The role of affect in the WTA/WTP disparity

Four studies demonstrated robust within‐ and between‐subject differences in willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) and willingness‐to‐accept (WTA) measures of the value of lottery tickets. Buyers and sellers attended to different numerical cues and interpreted the same numbers differently when setting these two kinds of monetary values. Affective influences appeared to guide the valuation process. Buyers with stronger positive feelings about owning a ticket were willing to pay more for a ticket; sellers with stronger negative feelings about no longer having a ticket required a greater minimum payment in exchange for their ticket. In addition, the WTA/WTP disparity tended to be greater for more affectively‐laden lottery tickets. The results suggest that WTA and WTP prices are constructed using salient numerical cues and affective feelings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of valence and framing in decision making II: Estimating subjective weighting1

Abstract: In comparison between choice options, judgments of “How much better is a preferred option?” and “How much worse is a less preferred option?” may differ in their magnitudes. Such discrepancies are called “valence effects.” Previously, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) observed systematic positive valence effects (“Better” exceeding “Worse”) in the domain of gains and systematic negative valence effects (“Worse” exceeding “Better”) in the domain of losses. The current experiment used the directions of valence effects as a tool to assess the decision maker's interpretation of choice tasks under the “framing effect” ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 ). Preferences under the framing effect switch from certain options in the domain of gains to uncertain options in the domain of losses. This study examined whether preferences for certain options were associated with positive valence effects, whereas preferences for uncertain options were associated with negative valence effects. Moreover, conditions under which preference reversals under the framing manipulations ceased to occur were examined. The effects of valence showed that framing effects ceased to occur when decision makers maintained consistent task interpretations as pertaining to gains or to losses. Most importantly, the pattern of subjective weighting under the valence effects was consistent with previous explanation of valence effects ( Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996 ). Possibilities for extending the current findings to understanding related psychological phenomena are discussed.     

全球化的新分析框架如何可能

全球化确实是一个客观存在,但是这种客观性与新自由主义的意识形态战略是分不开的。我们在经验意义上描述全球化的同时,更需要规范性地作出倡议和行动。全球化和全球化理论应受到理性的辩护,但是全球化需要变革,新自由主义的全球化理论需要批判。而对新自由主义的批判并不意味着需要回到国家主义,全球化的新分析框架应该建立在一种超越自由主义与国家主义二元对立的立场上。这种新分析框架强调对世界秩序的重建,强调对政治作出新的理解和开始一个新的政治时代。“承认的政治”应该是全球化的政治含义。     

An application of the prototype willingness model to drivers' speeding behaviour

We tested the prototype willingness model (PWM). The participants (N = 198) completed online questionnaire measures of PWM constructs (Time 1) and subsequent speeding behaviour (Time 2). Path analyses showed that the PWM accounted for 89% of the variance in subsequent (self‐reported) speeding behaviour. This significantly exceeded the variance accounted for by the theory of planned behaviour. In line with the PWM, both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness had direct effects on behaviour. Behavioural willingness had a significantly larger effect. Attitude and subjective norm both had indirect effects on behaviour through both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness. Prototype (similarity) perceptions had indirect effects on behaviour through behavioural willingness only. The findings support the notion that driving is governed by reactive decision‐making (willingness), underpinned by prototype perceptions, attitudes and subjective norms, to a greater extent than it is deliberative decision‐making (intentions), underpinned by attitudes and subjective norms. The implications for safety interventions are discussed.     

愤怒和悲伤情绪对助人决策的影响:人际责任归因的作用

基于具体情绪理论——评价倾向框架理论(ATF),采用两项研究考察负性情绪愤怒和悲伤对助人决策的影响,并探究人际责任归因在这一关系中的作用。两项研究均采用自传体情绪记忆任务诱发情绪,研究一中自变量情绪为组间变量,包括愤怒、悲伤和中性三个水平,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费时间;研究二中自变量1为组间变量情绪,包括愤怒和悲伤,自变量2为组内变量人际责任归因,操作为模糊归因、不可控的情景归因、可控的自我归因三种情境,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费金钱。结果发现:(1)与愤怒情绪相比,悲伤情绪下个体为他人花费的时间和捐助的金钱更多;(2)在模糊的人际责任归因条件下,悲伤个体会比愤怒个体捐助更多的钱。研究表明:同为负性情绪的愤怒和悲伤在助人决策上的作用不同,悲伤个体比愤怒个体做出更多的助人决策;人际责任性归因会影响附带情绪和助人决策的关系。研究结论有助于理解附带情绪对助人决策的影响,进一步丰富并延伸ATF理论的证据和领域,对发挥情境中人际责任归因在助人决策中的作用具有一定的现实意义。     

Measuring Probabilistic Reasoning: The Construction of a New Scale Applying Item Response Theory

