浅析神经外科中的诊疗思路和思维方式

应该注重培训年轻医生在临床中学会应用哲学思想和思维方式,真正认识事物的本质。这对于诊断、治疗、科研、创新有事半功倍的作用,可避免片面性、盲目性,减少医源性偏差与失误,提高治愈率和生活质量。一般通过三种思维方式即理论、工程及评价思维思考疾病,如蛛网膜下腔出血的病因、临床特点、检查方法、诊疗思路、预后和转归,最终达到预期的疗效。     

牙源性角化囊性瘤治疗的哲学思考

牙源性角化囊性瘤原称牙源性角化囊肿,因其生长缺乏自限性,具有某些肿瘤的特征,术后有较高复发倾向,WHO将其归属为良性牙源性肿瘤,并命名为牙源性角化囊性瘤。其治疗方法主要有保守性和根治性两种,医师应严格掌握两种治疗方法的适应证和禁忌证,以更大的责任心给予牙源性角化囊肿患者最好的治疗和更多的人文关爱。     

疾病的哲学思考——坦然和平静地对待疾病

面对人类无法改变与疾病共存的命运,本文从健康与疾病的关系、疾病的原因、疾病的话语、对待疾病的态度和利用疾病的契机五个方面来进行哲学追问和反思。以期使我们通过倾听身体的语言,来坦然、自然和平静地对待疾病;利用疾病的契机,获得身心的成长,使人类的生命在亘古的绵延中永远充盈着盎然的生机。     

Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?

Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes the important preliminary task of clarifying the content of these subtheses (e.g., what is meant by “objective”? what is meant by “experience”?). Finally, attention is given to the relation between (a) acknowledging that the projectivist account might be true of a token moral judgment and (b) maintaining moral projectivism to be true as a general thesis.     

Life satisfaction,ethical reflection,and the science of happiness

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values.     

心为文字之性:永明延寿判教原则的语言哲学分析

Along with the Chan’s “linguistic turn”, the significance of sutras, which were despised and even regarded as the obstacle to complete enlightenment, became accepted by the Chan. Due to Yanshou’s contributions, the principle that emphasized the diversity of teaching in terms of the relationship between meaning and expression in the Sui and Tang Dynasties has been changed into a system which stressed the importance of the root/branches relationship of the mind and words. According to Yanshou, the conflict between the Chan and doctrinal teachings is resolved by highlighting the significance of words. Yanshou’s work greatly inspired the Chan’s interest in words in the Song Dynasty. __________ Translated from Jiangsu Shehui Kexue 江苏社会科学 (Jiangsu Social Sciences), 2005, (5): 109–113     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52     

"不可或缺性论证"与反实在论数学哲学

The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2006, (8): 74–83     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Erkenntnistheorie der Zahldefinition und philosophische Grundlegung der Arithmetik unter Bezugnahme auf einen Vergleich von Gottlob Freges Logizismus und platonischer Philosophie (Syrian, Theon von Smyrna u.a.)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.