Attributions for spousal behavior in relation to criticism and perceived criticism

This study examined relations between spousal attributions and criticism in a sample of 118 married couples. Spouses rated general perceived criticism (PC) and their own expressed criticism as well as interaction-specific PC from a videotaped discussion. Independent judges also coded criticism from the discussion. Spouses’ self-reported causal and responsibility attributions for hypothetical spousal negative behavior were related to all types of criticism. Attributions were also associated with unique variance in spouses’ reports of general PC and criticism, even after controlling either for judges’ or partners’ ratings of criticism and marital adjustment. General PC and expressed criticism appear to reflect more than either the amount of criticism present or feelings about the marriage; rather, general PC and expressed criticism are uniquely associated with the cause and responsibility ascribed to partners’ behavior.     

A critical engagement with the DSM-5 and psychiatric diagnosis

Classifications in psychiatry can result in the reification of hypothetical approaches, arbitrary categorisation and social injustice. This article applies a social constructivist approach to critique the DSM-5 as a neurobiological model of psychiatric diagnosis which ignores psychosocial factors such as poverty, unemployment and trauma as causes of mental distress. It challenges the universality of psychiatric diagnosis and proposes that cultural psychiatry's framing of ‘culture-bound syndromes,’ or ‘cultural case formulation’ guidelines, is oversimplified. Use of the DSM in the South African context risks perpetuating injustice by labelling and stigmatising people who have in the past been racially stigmatised by apartheid. In culturally diverse South Africa, psychiatric diagnosis should take into account alternative explanatory models that provide a more balanced view of the complex and dynamic relationship between biological and sociocultural forces in the manifestation of psychopathology.     

Community Psychology Is (Thank God) More Than Science

Thinking about Community Psychology primarily as a science may make it harder, rather than easier, to embrace certain aspects of the field to which we are deeply committed, but usually fall outside the conventional meaning of doing science. While community psychologists use (and expand) the tools of science, this is different than saying that Community Psychology is only, or even primarily, a science. The field is just as much social criticism as it is science. In order to further conversation about these matters, seven thoughts about why (thank God) community psychology is more than a science are offered, the most basic of which is that today the greatest danger to freedom is not in the union of church and state, but in the union of science and state.Based on a paper presented at a Symposium, A. Wandersman (Chair), Science and Community Psychology, Held at the 9th Biennial Meeting of the Society for Community Research and Action, June, 2003, Las Vegas, New Mexico.     

An Appreciation of Hal Childs' Critique of Historical Jesus Research

Biblical scholars have been exceedingly slow to grasp the implications of the Heisenberg principle, namely, that the observer is always a part of the field being observed, and disturbs that field by the very act of observation. In terms of the interpretive task, this means that there can be no question of an objective view of Jesus as he really was. Objective view; is itself an oxymoron; every view is subjective, from a particular angle of vision. We always encounter the biblical text with interests. We always have a stake in our reading of it. We always have angles of vision that can be helpful or harmful in interpreting texts. Historical writing does not treat reality; it treats the interpreter's relation to it, according to Brian Stock. All history, said the poet Wallace Stevens, is modern history. And historical criticism is a form of criticism of the present, according to Walter Kasper. All that is true, but only partially. For historical criticism can still help us recover an understanding of that past that holds out to us present meaning.     

Six types of fallaciousness: Toward a realistic theory of logical criticism

I begin by formulating the problem of the nature of fallacy in terms of the logic of the negative evaluation of argument, that is, in terms of a theory of logical criticism; here I discuss several features of my approach and several advantages vis-à-vis other approaches; a main feature of my approach is the concern to avoid both formalist and empiricist excesses. I then define six types of fallaciousness, labeled formal, explanatory, presuppositional, positive, semantical, and persuasive; they all involve arguments whose conclusion may be said not to follow from the premises, that is, they involve the logical evaluation of relationships among propositions. I also provide a set of data consisting of four historical cases or nine specific instances of fallacious arguments; these all pertain to the Copernican controversy about the earth's motion in the seventeenth century. I end with a discussion of further problems and inquiries that deserve attention.     

On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism

Two studies explored a theoretical distinction between "blind" and "constructive" patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism. Constructive patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change. Items designed to investigate these dimensions of national attachment were administered to two groups of undergraduates in separate surveys. Measures of the two constructs derived from factor analysis of the responses proved to be reliable and valid. Blind patriotism was positively associated with political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, perceived importance of symbolic behaviors, and selective exposure to pro-U.S. information. In contrast, constructive patriotism was positively associated with multiple indicators of political involvement, including political efficacy, interest, knowledge, and behavior. The implications of this distinction for theory and research on patriotism are discussed.     

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE,RELIGION, AND THE RISE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM

This is an introduction to the Symposium on “Science, Religion, and the Rise of Biblical Criticism,” which has been designed as a thematic section for Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. The Symposium demonstrates the importance of and need for greater interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers, theologians, scholars of religion, and historians in tracing the origins and development of the “conflict thesis” between science and religion. Often neglected is the role biblical criticism played in guiding and constructing narratives of conflict. This series of articles thus attempts to redress this gap in the scholarship by explicitly focusing on the advent of historical‐critical scholarship of the Bible and how it changed perceptions about “science” and “religion.”     

FROM DIVINE ORACLES TO THE HIGHER CRITICISM: ANDREW D. WHITE AND THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM

Historians of science and religion have given little attention to how historical‐critical scholarship influenced perceptions of the relationship between science and religion in the nineteenth century. However, the so‐called “cofounders” of the “conflict thesis,” the idea that science and religion are fundamentally and irrevocable at odds, were greatly affected by this literature. Indeed, in his two‐volume magnum opus, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896), Andrew D. White, in his longest and final chapter of his masterpiece, traced the development of the “scientific interpretation” of the Bible. In this article, I argue that developments in biblical criticism had a direct impact on how White constructed his historical understanding of the relationship between science and religion. By examining more carefully how biblical criticism played a significant role in the thought of White and other alleged cofounders of the conflict thesis, this article hopes to relocate the origins, development, and meaning of the science–religion debate at the end of the nineteenth century.