Probabilistic reasoning skills are important in various contexts. The aim of the present study was to develop a new instrument (the Probabilistic Reasoning Scale – PRS) to accurately measure low levels of probabilistic reasoning ability in order to identify people with difficulties in this domain. Item response theory was applied to construct the scale, and to investigate differential item functioning (i.e., whether the items were invariant) across genders, educational levels, and languages. Additionally, we tested the validity of the scale by investigating the relationships between the PRS and several other measures. The results revealed that the items had a low level of difficulty. Nonetheless, the discriminative measures showed that the items can discriminate between individuals with different trait levels, and the test information function showed that the scale accurately assesses low levels of probabilistic reasoning ability. Additionally, through investigating differential item functioning, the measurement equivalence of the scale at the item level was confirmed for gender, educational status, and language (i.e., Italian and English). Concerning validity, the results showed the expected correlations with numerical skills, math‐related attitudes, statistics achievement, IQ, reasoning skills, and risky choices both in the Italian and British samples. In conclusion, the PRS is an ideal instrument for identifying individuals who struggle with basic probabilistic reasoning, and who could be targeted by specific interventions. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Decision Making Depend on Cognitive Abilities,Monitoring and Control

Decision making is the process by which actions are constructed and initiated. Across many research streams, this can be explained in terms of three broad cognitive processes: cognitive abilities that construct judgements and potential courses of action, and interacting monitoring and control processes that determine when to initiate them as behaviour. The aim of this research was to investigate the generality of individual differences in these processes, and their power to predict patterns of decision behaviour identified in our previous research. Undergraduate participants (N = 364) completed nine tests assessing cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, control thresholds and various patterns of decision behaviour. The tests differed in their cognitive ability requirements and the nature of the payoffs associated with decisions. Cognitive abilities were a strong predictor of individuals' decision competence and optimality, while monitoring confidence and control thresholds were strong and unique predictors of their overall decisiveness, and reckless and hesitant errors. These results were strongest when the measures of cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence were derived from tests with the same cognitive requirements as the tests used to derive the decision behaviours and when the control threshold measure was derived from tests with the same decision payoffs as the test used to derive the decision behaviours. This effect was particularly pronounced for control thresholds, highlighting the domain‐specific nature of cognitive control processes. These findings demonstrate how cognitive abilities, monitoring output and control thresholds interact with cognitive requirements and context‐specific payoffs to drive individual differences in decision‐making behaviour. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of “Display‐Set” Options on Decision‐Making

The way a choice set is constructed can have a significant influence on how individuals perceive and evaluate their options, and make decisions between them. Here, I examine whether a “display set” of visible but unavailable options can exert these same types of influences on whether or not to choose a single (target) item. Across a series of experiments, purchase intent is increased when the display set and target are drawn from the same category, but decreased when the display and target items are mismatched. This effect is shown to depend on perceived similarity, such that increasing display‐target similarity increases purchase intent towards the target. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions made by previous neural and behavioral research on choice sets, the relative value and/or number of display‐only items have no significant impact on these decisions. These findings reveal a novel choice behavior in commonly encountered settings such as online marketplaces. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reinforcement,Rationality, and Intentions: How Robust Is Automatic Reinforcement Learning in Economic Decision Making?

Reinforcement learning is often observed in economic decision making and may lead to detrimental decisions. Because of its automaticity, it is difficult to avoid. In three experimental studies, we investigated whether this process could be controlled by goal intentions and implementation intentions. Participants' decisions were investigated in a probability‐updating task in which the normative rule to maximize expected payoff (Bayes' rule) conflicted with the reinforcement heuristic as a simple decision rule. Some participants were asked to set goal intentions designated to foster the optimization of rational decision making, while other participants were asked to furnish these goal intentions with implementation intentions. Results showed that controlling automatic processes of reinforcement learning is possible by means of goal intentions or implementation intentions that focus decision makers on the analysis of decision feedback. Importantly, such beneficial effects were not achieved by simply instructing participants to analyze the feedback, without defining a goal as the desired end state from a first‐person perspective. Regarding intentions supposed to shut down reinforcement processes by controlling negative affect, effects were more complex and depended on the specified goal‐directed behavior. The goal intention to suppress the disappointment elicited by negative feedback was not effective in controlling reinforcement processes. Furnishing this goal with an implementation intention even backfired and strengthened unwanted reinforcement processes. In contrast, asking participants to keep cool in response to negative decision outcomes through the use of goal intentions or implementation intentions increased decisions in line with Bayes' rule. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accountability Systems and Group Norms: Balancing the Risks of Mindless Conformity and Reckless Deviation

In dynamic task environments, decision makers are vulnerable to two types of errors: sticking too closely to the rules (excessive conformity) or straying too far from them (excessive deviation). We explore the effects of process and outcome accountability on the susceptibility to these errors. Using a multiple‐cue probability‐learning task, we show that process accountability encourages conformity errors and outcome accountability promotes deviation errors. Two additional studies explore the moderating effects of self‐focused and other‐focused group norms. Self‐focused norms reduce the effect of process accountability on excessive conformity. Other‐focused norms reduce the effect of outcome accountability on excessive deviation. Our results qualify prevailing claims about the benefits of process over outcome accountability and show that those benefits hinge on prevailing group norms, on the effectiveness of prescribed decision rules, and on the amount of irreducible uncertainty in the prediction task. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.