains and losses differently than those high in NFC and are more susceptible to decision biases. The IGT is a popular laboratory task that involves making risky decisions from experience involving both gains and losses. In the first experiment, low NFC participants performed significantly worse than the high NFC participants. A second experiment designed to examine the nature of these differences provides evidence that low NFC participants place more importance on gains as opposed to losses when performing the IGT. Results are discussed in light of previous work suggesting that low NFC participants place more importance on losses in mixed outcome decisions.     

临床决策中患者及其家属的地位与作用

医生、医院每天都在为患者做临床决策。而在各个决策中患者与家属应该处于什么地位的问题早有争论。除了疾病外患者性别、年龄、家庭、经济、社会地位的个体差异决定了医生决策的不同。患者要真正参与,就必须真正全面知情。关于患者参与多少的问题要因人而异,可能只是提出意愿,可能提出耗资的底线,可能权衡费效比,可能以生活质量为唯一原则。总之,临床决策中患者及其家属的地位因人而异。     

论公共卫生决策的伦理模式

公共卫生决策的伦理问题是公共卫生伦理研究的一个核心问题。近年来我国公共卫生领域出现了大量严重的伦理问题,其主要根源在于公共卫生决策的伦理缺失。强调指出公共卫生伦理决策应当树立科学健康观,并以此为基础,从转变政府职能、强化公共卫生信息系统和加大政府投入等方面详细论述了公共卫生伦理决策的一种新模式。     

Analysis of proposed three-class classification decision rules in terms of the ideal observer decision rule

We analyze recently proposed decision rules for three-class classification from the point of view of ideal observer decision theory. We consider three-class decision rules proposed by Scurfield, by Chan et al., and by Mossman. Scurfield's decision rule is shown to be a special case of the three-class ideal observer decision rule in three different situations. Chan et al. start with an ideal observer model and specify its decision-consequence utility structure in a way that causes two of the decision lines used by the ideal observer to overlap and the third line to become undefined. Finally, we show that, for a particular and obvious choice of ideal-observer-related decision variables, the Mossman decision rule cannot be a special case of the ideal observer decision rule. Despite the considerable difficulties presented by the three-class classification task, the three-class ideal observer provides a useful framework for analyzing a variety of three-class decision strategies.     

Stimulus format and working memory in fast and frugal strategy selection

The necessity of retrieving complex attribute information from long‐term memory has been shown to elevate processing costs and boost the use of simple decision heuristics. This effect was confined to verbal as opposed to pictorial attribute information. In a large‐scale experiment (N = 151), either verbal or pictorial information for inferences had to be retrieved from long‐term memory. Concurrent secondary tasks either interfered with the Central Executive, the Phonological Loop, or the Visuo‐Spatial Sketchpad. These are hypothetical components of working memory responsible for processing different information formats. Whereas the information format massively affected strategy selection, there was an additive rather than interactive effect of secondary task, suggesting enhanced retrieval costs irrespective of the information format. An additional analysis in terms of a similarity match as proposed by exemplar‐based models did not enhance the explanation of the data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Emotion in Decision Making: A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective

ABSTRACT— Decision making often occurs in the face of uncertainty about whether one's choices will lead to benefit or harm. The somatic-marker hypothesis is a neurobiological theory of how decisions are made in the face of uncertain outcome. This theory holds that such decisions are aided by emotions, in the form of bodily states, that are elicited during the deliberation of future consequences and that mark different options for behavior as being advantageous or disadvantageous. This process involves an interplay between neural systems that elicit emotional/bodily states and neural systems that map these emotional/bodily states.     

循证医学在神经外科临床决策中的应用

在神经外科复杂的诊治实践中,需要循证医学的方法不断提高临床决策水平。本文从神经外科的角度对循证医学在临床决策中的应用进行了分析和探讨。     

乳腺癌保乳术与根治术的比较

为了比较分析保乳术和根治术的治疗成本和对乳腺癌患者预后的影响,从2002年1月~2005年6月湘雅医院乳腺科的乳腺癌资料库中,随机抽取64例I~II期乳腺癌分为保乳治疗组(A组,32例)和根治术组(B组,32例),并随访。结果显示,A、B两组全部药品费用分别平均为32474.11±16126.00元、35107.30±19352.71元,总费用平均为53959.64±22033.28元、53382.10±24042.87元。两组药品费和总费用均无统计学差异(P=0.556、0.921)。中位随访时间30个月,两组病例均无局部复发。A、B组远处转移率分别为6.25%、9.38%,两组无明显差异(P=0.641);Kaplan-Meier生存分析表明A、B组生存率分别为96.88%、93.75%,两组无显著性差异(P=0.4566)。保乳术患者对残乳的满意率为90.61%,认为保留了乳房后其对家庭和社会生活仍充满自信的分别占75%和87.5%;相反,根治术者仅占28.13%和40.63%;A、B两组有显著性差异(P=0.000、0.000)。由此得出结论,保乳术和根治/改良根治术两种治疗方法对I~II期乳腺癌患者的预后无差异,成本亦无明显区别,而保乳术明显提高了患者的家庭、社会生活质量。