Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: is a comparative psychology of social learning possible?

Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the "phylogenetic", "animal model", and "adaptational". We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these - survey reviews of published studies - we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single "gold standard" task.     

"达尔文模块"与认知的"瑞士军刀"模型

本文在描述“达尔文模块”的基本特征以及进化心理学家对这种模块的理论辩护的基础上,论证了所谓达尔文模块并不是真实的心理模块;由达尔文模块所构造的认知的“瑞士军力”模型也不具有现实的合理性。     

Chances and frequencies in probabilistic reasoning: rejoinder to Hoffrage,Gigerenzer, Krauss,and Martignon

Do individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type of data in order to draw correct inferences about uncertain events? Girotto and Gonzalez (Cognition 78 (2001) 247) showed that naive individuals solve frequency as well as probability problems, when they reason extensionally, in particular when probabilities are represented by numbers of chances. Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon (Cognition 84 (2002) 343) argued that numbers of chances are natural frequencies disguised as probabilities, though lacking the properties of true probabilities. They concluded that we failed to demonstrate that naive individuals can deal with true probabilities as opposed to natural frequencies. In this paper, we demonstrate that numbers of chances do represent probabilities, and that naive individuals do not confuse numbers of chances with frequencies. We conclude that there is no evidence for the claim that natural frequencies have a special cognitive status, and the evolutionary argument that the human mind is unable to deal with probabilities.     

Seeing by Feeling: Virtues,Skills, and Moral Perception

Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.     

The shape of things to come: Psychoneural reduction and the future of psychology

I contrast Bickle's new wave reductionismwith other relevant views about explanation across intertheoretic contexts. I then assess Bickle's empirical argument for psychoneural reduction. Bickle shows that psychology is not autonomous from neuroscience, and concludes that at least some versions of nonreductive physicalism are false. I argue this is not sufficient to establish his further claim that psychology reduces to neuroscience. Examination of Bickle's explanations reveals that they do not meet his own reductive standard. Furthermore, there are good empirical reasons to doubt that the cognitive approach to mind should be abandoned. I suggest that the near future will not see a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, so much as a replacement of both sciences by an improved form of neuropsychology.     

发掘情感策略的实验研究

将对内含隐性情感因素的教材内容实施情感性处理的一种策略——发掘情感策略运用于语文教学,进行现场的教学实验研究。研究结果表明：在内含隐性情感因素的文科教材内容中,可以运用发掘情感策略来对其进行情感性处理;这对促进学生的认知学习和情感发展、提高课堂教学质量是有效的。     

The Martin Buber-Carl Jung disputations: protecting the sacred in the battle for the boundaries of analytical psychology

The Martin Buber-C.G.Jung disputations rather than the Freud-Jung split or Samuels's post-Jungian categories is considered the more significant paradigm for understanding the conflicts erupting within the Jungian community surrounding clinical practice and candidate training. Looking through the lens of the Freud-Jung split keeps the conflicts focused on the theoretical and technical differences concerning such concepts as object-relations, transference-countertransference, neutrality, clinical boundaries. The Buber-Jung disputations move the discussion into a different and more foundational arena, namely the vertical and horizontal psychological considerations of the experience of the Sacred and how that dimension is supported or thwarted in clinical practice and candidate training by the respective allegiances of the 'warriors' in the 'Holy Wars'. Experiencing the texture of the Buber-Jung disputations as well as grappling with their content suggests that a more dialogical approach to actual clinical material may be a more fruitful way to understand the work of analysis and the business of candidate training.     

从心理学角度再析理学中的理欲辨

理可总称人合乎礼的诸种需要;从表现形态上看,欲是比情更为激烈的心理活动：欲具有促使人行动、情产生和“生百善”等方面的功能,人欲则具有“诱人为不善”、“害吾心”、使情变坏和损害身心健康等作用。理学中的理欲之辨也可看作是关于合理需要与不合理需要的内涵、相互关系及对待二者的态度之争。     

"Oh Those Crazy Cards Again": A History of the Debate on the Nazi Rorschachs, 1946–2001

This essay provides a critical history of the debate on the Rorschach Inkblot Tests administered to 22 leading figures of the Third Reich who were imprisoned in Nuremberg in 1945–1946. This debate occurred in two stages. The question at the heart of the first stage was whether the Nazi leaders were sane or psychopaths. Despite a strong disagreement concerning the use of these diagnostic labels, there was a surprisingly broad agreement on the actual substance of the discrepant diagnoses. Divisions of opinion, however, arose from political dissension in two areas: the nature of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the possibility of trust in any political leadership. The second stage was marked by an ideology of convergence aimed at establishing a consensual "scientific truth" on the Nazi Rorschachs. Thus, the politics of the second phase were motivated by interests and ambitions internal to the field of Rorschach expertise, rather than by extraneous political anxieties.