Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

大学生网络成瘾：背景性渴求与同伴网络过度使用行为及态度的交互作用

基于整体-交互作用模型,选取北京市某高校所有大一学生2511名为被试开展问卷调查,考察了大学生网络使用背景性渴求的特点及其与网络成瘾之间的关系,并就网络使用背景性渴求与同伴网络过度使用行为与态度对网络成瘾的交互作用进行了检验。结果发现:(1)与非网络成瘾大学生相比,网络成瘾大学生的网络使用背景性渴求更高,所感知到的同伴网络过度使用行为更多,同伴对网络过度使用的态度更积极;(2)网络使用背景性渴求各维度、感知到的同伴网络过度使用行为可正向预测大学生的网络成瘾;(3)背景性渴求中的积极结果预期与同伴对网络过度使用的态度对网络成瘾存在显著的交互效应:在低积极结果预期条件下,同伴对网络过度使用的态度可以负向预测网络成瘾程度,而在高积极结果预期条件下,同伴态度对网络成瘾的预测作用不显著。结论:外因在内因比较微弱的条件下发挥更为明显的作用。     

矛盾态度心理机制的理论模型述评

矛盾态度已发展为态度研究领域一个重要方面,在理论和实证研究都取得重要进展,但是对矛盾态度心理机制的探究还处于滞后的态势。本研究试图对矛盾态度心理机制研究做一个较系统的梳理,引入对象与评价的联结模型、态度元认知模型、重复加工模型和表征分布式联结主义模型等四种态度理论模型有关解析,并结合相关实证研究予以阐述和评价。未来该领域的研究应加强矛盾态度研究的元分析、各研究之间的沟通和整合、实证研究范畴的拓展、新技术的引入等问题的研究。     

The influence of number line estimation precision and numeracy on risky financial decision making

This study examined whether different aspects of mathematical proficiency influence one's ability to make adaptive financial decisions. “Numeracy” refers to the ability to process numerical and probabilistic information and is commonly reported as an important factor which contributes to financial decision‐making ability. The precision of mental number representation (MNR), measured with the number line estimation (NLE) task has been reported to be another critical factor. This study aimed to examine the contribution of these mathematical proficiencies while controlling for the influence of fluid intelligence, math anxiety and personality factors. In our decision‐making task, participants chose between two options offering probabilistic monetary gain or loss. Sensitivity to expected value was measured as an index for the ability to discriminate between optimal versus suboptimal options. Partial correlation and hierarchical regression analyses revealed that NLE precision better explained EV sensitivity compared to numeracy, after controlling for all covariates. These results suggest that individuals with more precise MNR are capable of making more rational financial decisions. We also propose that the measurement of “numeracy,” which is commonly used interchangeably with general mathematical proficiency, should include more diverse aspects of mathematical cognition including basic understanding of number magnitude.     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Afraid of one afraid of all: When threat associations spread across face-types

Fear can be acquired for objects not inherently associated with threat (e.g. birds), and this threat may generalize from prototypical to peripheral category members (e.g. crows vs. penguins). When categorizing people, pervasive stereotypes link Black men to assumed violence and criminality. Faces with Afrocentric features (prototypical) are more often associated with threat and criminality than non-Afrocentric (peripheral) faces regardless of whether the individual is Black or White. In this study, using a priming paradigm, threat associations related to negative racial stereotypes were tested as a vehicle for spreading fear across face-type categories. Results showed more negative than positive judgments for White face targets but only when the prime was primarily non-Afrocentric (i.e. Eurocentric). Black face targets were judged more negatively than positively regardless of prime. This suggests some cognitive processes related to threat generalizations of objects extend to complex social categories.     

Similarity,multiple estimations,and the anchoring effect

This paper compares the Selective Accessibility and Scale Distortion theories of anchoring as explanations for anchoring tasks involving (1) perceived dissimilarity between comparison and estimation objects and (2) successive estimation tasks. We begin by describing the two theories of anchoring and what each would predict for these conditions. Two studies are presented in which multiple estimates are made following a single comparison task and the effect sizes of these estimates are correlated to operationalizations of similarity. In the first study, the stimuli varied with respect to how well they fit within an existing category reasonably familiar to the participant population: aircraft. In the second study, the stimuli varied with respect to external features that did not define the category: the brand and location of hotels. In both studies, we find that the anchoring effect size has a positive correlation with the semantic similarity between the comparison and estimation objects, a finding consistent with Selective Accessibility.     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.     

Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.