Pierre de La Ramée et le déclin de la rhétorique

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient philosophers, above all Aristotle, though experience does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the new rhetoric, aims to fill the gap thus created.

     

The stages of acquisition in stimulus fading

Pigeons were exposed to a stimulus fading procedure in which control of responding was transferred from red and black stimuli to lines of different angular orientation. After superimposing one line on the red stimulus and the other line on the black stimulus, the intensity of the lines was gradually increased and that of the red stimulus was gradually reduced. Probes consisting of red and line stimuli presented separately were used during the course of fading to assess control exerted by each element of the compound. As the lines were faded in, they did not acquire control of responding. As red was faded out, control of responding was acquired first by the lower intensity red stimuli in combination with the line stimulus, and finally by the angular orientation of the lines. Probes also determined the point at which the line stimuli, presented alone, would maintain a high degree of stimulus control. The results demonstrated that new stimuli in fading acquire dimensional control of responding in two sequential stages. Acquisition of stimulus control in fading was explained in terms of attenuation of stimulus blocking.     

汉语复合词视觉识别的时间进程：基于同形语素的行为与ERP证据

基于同形语素抑制效应, 本研究探讨了汉语复合词视觉识别中的形音义激活进程。结果发现：(1) 同形异音、同形同音、相同条件相对于控制条件都产生了语素启动效应; (2) 在P2、晚期N400成分上, 同形同音条件与控制条件更为接近, 但与同形异音及相同条件差别显著; (3) 在早期N400成分上, 同形同音条件与相同条件更为接近, 但与同形异音条件差别显著。研究表明, 汉语复合词的视觉识别的早期阶段可能为基于词位的形态-正字法加工, 字形匹配与音位信息是首要影响因素, 但语义是否介入仍未可知; 而晚期阶段则可能为基于词条的形态-语义加工, 主要涉及语义竞争与选择。本研究结果支持了McClelland等学者提出的“平行分布加工模型”。     

Semantic Shifts in Argumentative Processes: A Step Beyond the ‘Fallacy of Equivocation’

In naturally occuring argumentation, words which play a crucial role in the argument often acquire different meanings on subsequent occasions of use. Traditionally, such semantic shifts have been dealt with by the fallacy of equivocation. In my paper, I would like to show that there is considerably more to semantic shifts during arguments than their potentially being fallacious. Based on an analysis of a debate on environmental policy, I will argue that shifts in meaning are produced by a principle I call local semantic elaboration. I will go on to show that semantic shifts in the meaning of a word, the position advocated by a party, and the questions that the parties raise during an argumentative process are neatly tailored to one another, but can be incommensurable to the opponent's views. Semantic shifts thus may have a dissociative impact on a critical discussion. By linking the structure of argumentation to its pragmatics, however, it may be revealed that there are two practices that account for a higher order of coherence of the debate. The first practice is a general preference for disagreeing with the opponent, the second practice is the interpretation of local speech acts in terms of an overall ideological stance that is attributed to the speaker. Because of these practices, parties do not criticize divergent semantic conceptions as disruptive, but they treat them as characteristic and sometimes even metonymic reflections of the parties' positions.     

Argumentation and Evidence

This essay explores the role of informal logicand its application in the context of currentdebates regarding evidence-based medicine. This aim is achieved through a discussion ofthe goals and objectives of evidence-basedmedicine and a review of the criticisms raisedagainst evidence-based medicine. Thecontributions to informal logic by StephenToulmin and Douglas Walton are explicated andtheir relevance for evidence-based medicine isdiscussed in relation to a common clinicalscenario: hypertension management. This essayconcludes with a discussion on the relationshipbetween clinical reasoning, rationality, andevidence. It is argued that informal logic hasthe virtue of bringing explicitness to the roleof evidence in clinical reasoning, and bringssensitivity to understanding the role ofdialogical context in the need for evidence inclinical decision making.     

Argumentation as Rule-Justified Claims: Elements of a Conceptual Framework for the Critical Analysis of Argument

The paper outlines a conceptual framework for the critical assessment of argumentation which differs in some of its core characteristics from conventional approaches: it is resolutely semantic rather than formal in its method; it centers on obligations rather than beliefs; and its analytical focus is on the contingent necessity of conclusions, rather than on their persuasiveness or formal validity. The paper briefly illustrates the applications of this conceptual framework by reanalyzing a couple of examples taken from the argumentation analysis literature.     

Distractor effect on the latent inhibition of conditioned flavor aversion in rats

Using a conditioned flavor aversion procedure with rats as subjects, the effect of the addition of a distractor stimulus on the magnitude of the latent inhibition effect was examined. Experiment 1 showed that latent inhibition to vinegar was attenuated by the addition of sucrose during preexposure. On the other hand, sucrose added during conditioning to vinegar did not attenuate latent inhibition. It was also found that the degree of latent inhibition to the vinegar-sucrose compound solution was less when vinegar alone was preexposed (i.e., when sucrose was added only during conditioning) than when the compound solution was preexposed (i.e., when sucrose was added both during preexposure and during conditioning). Experiment 2 gave similar results but with sucrose assigned as the target flavor and vinegar as the distractor. These findings are in full agreement with the generalization decrement account of latent inhibition.     

Robust Improvements on Reasoning Performance Following Discussion in Japan

Group discussion significantly improves performance on intellective problems. However, most experiments have been conducted in Western cultures. Cross‐cultural psychology suggests that members of Eastern cultures might be less likely to benefit from group discussion. One experiment in Japan suggested that this was not the case, but this experiment suffered from some limitations. To address these limitations, Japanese participants were asked to solve an intellective task four times: individually (pre‐test), in small discussion groups (test), individually again (transfer task, post‐test), and individually after a delay (delayed post‐test). The results revealed a robust improvement during group discussion. Groups in which at least one member had found the correct answer individually agreed on it during the discussion. Moreover, and in contrast with results obtained in Western cultures, most groups with no such member also found the correct answer. The gains obtained during discussion were maintained in the transfer tasks. This result provides further evidence that the improvement of reasoning performance in group discussion is a universal phenomenon, and provides support for the practice of collaborative learning in Japan.     

What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?

Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find those reasons compelling. The article then briefly looks at some implications of this conclusion.