Angry reactions to failure on a cooperative computer game: The effect of trait hostility,behavioural inhibition,and behavioural activation

This study describes the use of a “cooperative” computer game in which the subject has to follow directions, supposedly sent from a partner, and steer a tank to avoid invisible mines. The tank is lost if it hits a mine or does not reach base within a set time limit. The game was designed so that the majority of trials would be lost. Affective (mood self-ratings), cognitive (attribution of blame questionnaire), and behavioural (feedback sent to the “partner”) outcomes were assessed. The game significantly increased ratings of discontentedness and anger. Self-blame for task failure was correlated with the Guilt subscale of the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI), and blaming the partner was correlated positively with the Motor Aggression subscale and negatively with the empathy scale of the I7, supporting the notion of hostile attributional bias in adults. The importance of individual differences in the strength of the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) and behavioural activation system (BAS) were explored using the BIS/BAS scales developed by Carver and White [1994]. Sending negative feedback to the partner was negatively correlated with scores on the BIS. Scores on BAS drive were positively correlated with increases in discontentedness and with sending negative feedback on trials when the tank was lost due to lack of time. These results are discussed in relation to Berkowitz's [1993] model of affective aggression. Aggr. Behav. 24:27–36, 1998. © 1998 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Academic performance,prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: new pieces to the puzzle

This field study investigated the effects of a cooperative learning environment and a Jigsaw classroom environment on academic performance, self-esteem, liking of school, liking of peers, and racial prejudice. The subjects were 103 children in Grades 4–6, in two separate schools. The cooperative learning condition was used as a baseline measure of the effects of cooperation, against which the effects of a Jigsaw method, involving both cooperation and interdependence, were compared. The results reveal that Jigsaw produced significant improvements on measures of academic performance, liking of peers, and racial prejudice. In contrast, the effect of the cooperative condition was to exacerbate pre-existing intergroup tensions. The present findings demonstrate that the Jigsaw method can be applied successfully in Australian conditions, and lend support to Allport's contact hypothesis. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

9-16岁儿童的合作倾向与合作意图的发展研究

本研究采用情境故事法,对154名9-16岁儿童的合作倾向与合作意图进行了探讨。结果表明,随着年级升高,儿童的合作倾向逐渐减小,初二到高一之间是儿童的合作倾向发展的转折期,同伴关系是影响儿童合作倾向的稳定因素;儿童的合作意图随年龄增长日趋复杂和分化,维系良好的同伴关系的意图随年龄增长变化不大,自利意图逐渐减弱,利他意图逐渐增强。     

暴力电脑游戏对个体攻击性的影响

以75名大学生为被试,采用3×2×2被试间设计,探讨电脑游戏暴力对个体的攻击性行为、攻击性情绪和攻击性认知的影响。结果表明:(1)暴力电脑游戏导致个体的攻击性行为增加。游戏与性别和攻击性特质的两重和三重交互作用不显著;(2)暴力电脑游戏对个体的攻击性情绪无显著影响;(3)暴力电脑游戏启动了攻击性认知。游戏、性别和攻击特质这三个变量在攻击性认知上交互作用显著,对于男性,暴力电脑游戏在高攻击性个体身上比低攻击性个体启动了更多的攻击性认知;对于女性,暴力电脑游戏对高低攻击性个体攻击性认知的启动没有显著差异。     

流畅感理论综述及其运用——由网游引发的若干思考

流畅感,也有人译作沉浸,指的是一种暂时性、主观的经验,当人们在进行活动的时候如果完全的投入情境中,就是进入一种沉浸的状态。在网络游戏中也有可能产生这样的状态,而这也是许多人会对网络游戏不可自拔的着迷的原因。我们以网络游戏中体验到的流畅感为例,探讨如何将这种体验迁移到教学或者工作当中,实现流畅感理论的应用。     

新型农村合作医疗补偿模式现状分析

新型农村合作医疗工作试点推广以来,各地都在探索适合本地实际的运行机制和模式。尝试在归纳我国新型农村合作医疗补偿模式的基础上,分析其发生发展的动因度机制,以供研究和实践者参考。     

论以社会适应为导向的大学生合作学习

本文在广泛研究国内外相关文献的基础上,从合作学习的内涵、理论基础和基本要素等方面入手,论述了大学生合作学习对培养其社会适应能力的重要意义,论证了大学生的合作学习是培养其社会适应能力的有效途径之一。     

The role of autoshaping in cooperative two-player games between starlings

We report a study of the behavior of starlings in laboratory situations inspired by the “prisoner's dilemma.” Our purpose is to investigate some possible mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperation by reciprocity and to investigate the process of autoshaping at a trial-by-trial level. In Experiment 1, pairs of starlings housed in adjacent cages played a discrete-trial “game” in which food could be obtained only by “cooperation.” In this game, pecking at a response key eliminated the opportunity to obtain food but produced food for the partner. If neither bird pecked, neither had the opportunity to obtain food in that trial. Some level of cooperation persisted for several sessions whether the birds had been pretrained for a high or low probability of pecking at the key. The probability of a cooperative response was higher after trials in which the partner responded (and a reward was obtained) than after trials in which neither bird responded (and no reward was obtained), but the probability of a response was even higher after trials in which the same bird had responded, even though no reward was obtained by the actor in these trials. This behavior did not require visual presence of another player, because similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 (a replicate of Experiment 1 in which the members of the pair could not see each other) and in Experiment 3, a game in which each starling played with a computer responding with “tit for tat.” Using an omission schedule, in which food was given in all trials in which the bird did not peck, Experiment 4 showed that pecking could be maintained by autoshaping. In this experiment, overall probability of pecking decreased with experience, due to a drop in the tendency to peck in consecutive trials. The probability of pecking in trials following a reinforced trial did not decrease with experience. An implementation of the Rescorla–Wagner model for this situation was capable of reproducing molar, but not molecular, aspects of our results. The results violate the predictions of several game-theoretical models for the evolution of cooperation, including tit for tat, generous tit for tat, and the superior win-stay-lose-shift.     

Role Asymmetry and Code Transmission in Signaling Games: An Experimental and Computational Investigation

In signaling games, a sender has private access to a state of affairs and uses a signal to inform a receiver about that state. If no common association of signals and states is initially available, sender and receiver must coordinate to develop one. How do players divide coordination labor? We show experimentally that, if players switch roles at each communication round, coordination labor is shared. However, in games with fixed roles, coordination labor is divided: Receivers adjust their mappings more frequently, whereas senders maintain the initial code, which is transmitted to receivers and becomes the common code. In a series of computer simulations, player and role asymmetry as observed experimentally were accounted for by a model in which the receiver in the first signaling round has a higher chance of adjusting its code than its partner. From this basic division of labor among players, certain properties of role asymmetry, in particular correlations with game complexity, are seen to follow.