The Necessity of Thinking Historically – Heidegger After Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the turning that occurs within the work of Martin Heidegger. In particular it seeks to reveal it as a turning that takes place within the notion of history as it is elaborated by Heidegger in the difference between Nietzsche and Hölderlin, that is, in the difference between philosophy and poetizing. It locates the necessity for such a turning in Heidegger's dissatisfaction with his own thinking up to the early 1930s (as suggested in his Black Notebooks). In particular the paper focuses on Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche over the question of nihilism in the hope of drawing out the different approaches of each thinker in trying to think this problem historically, and how this confrontation helps move Heidegger's thought towards a more poietical way of thinking. The paper concludes that Heidegger, in seeking to distinguish his thought from that of Nietzsche's, not only owes a debt to Nietzsche but that Heidegger's non-public texts of the late 1930s and early 1940s are also formally indebted to him.     

Application of a worry reduction intervention in a medically unexplained symptoms-analogue student-sample

Objective: Worry is an important perpetuating factor of Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS). Former research has shown that a worry postponement instruction is effective in reducing Subjective Health Complaints (SHC) in non-clinical samples. This study aimed to (1) replicate these findings in a MUS-analogue student-sample and (2) assess alexithymia as a moderator.

Design: The current study had an experimental design with two waves of data collection: pre- and post-intervention.

Main outcome measures: A MUS-analogue student-sample consisting of 114 undergraduate students with high self-reported health worry and a minimum of two doctor visits in the previous year with no current diagnosis for a (chronic or acute) disease were instructed to register their worry frequency and duration eight times per day via an experience sampling-application on their smartphones. The intervention group additionally postponed their worries to a 30-minute period in the evening. SHC were assessed pre- and post-intervention.

Results: The intervention did not have an effect on worry or SHC. Alexithymia did not moderate this effect (p’s > .05).

Conclusion: Our study did not find evidence for the effectiveness of the worry reduction intervention on SHC in a MUS-analogue student-sample. This finding contributes to several previous studies that have found mixed evidence for the effectiveness of the worry reduction intervention on SHC and suggests that the worry intervention may not be effective in all cases.     

The role of magical thinking in forecasting the future

This article explores the role of magical thinking in the subjective probabilities of future chance events. In five experiments, we show that individuals tend to predict a more lucky future (reflected in probability judgements of lucky and unfortunate chance events) for someone who happened to purchase a product associated with a highly moral person than for someone who unknowingly purchased a product associated with a highly immoral person. In the former case, positive events were considered more likely than negative events, whereas in the latter case, the difference in the likelihood judgement of positive and negative events disappeared or even reversed. Our results indicate that this effect is unlikely to be driven by participants’ immanent justice beliefs, the availability heuristic, or experimenter demand. Finally, we show that individuals rely more heavily on magical thinking when their need for control is threatened, thus suggesting that lack of control represents a factor in driving magical thinking in making predictions about the future.     

Kant’s “I think” and the agential approach to self-knowledge

ABSTRACT

This paper relates Kant’s account of pure apperception to the agential approach to self-knowledge. It argues that his famous claim ‘The I think must be able to accompany all of my representations’ (B131) does not concern the possibility of self-ascribing beliefs. Kant does advance this claim in the service of identifying an a priori warrant we have as psychological persons, that is, subjects of acts of thinking that are imputable to us. But this warrant is not one to self-knowledge that we have as critical reasoners. It is, rather, an a priori warrant we have, as thinkers, to prescribe to given representations their conformity to principles of thinking inherent in our capacity of understanding itself.     

Recent advances in the psychology of creativity / Avances recientes en psicología de la creatividad

Abstract

This introduction to Studies in Psychology presents a collection of theoretical and empirical works covering various areas of research into the psychology of creativity. This issue contains five articles that present theories or review evidence regarding various approaches to creativity and three articles that are empirical reports. The articles cover a broad range of topics related to the psychology of creativity. Thus, this collection of articles highlights the fact that research into creativity expands our basic understanding of the functioning of the mind, has an impact on other related areas of psychological research and has an increasing number of applications.     

Old or New? Evaluating the Old/New Scoring Method for Divergent Thinking Tasks

When people generate responses during a divergent thinking task, some responses are “old” (retrieved from memory) and some are “new” (generated on the spot). K.J. Gilhooly, E. Fioratou, S.H. Anthony, and V. Wynn (2007) suggested that old and new responses stem from different cognitive strategies and differ in key ways. The present research explored the old/new scoring method in a sample of 143 young adults. After completing unusual uses tasks, the participants classified each response as old or new. The creativity of each response was also rated by three judges and by the participants themselves. As in past research, “old” responses appeared significantly earlier in the task and were rated as significantly less creative by both the judges and the participants. Old and new responses, however, correlated equally strongly with predictors of creative ability, such as openness to experience and its facets. Overall, the old/new scoring approach appears promising as a way of illuminating the diverse mental strategies people use to generate ideas.     

The mediating effect of reflective-analytic cognitive style on rational thought

Abstract

We investigate whether non-miserly cognitive styles mediate the effects of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. Specifically, we review relevant literature on two dimensions that define non-miserly cognitive style: reflection-impulsivity and analytic-intuitive. We use these two dimensions to identify a continuum of cognitive styles that vary from miserly (impulsive-intuitive) to non-miserly (reflective-analytic) and are congruent with tendencies to commit specific rational thinking errors. Further, we argue that this continuum, which we label reflective-analytic cognitive style, mediates the effect of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. We conduct an experiment testing our predictions and find evidence, via structural equation modelling, that reflective-analytic cognitive style does mediate the effect of cognitive ability (as measured by working memory capacity) and thinking dispositions (as measured by need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking) on responses to traditional rational thinking tasks.     

The influence of thinking dispositions on integration and recall of multiple texts

We investigated the association between thinking dispositions and two outcomes of multiple-texts comprehension: integration of conflicting information in argumentative essays; and recall of inferential information as an index of deep comprehension. We focused on two thinking dispositions, need for cognition (NFC) and actively open-minded thinking (AOT), as relevant individual differences in the processes involved in multiple-texts comprehension. NFC is the tendency to engage in and enjoy cognitively demanding activities, whereas AOT is the tendency to rationally evaluate arguments and supporting evidence, without being influenced by biases from one's own prior beliefs and prior knowledge. 73 university students completed perceived topic knowledge, perceived exposure to argumentative writing, and perceived competence in argumentative writing, NFC and AOT questionnaires, read two contradictory texts, wrote an argumentative essay, and recalled the information read 1 month later. Argumentative essays were assessed by length and level of integration of conflicting perspective. Text recalls were assessed by number of valid inferences included. Research questions were investigated through a path analysis model. The path analysis model had a good fit. NFC was indirectly associated with argumentation quality of the essay via the essay length. AOT was directly associated with the inferences included in the recall task. The present study contributes to the literature on multiple-texts comprehension by emphasizing the role of thinking dispositions.