Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification

There are distinct but legitimate notions of both personal justification and interpersonal justification. Interpersonal justification is definable in terms of personal justification. A connection is established between good argumentation and interpersonal justification.     

Chaïm Perelman: Justice,argumentation and ancient rhetoric

Theoretical interest in Perelman's thought is linked, for the main part, to the place he accords to the notion of argumentation, defined in his work in reference to the Greek philosophy, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, in contrast to the assertions of the sophists and rhetors. He separates the notion of demonstration and that of argumentation and supports his position on an analysis of the debates which were common in the sophistic and rhetoric period.It is in different ways that the notion of argumentation comes into the work of Perelman. By taking up again the analysis of justice with the aim of removing the various strata of meaning which had accumulated on it as a result of the reductions of Plato and the dialectical analyses of Aristotle, Perelman showed that the theory of argumentation transcends the domain of right in which it is rooted and ought not be abandoned to lawyers only. Thus, he follows a train of thought to which he accords a certain nobilty in the name of the new rhetoric. This manner of considering the relationship of the moderns to the Greeks leads him to set up the notion of argumentation in his own texts, where it demonstrates a logical retreat which enables him to work back from Aristotle to Plato and from him to the rhetors and sophists, whose discourse is defined on the level of the self-referential.The exemplary character of Perelman's work is on account of this rehabilitation of argumentation in the old rhetoric which will be examined here.A slightly different version of this essay was presented at the Third Intenational Philosophy Symposium on Justice, Athens, 22–27 May 1987.     

Hoisted by their own petards: Philosophical positions that self-destruct

Philosophers have not resisted temptation to transgress against the logic of their own conceptual structures. Self-undermining position-taking is an occupational hazard. Philosophy stands in need of conceptual therapy.The author describes three conceptions of philosophy: the narcissistic, disputatious, and therapeutic. (i) Narcissistic philosophy is hermetic, believing itself to contain all evidence that can possibly be relevant to it. Philosophy undertaken in this spirit has led to defensive, monadically isolated positions. (ii) Disputatious philosophies are fundamentally question-begging, animated by assumptions that philosophical adversaries reject. (iii) The intention of therapeutic philosophy is to study philosophical positions from the standpoint of their internal consistency, or lack of it. In particular, its interest is in positions that either compel assent, because they cannot be rejected without self-referential inconsistency, or self-destruct because self-referential inconsistency cannot be avoided. The article's focus is on the latter. Several examples of self-undermining positions are drawn from the history of philosophy, exemplifying two main varieties of self-referential inconsistency: pragmatical and projective.     

The disputation — a special type of cooperative argumentative dialogue

This article consists of three parts, two introductory, in which the limits and the methods of analysis of dialogues are expounded, and the major part, in which the main features of a philosophical theory of disputation are outlined.

An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

母亲消极教养、同伴侵害与FKBP5基因对青少年抑郁的影响

累积压力假说与匹配-不匹配假说均可解释远端和近端逆境对个体抑郁的影响,但鲜有研究考察遗传基因在其中的调节作用。采用问卷法和DNA分型技术,对970名青少年进行间隔3年的追踪调查。分别以母亲消极教养、同伴侵害为远端和近端压力指标, FKBP5基因多位点累加得分为遗传指标,考察三者对青少年抑郁的交互作用及性别差异。结果发现,在男青少年中, E×E×G显著。当累加得分较高、同伴侵害水平较高时,母亲消极教养显著负向预测抑郁,符合匹配-不匹配假说;累加得分较低时, E×E不显著,但倾向于以累积压力假说的方式发挥作用。女青少年中, E×E×G不显著。研究结果提示,在男青少年中,累积压力假说与匹配-不匹配假说均可阐明抑郁的发生机制,分别适用于携带不同FKBP5基因多位点累加得分的个体。     

Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.     

Preference,resistance to change,and the cumulative decision model

According to behavioral momentum theory (Nevin & Grace, 2000a), preference in concurrent chains and resistance to change in multiple schedules are independent measures of a common construct representing reinforcement history. Here I review the original studies on preference and resistance to change in which reinforcement variables were manipulated parametrically, conducted by Nevin, Grace and colleagues between 1997 and 2002, as well as more recent research. The cumulative decision model proposed by Grace and colleagues for concurrent chains is shown to provide a good account of both preference and resistance to change, and is able to predict the increased sensitivity to reinforcer rate and magnitude observed with constant‐duration components. Residuals from fits of the cumulative decision model to preference and resistance to change data were positively correlated, supporting the prediction of behavioral momentum theory. Although some questions remain, the learning process assumed by the cumulative decision model, in which outcomes are compared against a criterion that represents the average outcome value in the current context, may provide a plausible model for the acquisition of differential resistance to change.     

The influence of thinking dispositions on integration and recall of multiple texts

We investigated the association between thinking dispositions and two outcomes of multiple-texts comprehension: integration of conflicting information in argumentative essays; and recall of inferential information as an index of deep comprehension. We focused on two thinking dispositions, need for cognition (NFC) and actively open-minded thinking (AOT), as relevant individual differences in the processes involved in multiple-texts comprehension. NFC is the tendency to engage in and enjoy cognitively demanding activities, whereas AOT is the tendency to rationally evaluate arguments and supporting evidence, without being influenced by biases from one's own prior beliefs and prior knowledge. 73 university students completed perceived topic knowledge, perceived exposure to argumentative writing, and perceived competence in argumentative writing, NFC and AOT questionnaires, read two contradictory texts, wrote an argumentative essay, and recalled the information read 1 month later. Argumentative essays were assessed by length and level of integration of conflicting perspective. Text recalls were assessed by number of valid inferences included. Research questions were investigated through a path analysis model. The path analysis model had a good fit. NFC was indirectly associated with argumentation quality of the essay via the essay length. AOT was directly associated with the inferences included in the recall task. The present study contributes to the literature on multiple-texts comprehension by emphasizing the role of thinking dispositions.