Why and when justice sensitivity leads to pro- and antisocial behavior

People differ in how injustice-sensitive they are either as victims or as observers. Whereas observer sensitivity is positively related to cooperative behavior, victim sensitivity promotes antisocial and egoistic behavior. The present article investigates the dynamics underlying these effects. Participants played an online-based public goods game and were informed about the number of people who violated a fairness rule in previous rounds of the game (no, some, or many violators). High victim-sensitive participants contributed less to the public good even in the “some violators” condition. High observer-sensitive participants contributed more to the public good even in the “many violators” condition. The findings correspond with the sensitivity to mean intentions model and cannot be explained by individual differences in general trust.     

Beyond the Crisis of the Globalized “World System”: the Need For a New Civil Society

In my view, we need a sociological analysis to show how the crisis stemmed from a certain set-up of the so-called global society. Such a set-up is the product of a long historical development, which goes beyond the financial crisis’ outbreak in 2008. The question I ask is the following: from a sociological standpoint, why did this crisis break out? And what remedies can be put in place? The measures adopted these days cannot solve the crisis, but, for a number of reasons, they can at most provide temporary stoppers and remedies.     

Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding

We study a class of multi-level collective actions, in which each individual is simultaneously engaged in an intragroup conflict and intergroup competition. The intragroup conflict is modeled as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing. The intergroup competition is for an exogenous and commonly known prize shared by members of the winning group. We focus on the effects on the level of contribution of the two most common sharing rules for dividing the prize, equal and proportional. Our results show that (1) embedding the intragroup conflict in intergroup competition markedly reduces free riding; (2) the proportional profit sharing rule significantly outperforms the egalitarian rule, and the difference between the two increases with experience; (3) under egalitarian but not under proportional sharing, there is over-contribution compared to theoretical predictions, and (4) a simple reinforcement-based learning model accounts for the aggregate results of all five experimental conditions.     

The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans

Laboratory experiments indicate that many people willingly contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a personal cost. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, allow political parties to overcome collective action problems, thereby allowing those organizations to compete for scarce resources and to produce public goods for like‐minded individuals. Using a series of laboratory games, we examine whether partisans contribute to public goods and punish free riders at a greater rate than nonpartisans. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Given the broad theoretical literature on altruistic punishment and group selection as well as our own formal evolutionary model, we hypothesize that it is being a partisan that makes an individual more likely to be a strong reciprocator and not vice versa.     

Competence,equipment and behavioural adaptation on Norwegian winter roads: A comparison of foreign and Norwegian HGV drivers

There seems to be a widespread view that foreign lorry drivers’ lack of competence on Norwegian roads, especially related to winter driving, is a significant safety problem. It has, however, been suggested that foreign heavy goods vehicle (HGV) drivers perform better than expected on Norwegian winter roads, as they feel less safe than Norwegian drivers, and adapt by driving slower and more carefully. The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we examine whether foreign HGV drivers in Norway actually have poorer competence on, training for, experience with and equipment for winter driving than Norwegian HGV drivers. Second, we discuss whether the expected negative effect of these safety challenges is mitigated, as foreign HGV drivers adapt their behaviours. We use four data sources to shed light on the aims: (1) interviews, (2) roadside inspections, (3) small-scale survey and (4) towing incidents. Our data support the hypothesis about behavioural adaptation, indicating that foreign HGV drivers experience winter driving as more difficult or unsafe, as they have supposedly less suitable vehicles and equipment, less experience, training and competence for winter driving. They are therefore more likely to get stuck while driving uphill on winter roads, supposedly as they drive more carefully and slower than Norwegian HGV drivers. Norwegian HGV drivers feel safer and more confident while driving on winter roads, because of their equipment and their experience.     

The devil you know: the effects of identifiability on punishment

Prior research has confirmed Thomas Schelling's observation that people are more sympathetic and hence generous toward specific identified victims than toward “statistical” victims who are yet to be identified. In the study presented in this article we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We find that people are more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified, wrongdoers, even when identifying the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information about him or her. To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger toward an identified than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with such an account, the effect of identifiability on punishing behavior was mediated by self‐reported anger. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts

There are great goods desired by all of us, and the lack of themmakes for bad lives. One sample of bad African lives involves aloss of 20 million years of living time. The questions raised bythese and other facts are to be answered by the Principle ofHumanity, about bad lives and rationality. It is superior tomorality of relationship and all else, and in a way is undeniable.The principle together with other things issues in six propositions.One gives us a moral responsibility, our politicians at our head,for the terrorism of September 11. To be ordinary is not to beinnocent. Another proposition is that the Palestinians have a moralright to their terrorism. The latter proposition can be given stillmore support than in the book from which this paper derives.     

Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities

In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each. Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't follow that we should always toss a coin. In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are different.     

Feelings and motives underlying Machiavellian behavioural strategies; narrative reports in a social dilemma situation

This study explored the reasons and motives underlying the decisions of individuals with strong Machiavellian attitudes (High Machs). One hundred and fifty undergraduate students completed the Mach‐IV test, and their contributions to, financial success in and narrative reports of a public goods game were analysed. High Machs contributed less to the public good and gained more benefit than Low Machs. Analysis of the narrative reports showed that High Machs used significantly fewer verbs referring to emotional involvement and first person plural verb forms, than did Low Machs. This study confirmed previous findings that High Machs have a cool and rational character and a proself orientation and showed that their lack of group orientation may account for their low cooperation in social dilemmas. The results of narrative content analysis provide a new perspective on the motives and values behind High Machs' decisions and success in different fields of social life.