Social Context and the Dynamics of Cooperative Choice

Recent work using decontextualized economic games suggests that cooperation is a dynamic decision‐making process: Automatic responses typically support cooperation on average, while deliberation leads to increased selfishness. Here, we performed two studies examining how these temporal effects generalize to games with richer social context cues. Study 1 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games played with in‐group members and out‐group members. Study 2 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games described as competitions and games described as collaborations. These results show that previous positive effects of time pressure on cooperation are not unique to neutrally framed games devoid of social context and are not driven by implicit assumptions of shared group membership or cooperative norms. In doing so, our findings provide further insight into the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Giving,Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving

Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation (Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4). Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

RAISING DARWIN'S CONSCIOUSNESS: FEMALES AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Abstract Early studies of primate social behavior were distorted by observational, methodological, and ideological biases that caused researchers to overlook active roles played by females in the social lives of monkeys. Primatology provides a particularly well documented case illustrating why research programs in the social and natural sciences need multiple studies that enlist researchers from diverse backgrounds     

Error Feedback Frequency Affects Automaticity But Not Accuracy and Consistency After Extensive Motor Skill Practice

Earlier studies addressed the effects of feedback frequency on movement accuracy and consistency. The authors additionally addressed the effects on motor automatization. High error feedback frequencies may induce attentional control processes and impede motor automatization. In a pre-post design, 42 participants were assigned to 2 groups with different feedback frequencies and practiced an arm movement sequence with 760 trials in 5 sessions. The 100% group practiced with feedback on 3 movement reversals of the sequence after each trial. The 14% group practiced with 14% frequency according to a fading schedule. Only the 14% group showed a decrease in dual-task costs indicating an increase in automaticity. Group differences in movement accuracy and consistency were not evident.     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.     

Susceptibility of spatial and verbal working memory to demands of the central executive

We used a dual-task paradigm to examine the degree to which domain-specific spatial and verbal subsystems depend on the domain-general central executive. Forty participants were asked to retain spatial or verbal information while performing a concurrent secondary task related to simple arithmetic. The secondary tasks consisted of three cognitive processes: single-digit addition, a digit-carrying operation, and digit reading. The single-digit addition and carry operation include central executive functioning, while digit reading relies solely on the phonological loop. The single-digit addition caused a performance decrement on the spatial working memory task, while the digit reading impaired performance on the verbal working memory task. The carry operation interfered with recall accuracy on both working memory tasks. The spatial working memory task was significantly correlated with the verbal working memory task only when the secondary task was more demanding on the central executive. Our results suggest that spatial working memory rather than verbal working memory is susceptible to failure of central executive functioning and that the central executive plays an important role in regulating the cognitive demands of different domains.