Gene Concepts and Genethics: Beyond Exceptionalism

The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics.     

PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF ITS HISTORY

Abstract: This article's goal is to outline one approach to providing a principled answer to the question of what is the proper relationship between philosophy and the study of philosophy's history, a question arising, for example, in the design of a curriculum for graduate students. This approach requires empirical investigation of philosophizing past and present, and thus takes philosophy as an object of study in something like the way that contemporary (naturalistic) philosophy of science takes science as an object of study. This approach also requires articulating a sense in which philosophy might make, or might have made, progress.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

论神经语言学的兴起与发展

神经语言学是一门新兴的医学与语言学的交叉边缘学科。简要论述了该学科的起源,研究范围,主要研究方法以及在我国的研究现状,还探讨了它与神经哲学的关系和它的哲学思考。因此,神经语言学体现了现代科学各学科门类交叉的必然趋势,是当代学术研究的前沿,具有广阔的发展前景。     

Ancient Chinese philosophical advice: can it help us find happiness today?

Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism are three main classic Chinese philosophy schools, which all deal with the question of how one should live. In this paper, we first review these ancient recommendations and next consider whether they promise a happy life in present-day society. Recommended behaviours found in the ancient texts are compared with conditions for happiness as observed in present-day empirical investigations. Classic Confucianism appears to offer the most apt advice for finding happiness in present-day society, in particular because it recommends that one should be involved in real life. Classic Taoist advice is second best: its strong point is that it advises us against too much social conformism and bookishness. The advice given by classic Buddhists is better not followed in modern society.     

WELCOMING (AUTO)BIOGRAPHY WITHOUT WAVING AWAY FICTION

Abstract: This article is a response to Ole Martin Skilleås's “Knowledge and Imagination in Fiction and Biography.” The first section of the article summarizes the line of the argument in four theses: (1) What is real is more influential than what is made up; (2) there is no metaphysical chasm between autobiographers and us; (3) (auto)biographies are not just empirical; and (4) the moral lesson of a fiction need not be accepted. In the second section each of these theses is criticized. This criticism leads to the conclusion that we should welcome (auto)biographical texts in our moral investigations, but not at the cost of fictional texts. This conclusion is coupled with a proposal to formulate criteria to distinguish texts that matter from those that do not.     

Break philosophy through internally

This paper contrasts and illustrates two types of breakthroughs in philosophy; i.e., external and internal ones. Both are made possible through its application to a newfield. In the external breakthrough, a new field is discovered by such factors without philosophy as encounters with different traditions of thought and advance in technology. In the internal one, a new field is brought into attention by critical examination of one or another assumption within philosophy that has once dismissed the field as too trivial or insignificant to be its proper subject. Based on this distinction, a research guideline for philosophy is proposed that one must always seek the possibility of its internal breakthrough. It is also suggested that the philosophy of science and epistemology can be innovated internally when they are applied to a new field, that is, statistics. Finally the distinction between pure and applied philosophy is reinterpreted in the light of the internal breakthrough.     

Philosophy: What is to be done?––Bleak prospects

Culturally, America is well overdue for a Second Enlightenment, but since the dominant majority of its citizens are regrettably both symbol-minded and star-craving mad, and since the mass media are generally inaccessible to us, the chance that contemporary philosophers could contribute to such a thing, much less help instigate it, is near vanishingly small. As educators, in contrast, we can perhaps make ourselves useful by beginning to clear the extensive muck out of at least some of our students’ minds. In any event, the discipline of philosophy as such is in serious need of renewal, but that, should it unexpectedly happen, will be matter of luck rather than a result of deliberate action.     

One hundred and fifty years of philosophy

Looking back from 2049 over one-hundred and fifty years of philosophy, a student's essay reveals what became of rival strands in Western philosophy – with a sidelong glance at the special Topoi issue on the theme “Philosophy: What is to be Done?” that was published almost half a century earlier.     

Philosophy, the “unknown knowns,” and the public use of reason

There are not only true or false solutions, there are also false questions. The task of philosophy is not to provide answers or solutions, but to submit to critical analysis the questions themselves, to make us see how the very way we perceive a problem is an obstacle to its solution. This holds especially for today’s public debates on ecological threats, on lack of faith, on democracy and the “war on terror”, in which the “unknown knowns”, the silent presuppositions we are not aware of, determine our acts.