Is Established Knowledge About Cross-Cultural Differences in Individualism–Collectivism Not Applicable to the Military? A Multi-Method Study of Cross-Cultural Differences in Behavior

Preparing for international military collaboration includes raising knowledge about cultural differences. The differences in individualism–collectivism between countries are among the most central aspects likely to impact collaboration. However, are the differences in individualism–collectivism between countries as documented in a significant amount of civilian research (e.g., Hofstede, 2001a Hofstede, G. (2001a). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [Google Scholar]) generalizable to a military context? Or are the differences not the same in a military context, as suggested by Soeters (1997) Soeters, J. L. (1997). Value orientations in military academies: A thirteen country study. Armed Forces and Society, 24, 7–32. 10.1177/0095327X9702400101[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] on the bases of a values survey? Quasi-experiments were conducted in a distributed collaborative computer game environment. The study is multimethod, employing self-reporting, observer ratings and direct behavioral measures, and it is the first study of cross-cultural differences in individualism–collectivism in behavior in a military context. By studying differences in collectivist-type behaviors in a sample of military officers (N = 154) in 4 different countries (the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway), this study seeks to determine whether the cross-cultural differences in values found by Soeters from a military context are reflected in behavior. The study also includes a values survey using Hofstede’s (2007) Hofstede, G. (2007). Values survey module 1994 (VSM-94). Retrieved from www.geerthofstede.com [Google Scholar] measurement tool, the Values Survey Module (VSM), consistent with Soeters’ study. The study is considered exploratory because of a somewhat limited sample. The results from the 6 different measures of collectivist behaviors provide no support for the suggestion that cross-cultural differences in individualism–collectivism are not the same in military organizations as in civilian organizations. Although not conclusive, the results raise doubt concerning the appropriateness of using the VSM in military samples. The implications are discussed.     

What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?

Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find those reasons compelling. The article then briefly looks at some implications of this conclusion.     

Happiness: unlocking the mysteries of psychological wealth,by Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener

No research to date has supported the ‘social contagion’ effect of laughter and smiles in a non-Western context, nor among children. Expressions of positive affect were here compared according to social and non-social conditions among 163 children between the ages of 5–12 while playing in a park in Afghanistan. Independent observers coded laugh and smile responses using published criteria and identified 147 laugh responses and 697 smile responses. Children in the social play condition demonstrated significantly more laughs than children in the non-social play condition, and the number of peer observers present in the social play condition significantly increased the number of participant smile responses, but not laugh responses. Findings supported the idea in Western research that laughter and smiles may function in moderating social relationships and communicating affect. The authors recommend future research to investigate the relationship between positive affect and well-being across cultures, with consideration for practical interventions.     

A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Social Phobia Symptoms

This study examined two forms of social anxiety or phobia, social phobia as defined by DSM-IV and Taijin Kyofusho (TKS, a Japanese form of social anxiety), in relation to their respective culturally prescribed self-construals as independent and interdependent. Japanese university students (N = 124) and U.S. university students (N = 123) were administered the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, the Social Phobia Scale, the TKS Scale, and the Self-Construal Scale. From the results of a hierarchical regression analysis, TKS symptoms are more likely to be expressed by individuals who are Japanese and individuals who construe themselves low on independence but high on interdependence. In addition, social phobia symptoms are more likely to be expressed by individuals who construe themselves low on independence but high on interdependence irrespective of culture. Implications for therapists from each culture who have clients who present social anxiety or phobia symptoms are discussed.     

Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach to Argumentation

This paper describes the development of pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentative discourse. First the development of the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is explained, with the rules that are to be complied with in order to avoid fallacies from occurring. Then the integration is discussed of rhetorical insight in the dialectical framework. In this endeavour, the concept of strategic manoeuvring is explained that allows for a more refined and more profoundly justified analysis of argumentative discourse and a better identification of fallacies. The paper ends with a brief overview of current research projects.     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.