A multidimensional framework for financial–economic decisions

Most financial–economic decisions are made consciously, with a clear and constant drive to ‘good’, ‘better’ or even ‘optimal’ decisions. Nevertheless, many decisions in practice do not earn these qualifications, despite the availability of financial economic theory, decision sciences and ample resources. We plea for the development of a multidimensional framework to support financial economic decision processes. Our aim is to achieve a better integration of available theory and decision technologies. We sketch (a) what the framework should look like, (b) what elements of the framework already exist and which not, and (c) how the MCDA community can co‐operate in its development. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positive psychology,the classification of character strengths and virtues,and issues of measurement

ABSTRACT

This essay raises concerns about positive psychology’s classification of character strengths and virtues and issues of measurement. Part I examines the process whereby the classification was compiled. Part II turns to issues of measurement and questions about positive psychologists’ sensitivity to variations in the meanings of the constructs they purport to measure, both within and across cultures. I argue that attempts to find a ‘deep structure’ of the character strengths and virtues should proceed hand in hand with efforts to render positive psychology and its measurement tools more sensitive to variability in character strengths and virtues across and within cultures. The essay concludes with suggestions for future research.     

With crisis comes opportunity: Building ethical competencies in light of COVID-19

ABSTRACT

The emergence of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has wide-ranging implications for the field of professional psychology. As clinical practice has rapidly adapted to ensure continuity of care, doctoral students have encountered unique opportunities for ethics-related competency development across practicum training settings. This article discusses the relevant American Psychological Association (APA) Ethics Code standards and additional ethical considerations facing trainees as they navigate their foundational clinical experiences and develop as professional psychologists in light of a pandemic.     

Comment by Arvind Sharma

Comments on:
JRE Focus on The 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Journal of Religious Ethics 26.2 (Fall 1998)
"Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other Matters" by David Little, Journal of Religious Ethics 27.1 (Spring 1999)     

Refining our understanding of the VIA Classification: Reflections on papers by Han,Miller, and Snow

ABSTRACT

Han, Miller, and Snow have written three thoughtful critiques of the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues. In this response, I emphasize five points. First, I suggest the concept of practical wisdom may be understood in terms of three VIA strengths: prudence, judgment, and perspective. Second, recognizing that the VIA Classification is a structural model of individual traits, rather than a moral theory, can address some concerns about the model, including its failure to account for the unity of the virtues. Third, I review a three-virtue model that has emerged in recent research on the VIA strengths may provide essential elements for a taxonomy of virtue. Fourth, I raise several issues associated with the application of the VIA Classification to moral education. Finally, though the model demonstrates substantial generalizabilty across Westernized populations, research in traditional indigenous cultures remains insufficient. I conclude with a series of questions for future research.     

Covenants and Commands

Robert Adams’s account of divine command theory argues that moral obligations are idealized versions of everyday social requirements. One type of social requirement is the ordinary demand one person makes of one another. Its idealized version is the perfect command a perfect God makes of those he loves. This paper extends Adams’s account of moral obligation by considering another kind of social requirement: promises. It argues that we can understand a divine covenant as an idealized version of a promise. Promisers take on social requirements to promisees when they make promises. Analogously, God takes on obligations to humans when God makes covenants with them. Divine command theorists might fear that this makes God subject to moral rules not of his own choosing. This paper considers these fears and argues that they are unwarranted.     

Application of the APA ethics code for psychologists working in integrated care settings: Potential conflicts and resolutions

ABSTRACT

Increasingly, there is evidence of the potential benefits of an integrated care model. In fact, the American Psychological Association (APA) supports the role of psychologists in integrated healthcare given the positive outcomes for patients in primary care settings such as increased access to mental health services, reduced mental illness stigma, and improved health associated with recognizing the impact of psychosocial factors on physical wellbeing. Less attention has been paid, however, to ethical dilemmas that may arise for psychologists working in integrated healthcare. This paper explores considerations for resolving potential ethical conflicts that may arise for psychologists working in integrated care settings.     

The Innocuous Legacy of Christian Ethics in Comparative Religious Ethics

I argue that even if the influence of Christian ethics on comparative religious ethics (CRE) is inevitable, it need not be problematic. The legacy would only be worrisome if it stacked the deck in favor of Christian ethics or predisposed comparative ethicists to conform to the methods or thematic concerns of Christian ethics. Following Gadamer, I suggest that the ideal of presuppositionless objectivity is an illusion that applies to not only those who emerge from a Christian cultural context but in every global context. Given the specific historical and cultural contexts of the emergence of CRE, the residue of Christian ethics in CRE is understandable and expected. Thus, the legacy of Christian ethics in CRE will only be problematic to the extent that the potential dangers of Christian hegemony remain hidden, which does not seem to be the case in the contemporary academic context.     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.     

Slaves,Fetuses, and Animals

This essay is an exploration in ethical rhetoric, specifically, the ethics of comparing the status of fetuses and animals to enslaved Africans. On the view of those who make such comparisons, the fetus is treated as a slave through abortion, reproductive technologies, and stem cell research, while animals are enslaved through factory farming, experimentation, and as laborers, circus performers, and the like. I explore how the apotheosis of the fetus and the humanization of animals represent the flipside of the subjugation and animalization of black people. At their ethical best, those who compare aborted fetuses and abused animals with enslaved black people have laudable ethical goals. The anti‐abortion right and the animal rights left, respectively, wish to abolish abortion (and associated reproductive technologies that harm prenatal life) and the unethical treatment of animals. They seek, respectively, to reimagine the ethical‐political status of the fetus and to criticize the animalization of animals, the practice of constructing them as beasts. While sympathetic to these goals, I worry about the comparative diminution of the historical, literal enslavement of black people. To what extent, I ask, does the comparative ethical rhetoric of fetal slaves and animal slaves affect historical constructions of black people as beastly and disposable?