Too individualistic for safety culture? Non-traffic related work safety among heavy goods vehicle drivers

IntroductionThis article reports on a study of non-traffic related work safety among drivers of heavy goods vehicles in Denmark. In the heavy goods vehicle transport (HGV) sector only 6.4% of workplace accidents involving drivers are traffic related. HGV work is characterised by solitary work, as drivers tend to work at a physical distance from their own company and their working environment is also influenced by the working environment of other companies e.g. the places where they deliver goods. This study focuses on an analysis of HGV drivers’ and managers’ differentiated understandings of risk and safety and its management within an organisational context. The situational focus involves viewing HGV drivers’ working environment as a part of the organisational structure as well as of other social relationships. An understanding of safety culture as practice is applied with the view of identifying values and attitudes as well as organisational and technical aspects in relation to how individualist or collectivist understandings of risk and safety influence the working environment in HGVs.MethodThe study applied a mixed methods approach and in this article the qualitative interviews conducted with drivers and managers is the primary data source.ResultsThis study suggests a widespread understanding of drivers as being individually oriented in their work, from drivers and management alike. However, the study also demonstrates that, in conducting their work, the drivers are actually interdependent, and share knowledge frequently, albeit informally. The organisational structure of the company shapes their individual attitudes towards safety but they also report being dependent on relationships with, and information from, their fellow colleagues, former colleagues and friends who shape their understandings and attitudes towards hazards and safety practices. The analysis points to risk-taking and unsafe practices as prevalent among HGV drivers, who often refer to risk as trivial and the management of such risks as one’s own responsibility. Knowledge of how to manage risks in everyday practice is shown to be principally related to personal experiences but also to the good advice and examples of fellow drivers.ConclusionsThe analysis points to interdependent and collectivist practices among HGV drivers even though they are perceived as being individualistically oriented when it comes to safety. Therefore, non-traffic related safety practices, in this case the loading and unloading of vehicles, occur in the grey zone of organisational safety management. Despite the fact that organisational safety initiatives are initiated, the management sees limited possibilities for enforcing them and hence safety practice is often left to the individual driver.Practical applicationsA safety culture perspective might enhance work safety among HGV drivers if we are able to understand workplace culture in a pluralistic way. Collectivist practice among the drivers can be utilised in order to improve knowledge sharing and situational safety practices. The informal communication identified among the drivers might offer a new model for safety initiatives based on more collectivist, albeit informal, safety culture practices on behalf of HGV companies.     

Does snobbish service generate better sales? The case of luxury goods

The objective of this study is to explore whether a “bad” service encounter triggers a consumer's impulse purchase in a luxury goods store in an Asian emerging market. A 2 (service encounter: favorable vs. snobbish) × 2 (shopping companion: alone vs. with a close friend) between‐group factorial design was employed with 160 female consumers in an Asian emerging market to examine the antecedents of both the urge to save social identity and the impulse purchase of luxury goods. The results show that consumers in an Asian emerging market can be triggered to make an impulse purchase of a luxury good, not because they received excellent service in the store but because they encountered snobbish service, especially when shopping with a close friend. Research implications and limitations are also discussed.     

论当前我国医疗市场对医患关系的影响

解读目前紧张的医患关系是一个迫切的社会课题.医疗服务是一种商品,医疗市场是客观存在的,它是导致医患关系紧张的深层次原因.     

公共物品困境中自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的影响

本研究分别操纵被试稳定的权力（实验1）和不稳定的权力（实验2）,并与不同权力个体进行公共物品困境任务,以考察了自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的交互作用及其权力稳定性在其中的作用。结果发现,在权力稳定情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平低于低权力组和控制组,而在权力不稳定的情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平高于低权力组。无论权力稳定与否,与低权力同伴合作时,低权力者的合作水平均显著高于与高权力同伴合作时。     

Genomic Databases as Global Public Goods?

Recent discussions of genomics and international justice have adopted the concept of 'global public goods' to support both the view of genomics as a benefit and the sharing of genomics knowledge across nations. Such discussion relies on a particular interpretation of the global public goods argument, facilitated by the ambiguity of the concept itself. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate this by a close examination of the concept of global public goods with particular reference to its use in the context of genomic databases. We content that the argument for construing genomics as a global public good depends on seeing it as a natural good by focusing on features intrinsic to genomics knowledge. We shall argue that social and political arrangements are relevant and that recognising this opens the door to construing the use of global public goods language as a strategic one.     

Small wonders of the Indian market

Heavy competition in India in almost all product categories, due to diversification by large and medium companies and increased entry of multinationals, has restricted the growth of domestic companies. Previously, large companies enjoyed high profit margins by targeting premium priced products in the upper strata of Indian society. High levels of competition from equally reputed brands have not only decreased the companies' market share but also created price wars, reducing profit margins and limiting market growth. This has motivated companies to consider the lower classes and the rural segments, which they had previously ignored. By targeting these segments with products in small packs at lower price points, companies have experienced great success. At the same time, small packs also pose some challenges for the companies. This paper explains the importance of small packs for market expansion in various product categories within the Indian market, drawing on several examples to support the views of the authors. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule

A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fairness and bargaining power in threshold public goods experiments

Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.