Quantized Linear Logic,Involutive Quantales and Strong Negation

A new logic, quantized intuitionistic linear logic (QILL), is introduced, and is closely related to the logic which corresponds to Mulvey and Pelletier's (commutative) involutive quantales. Some cut-free sequent calculi with a new property quantization principle and some complete semantics such as an involutive quantale model and a quantale model are obtained for QILL. The relationship between QILL and Wansing's extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation is also observed using such syntactical and semantical frameworks.     

《周易》的“生态学”解读——从“还原”的角度

对于《周易》的研究,当代学者已从人文、象数、哲学乃至科学等角度进行解读,并取得了丰硕的成果。事实上,作为"天人之学"的《周易》蕴含了丰富的生态思想,其对生命的重视,对人与自然关系的认定乃至"与天与一"的宇宙观皆凸显了深层的生态关怀。无疑,在环境日益恶化的当下,回归经典寻求智慧不失为一种有益的探索。     

中国背景下员工建言行为结构及中庸思维对其的影响

企业的自主创新离不开员工的自发性和创造性, 员工建言行为研究因此愈加受到重视。本研究拟探索中国背景下企业员工建言行为的结构(研究一), 并检验中国人的典型思维特征－中庸思维与中国背景建言行为的关系(研究二)。研究一通过对长三角地区30名企业员工的访谈提取建言行为关键事件, 编制初始问卷, 再通过对159名被试的探索性因素分析, 抽取出顾全大局式和自我冒进式两个建言行为维度; 另一批159名被试的验证性因素分析结果进一步证实了该结构。研究二以278份配对员工为样本, 层次回归分析结果表明, 中庸思维与顾全大局式建言存在正相关, 与自我冒进式建言存在负相关, 且授权对中庸思维与两类建言行为之间关系存在着调节作用。     

The Influence of Phonological Context on the Sound Errors of a Speaker with Wernicke's Aphasia

A corpus of phonological errors produced in narrative speech by a Wernicke's aphasic speaker (R.W.B.) was tested for context effects using two new methods for establishing chance baselines. A reliable anticipatory effect was found using the second method, which estimated chance from the distance between phoneme repeats in the speech sample containing the errors. Relative to this baseline, error-source distances were shorter than expected for anticipations, but not perseverations. R.W.B.'s anticipation/perseveration ratio measured intermediate between a nonaphasic error corpus and that of a more severe aphasic speaker (both reported in Schwartz et al., 1994), supporting the view that the anticipatory bias correlates to severity. Finally, R.W.B's anticipations favored word-initial segments, although errors and sources did not consistently share word or syllable position.     

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

东西方医学伦理思维之共通性

从中国古代医者的行医事迹、著作来探寻中国的医者是否在行医过程当中勤守医者的本份,也即类似原则思维的表现。虽然中国古代并没有"医学伦理"这个名词,但从历代具有代表性之医者身上发现,其实在中国古代医者的行医事迹当中,就表现出类似的医学伦理情操。因之,医学伦理原则是俱普世价值的,也即世界上有所谓的共同道德存在。     

伦理与道德之间－以“道理”说文为视角

“道”、“理”二字使道理、道德和伦理三个不同的基本范畴的关系变得耐人寻味,“道”与“理”合一相成即“道理”,道理和道德以“道”为“同源”,道理和伦理以“理”为“同源”,道德和伦理分有“道理”的“养分”,二者“同源共生异长”,长成各自独特的内涵,成为伦理学中两个最基本、最重要的范畴。     

医学AI道德主体地位的哲学批判

医学人工智能(artificial intelligence, AI)是否能够成为道德主体而承担道德责任,关键要从哲学上辨析医学AI的感受性意识和意向性行为是否可能。意向性因果关系可以论证医学AI无法获得感受性意识和自由意志,因而不可能成为完全的道德主体;但在世界语境中,医学AI可以通过算法模拟表征派生的意向性意识,表现为有限的道德主体行为,这一功能完全由科研设计决定,因而可以向相关科研人员或机构追溯替代责任;在交流语境中,医学AI因“感受性缺失”不具有内在的意向性意识,因而不能有效交流并做出正确的医学判断,应由相关医务人员或机构承担替代责任。