To Pass or Not to Pass: A Mathematical Model for Competitive Interactions in Rugby Union

ABSTRACT. Predicting behavior has been a main challenge in human movement science. An important step within the theory of coordination dynamics is to find out the rules that govern human behavior by defining order parameters and control parameters that support mathematical models to predict the behavior of a system. Models to describe human coordination have been focused on interlimb coordination and on interpersonal coordination in affiliative tasks but not on competitive tasks. This article aims to present a formal model with two attractors to describe the interactive behavior on a 2v1 system in rugby union. Interpersonal distance and relative velocity critical values were empirically identified and were included as task constraints that define the attractor landscape. It is shown that using relative velocity as a control parameter the model offers reasonable prediction concerning the decision-making process. The model has the plasticity to adapt to other settings where interpersonal distances and relative velocities amongst system components act as significant task constraints.     

Gender Roles,Suicide Attempts,and Substance Abuse

In this article, the focus is on a comparison of suicide attempts and substance abuse in the United States. It is argued that suicide attempts and substance abuse may function as psychologically equivalent but gender-specialized forms of self-injurious behaviors. Possible explanations for the gender segregation of suicide attempts and substance abuse are reviewed, and the benefits of crossover theories and treatments are presented.     

Hedonic Intensity of Disappointment and Elation

This research is an investigation of the hedonic intensities of elation and disappointment following the outcomes of risky gambles using two principles: disappointment aversion and the principle of limited emotion processing. Disappointment aversion implies a stronger impact of disappointment compared with elation; the principle of limited emotion processing predicts a smaller impact of elation if it occurs with a real gain, and a smaller impact of disappointment if it occurs with a real loss. Both principles support each other in the gain domain but operate against each other in the loss domain. It was predicted that disappointment would outweigh elation in the gain domain. For the loss domain, this question was left open to empirical scrutiny. Participants were provided with hypothetical gambles and were required to imagine having won, not won, lost, or not lost, money. Results supported the prediction for the gain domain; mixed results emerged for the loss domain. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes following the outcomes of risky events.     

Threats to Democratic Rationality

This article examines trends that are impacting democratic rationality. It is found that the trends are almost uniformly negative. Viewed from within the legislative branch, trends are negatively impacting legislators’ time, complexifying problems, constraining options, and limiting the evaluation of options. Trends external to the legislative branch are reducing citizen participation and knowledge about public affairs, skewing the balance of power among the branches and states, and decreasing accountability of public officials. In combination, democratic rationality, the process of making good, efficient, and timely decisions to promote higher quality of life and the public good, is seriously threatened. Recommendations include public financing of campaigns, more structured legislative decision-making processes, simplification tests for all new legislation and regulations, and a major new initiative to foster public involvement in public decision making.     

Separating the confident from the correct: Leveraging member knowledge in groups to improve decision making and performance

Groups often struggle to distinguish expert members from others who stand out for various reasons but may not be particularly knowledgeable (Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). We examined an intervention designed to improve group decision making and performance through instructing group members to search for information they already possessed that was relevant to a problem. Participants estimated values and expressed their confidence in their estimates individually and then a second time either individually or in a group. This was done with or without the intervention. Results indicated that: (1) groups were more confident than, and out-performed, individuals, (2) group decision making was best captured by models predicting more influence for more accurate members when the intervention was used and more influence for more confident members in its absence, and (3) groups that received the intervention out-performed groups that did not.     

The Consequences and Correction of Inflation in Personal Savings Estimates in Specific Future Time Frames

We examined the consequences of personal savings estimate inflation that occurs when decision makers provide savings estimates for specific future months when compared with the next month or the next year time frames, along with a method to attenuate this bias. The results of three experiments showed that the savings estimate inflation leads to significantly larger estimates of desired nest egg size (Experiment 1) and preference for riskier choices in other financial domains such as investment and employment decisions (Experiment 2). An attempt to attenuate this bias revealed that it is corrected when individuals provide a budgeting estimate prior to giving a savings estimate (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.