论宏观经济调控和管理中的若干伦理问题

宏观经济调控和管理中的伦理问题,是一个不可忽视的领域。中国是一个发展中国家,正处在从传统经济向现代市场经济转型,政府的宏观调控不可或缺;同时政府作为经济活动的主体,其行为也必须遵守适应市场经济运作的规则。     

关于伦理道德与智慧

伦理道德与智慧的关系是一个有着重要的理论和现实意义的课题。伦理、道德与智慧都有联系,但本身都不是智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧相通,但两者不是同一种意义上的智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧具有多方面的社会价值,提倡伦理智慧和道德智慧有助于当代中国的社会改革和全面进步,为此需要对中国传统伦理思想和道德价值进行批判性的反思。     

当代美国行政伦理的理论与实践

当代美国行政伦理的基本价值理念在个人价值上重视诚实和正义;在职业价值上重视专业和敬业;在组织价值上重视效率和规则;在合法价值上重视依法和守法;在公共利益价值上重视为公共利益服务。美国行政伦理规范经历了一个制定、修订和演进过程,并始终重视其管理和实践。美国行政伦理50年的建设经验,对我国社会主义行政伦理建设具有重要启示意义。     

由知识对伦理的辩护到伦理对知识的批判——论知识的伦理价值

古希腊哲学最早将美德与知识相联系,“真”的达到就是“善”的实现,人的合目的性是建立在其合规律性的基础上的,伦理学从此有了独立存在的根据。近代知识论提出“知识就是力量”,将获得知识与获得幸福视为同一,知识(理性)是建立伦理的绝对普遍的坚实基础,人的尊严和主体性成为伦理追求的最大价值。20世纪以来,由于科学知识的异化,“知识与人的幸福和命运问题”凸现在当代伦理学面前。为知识找寻一条“应然”的光明之路,不仅是伦理学的理论使命,也是人类自身的神圣使命。     

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.     

Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy

This article defends the view that an adequate response to some central epistemological problems requires us to find a role for emotions and other affective states in epistemic evaluation and also to invoke virtuous traits of character in order to explain how these affective evaluations are regulated. The argument is based on the need for some epistemic evaluations to possess a kind of immediacy, if we are not to face a worrying regress. The closing sections support the claim that epistemic evaluation depends upon appropriate character traits though a discussion of what is involved in being observant .     

Mars and Venus at Twilight: A Critical Investigation of Moralism, Age Effects, and Sex Differences

Analysts have long sought to understand whether women and men have different ethical orientations. Some researchers have argued that women and men consistently make fundamentally different ethical judgments, especially of corruption; others have found no such disparities. This study considered whether an individual's age may also play a role in determining his or her moral judgment. A statistical investigation of interactive effects between gender and age in a nationally representative data set from Japan shows that this interaction functions better as a predictor of moralism than do education or gender alone. Older individuals of both sexes were found to have similar strict moral perceptions; as women and men age, their ethical judgments converge.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.