The choice of constraints in correspondence analysis

A discussion of alternative constraint systems has been lacking in the literature on correspondence analysis and related techniques. This paper reiterates earlier results that an explicit choice of constraints has to be made which can have important effects on the resulting scores. The paper also presents new results on dealing with missing data and probabilistic category assignment.I am most grateful to the following for their helpful comments. Arto Demirjian, Michael Greenacre, Michael Healy, Shizuhiko Nishisato, Roderick Mcdonald, and several anonymous referees.     

Forced classification: A simple application of a quantification method

This study formulates a property of a quantification method, the principle of equivalent partitioning (PEP). When the PEP is used together with Guttman's principle of internal consistency (PIC) in a simple way, the combination offers an interesting way of analyzing categorical data in terms of the variate(s) chosen by the investigator, a type of canonical analysis. The study discusses applications of the technique to multiple-choice, rank-order, and paired comparison data.This study was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Grant No. A7942). Comments on the earlier drafts from anonymous reviewers and the editor were much appreciated.     

SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE: PROCESSING DIFFERENT INFORMATION OR PROCESSING INFORMATION DIFFERENTLY?

This article introduces the concept of spiritual intelligence in terms of a natural human ability to take a different perspective on reality rather than an extraordinary ability to engage with a different/supernatural reality. From a cognitive perspective, spiritual intelligence entails a re-balancing of the two main modes of human cognition, with a prioritization of the holistic-intuitive mind over the conceptual one. From the psychological and phenomenological perspectives, it involves a different kind of engagement with information: slower, more participatory, less objectifying, and not focused entirely on problem solving. The article ends with a reflection on the theological implications of the proposed model and how such an account of spiritual intelligence as knowing differently might relate to theological anthropology and the theology of the spirit and the spiritual.     

Brief report: Complex postformal thought in skilled research administrators

Expert research administrators responded to questions to determine to what degree they had postformal thinking skills. Postformal theory suggests that the interpersonal and institutional complexity of work roles would make them likely to exhibit postformal thought. The tests included a questionnaire about the use of postformal operations on the job, and thinking-aloud taped interviews of responses to job-related and standard postformal problems. The respondents demonstrated the use of postformal thinking operations on job-related tests and a more moderate degree of use on the standard problems. The results support prior research and our working hypothesis that a high degree of interaction with people and complex problems is associated with adults' postformal thought.     

Can we learn from the clinically significant face processing deficits,prosopagnosia and capgras delusion?

This review describes two clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion, and provides new knowledge about the face recognition process by a convergence of empirical findings. These empirical findings are structured around two questions that are viewed from the perspectives of the two deficits. First is the question of hemispheric specificity, which inquires into the degree of each hemisphere's contribution to the face recognition process. Second is the question of dual neural pathways, which addresses the possibility that the face recognition process proceeds along two parallel pathways in the brain. Findings from the hemispheric specificity studies reinforce the current view that right hemisphere involvement is necessary for face recognition while left hemisphere involvement is minimal. Findings from the dual neural pathways studies reinforce the plausible but yet unproven hypothesis that two neural pathways pass information from the visual association cortex in the occipital lobe toward the temporal lobes and limbic system when faces are seen and recognized. These findings, which also indicate that each of the dual neural pathways carries different, nonredundant information, could be instrumental in showing that the pathways play different roles in the manifestations of the clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion.     

目标探测对记忆提取的影响

采用经典的"学习–再认"范式,在测验阶段设置了目标探测的干扰任务,通过比较目标探测和分心拒绝是否会对记忆提取产生不同的影响,以进一步探讨提取干扰与再认记忆之间的关系。结果发现,无论对目标进行显性(实验1)还是隐性(实验2)的探测反应,目标探测下旧词的再认反应均要比分心拒绝下更优,表明外显记忆的提取也会受到注意资源的调节。但更为重要的是,在辨别力指数(d′)及判断标准(C)上的差异分析发现,目标探测并没有提高被试的再认水平,而是降低了被试的判断标准,使得被试在目标探测条件下更容易对词做出"旧"反应。这种反应倾向与目标探测的动作反应方式无关,也不受词汇的编码加工水平深浅的调节。由此可见,外显记忆提取并非完全的"自动化加工",仍会受到注意资源的调节。     

样例的子目标编码对新问题解决中原理通达的作用

通过 3个实验 ,分别研究了样例的不同编码对消除由于表面概貌和表面对应变化对原理通达带来的消极影响的作用以及样例学习中原例概化的形成阶段。实验结果表明 :样例解题步骤的子目标编码有助于消除由于表面内容变化对原理通达带来的消极影响 ;子目标学习使学习者在样例学习阶段就形成了关于原理的概化。     

Social Context and the Dynamics of Cooperative Choice

Recent work using decontextualized economic games suggests that cooperation is a dynamic decision‐making process: Automatic responses typically support cooperation on average, while deliberation leads to increased selfishness. Here, we performed two studies examining how these temporal effects generalize to games with richer social context cues. Study 1 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games played with in‐group members and out‐group members. Study 2 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games described as competitions and games described as collaborations. These results show that previous positive effects of time pressure on cooperation are not unique to neutrally framed games devoid of social context and are not driven by implicit assumptions of shared group membership or cooperative norms. In doing so, our findings provide further insight into the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Giving,Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving

Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation (Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4). Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.