Aggression in television programs in Finland

A detailed coding system was constructed to study the frequency and salience of aggression in TV programs broadcast on Finnish television. Salience of aggression was measured by the brutality index which consisted of ratings concerning the (1) program context, (2) seriousness, (3) justification, and (4) dramatization of aggressive acts. When compared to previous studies of TV-violence, the rate of aggression in Finnish TV was moderate with 3.5 aggressive acts per program hour. Only 14% of aggressive acts portrayed brutal aggression, which was mostly seen in fictional films and serials. A clear 9 pm watershed was not seen in Finland, since aggressive acts were distributed quite evenly during the TV time. Aggressiveness of a program was not related to its popularity among viewers. © 1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc. ©1993 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

The self-attribution bias and paranormal beliefs

The present study investigated the relation between paranormal beliefs, illusory control and the self-attribution bias, i.e., the motivated tendency to attribute positive outcomes to oneself while negative outcomes are externalized. Visitors of a psychic fair played a card guessing game and indicated their perceived control over randomly selected cards as a function of the congruency and valence of the card. A stronger self-attribution bias was observed for paranormal believers compared to skeptics and this bias was specifically related to traditional religious beliefs and belief in superstition. No relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory control was found. Self-report measures indicated that paranormal beliefs were associated to being raised in a spiritual family and to anomalous experiences during childhood. Thereby this study suggests that paranormal beliefs are related to specific cognitive biases that in turn are shaped by socio-cultural factors.     

McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens,colours and cardinals

McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of argument and show that it rests on the assumption that a specific model of justification, the Comparison Model, must apply to all cases of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. We then show that the Comparison Model cannot be applied to McDowell’s new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. As a consequence, McDowell is in need of an alternative model of justification and an alternative argument for conceptualism. We propose such an alternative model of justification based on McDowell’s reading of Sellars, but argue that the model only serves to make the need for an alternative motivation for conceptualism more urgent.     

心理咨询中好坏效果案例咨询互动的内容分析

目的:了解好坏效果案例咨访互动的特点及差异。方法:运用内容分析法对5个好效果案例和3个坏效果案例的会谈谈话轮进行评定。结果:在治疗师介入上,好坏效果案例存在显著差异;在当事人回应上,二者差异不显著;在治疗性最近发展区上,二者在"确认-安全"和"确认-可忍受冒险"两个区段存在显著差异,其他区段差异不显著。结论:临床工作中可多使用支持性技术,适当结合挑战性技术,并增多落入"确认-可忍受冒险"区段的比例。     

社区感的研究现状(1977～2020)及展望——基于Leximancer的内容分析

社区感是社区心理学领域中最重要的概念之一。全面系统地呈现社区感研究的主题及核心概念,探讨演进趋势及中国场景中的特殊性,对推进我国社区感研究的本土化发展具有重要意义。研究以系统筛查后的644篇SSCI文献的标题及摘要作为分析文本,采用内容分析法对不同阶段及中国本土研究中所呈现的关键主题及核心概念进行阐述和分析。研究结果表明社区感的研究对象以城市居民及学生群体为主;研究方法主要以实证的问卷调查展开;社区感的前因变量和结果变量中包含了健康、满意度、邻里关系、生活质量等因素;社区感研究在不同的发展阶段及中国场景中所关注的话题均有其独特性。基于研究结果,本研究针对社区感的未来发展提供了若干建议,旨在推进社区感在中国本土实践场景下的发展。     

Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-conceptual Content

John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content (rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.

The rational side of egocentrism in social comparisons

Prior work has found that when people compare themselves with others they egocentrically focus on their own strengths and achievements more than on the (equally relevant) strengths and achievements of the comparison group. As a consequence, people tend to overestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is high and underestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is low. The present research investigated a rational discounting explanation of this bias—namely, that people weight the target of the comparison (the self) more than the referent of the comparison (others) because they typically have more knowledge about the former than the latter. In three studies, we found that the tendency to focus on the target in social comparisons—and the over and underestimation of relative standing that tendency engenders—was reduced (but not eliminated) as people’s knowledge about the comparison group increased. These results suggest that there may be a rational side to egocentrism in social comparisons.