From mimesis to agency: Clinical steps in the work of psychic two‐ness1

In this paper, through the study of the clinical process of a girl starting treatment at the age of 3 years 10 months, who was thought of as a dummy by her family and who came for consultation when the assumed genetic aetiology was questioned, the authors build upon Tustin's contributions on the context of togetherness and the crisis of two‐ness, and upon Eugenio and Renata Gaddini's on the precursor object. The mimetic phenomena enacted with an older brother and at the kindergarten are found to result from cumulative trauma at her contacting a loving but mind–blind mother. After an initial stage of transference autism, enactment in the session of the traumatic situation was the first step in surmounting her autistic pseudo–stupidity. Mimetic transference dynamics took place principally at the level of the gaze, leading to the unfolding of the work of two–ness to a differentiation from the analyst as psychic breast, on the road to symbol formation and personal agency.     

Two Forms of the Straw Man

The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.     

态度测量的新进展:二值概率展开模型及一般形式

态度测量主要应用两种模型:累进型与展开型。目前国内的相关研究主要针对累进型模型。文章在回顾累进型模型的基础上,介绍了当前国际研究最为前沿的一种新的态度测量模型———二值概率展开模型,并详细阐述了该模型的一般数学表达式。     

A Pragma-dialectical Procedure for a Critical Discussion

According to the pragma-dialectical ideal of reasonableness, in case of a difference of opinion the protagonist and the antagonist of a standpoint should attempt to find out by means of a critical discussion whether the protagonist's standpoint is capable of withstanding the antagonist's criticism. In this paper, the authors formulate the latest version of their basic rules for the performance of speech acts in the various stages that can beanalytically distinguished in a critical discussion that can lead to the resolution of a single and non-mixed difference opinion.     

Complex Argumentation in a Critical Discussion

In this paper, it is explained that a dialogical approach to complex argumentation can be fruitful for solving two important problems concerning the analysis of the argumentation structure. First, such an approach makes it possible to clarify the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation structures, and to identify clues in the presentation for each of these structures. Second, a dialogical approach can provide a basis for dealing more adequately with refutations of counterarguments.     

On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.     

Certainty,reasonableness and argumentation in law

This paper defends a position that parts ways with the positivist view of legal certainty and reasonableness. I start out with a reconstruction of this view and move on to argue that an adequate analysis of certainty and reasonableness calls for an alternative approach, one based on the acknowledgement that argumentation is key to determining the contents, structure, and boundaries of a legal system. Here I claim that by endorsing a dialectical notion of rationality this alternative account espouses an ambitious approach to reasoning in law and conceives of the theory of legal argumentation as the vantage point from which to analyze legal systems and tackle the main problems connected with their existence. Next, I look at what this alternative approach does for the way we should go about treating certainty and reasonableness, considered singularly as well as in their reciprocal relationship. I conclude on this basis that when argumentation receives its due emphasis in law we have to redefine certainty and reasonableness and recast their connection as non-conflictive.     

Argumentation Schemes in Persuasive Brochures

Many public information documents attempt to persuade the recipients that they should engage in or refrain from specific behaviour. This is based on the assumption that the recipient will decide about his or her behaviour on the basis of the information given and a rational evaluation of the pros and cons. An analysis of 20 public information brochures shows that the argumentation in persuasive brochures is often not marked as such. Argumentation is presented as factual information, and in many instances the task of making argumentational links and drawing conclusions is left to the reader. However, since the information offered does follow familiar argumentational schemes, readers can, in principle, reconstruct the argument. All the brochures make use of pragmatic argumentation (argumentation from consequences),i. e.,they formulate at least certain benefits of the desirable behaviour or disadvantages of the undesirable behaviour. In addition, they make regular use of argumentation from cause to effect and argumentation from example. Argumentation from rules and argumentation from authority are less frequently used. This empirical analysis of the use of argumentation schemes is a solid base for interesting and rich hypotheses about the cognitive processing of persuasive brochures. Central processing requires the reader to be able to reconstruct argumentation from informational texts and to identify and evaluate various types of argumentation.     

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE DEBATES ON MELANIE KLEIN AND JACQUES LACAN IN THE RÍO DE LA PLATA

Controversies are part of the process of scientific knowing. In psychoanalysis, the diversity of theoretical, technical and epistemological positions makes the debate particularly necessary and by the same token difficult. In this paper, the author examines the function of controversies and the obstacles to their development, taking as examples the debates held in the Rao de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) during the nineteen seventies, when the dominant Kleinian ideas came into contact with Lacanian thought. The author examines different examples of argumentative discourses, using concepts taken from the theory of argumentation. The major difficulties encountered did not hinge on characteristics pertaining to psychoanalytic theories (i.e. the lack of commensurability between them), but on the defensive strategies aimed at keeping each theory's premises safe from the opposing party's arguments. A true debate implies the construction of a shared argumentative field that makes it possible to lay out the different positions and see some interaction between them and is guided by the search for the best argument. When this occurs, controversies promote the discipline's development, even when they fail to reach any consensus.     

Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation

Leading contemporary argumentation theories such as those of Ralph Johnson, van Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale, in their attempt to address rhetoric, tend to define rhetorical argumentation with reference to (a) the rhetorical arguer’s goal (to persuade effectively), and (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant view, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the domain of issues discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this domain is considered crucial. Hence, argumentation theories such as those discussed, insofar as they do not see rhetoric as defined by its distinctive domain, apply an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. It is further suggested that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important distinctive features of argumentation about action.