Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

刻板印象从内容模型到系统模型的发展与应用

21世纪以来,在刻板印象研究中最受瞩目的当属刻板印象内容模型（Stereotype Content Model, SCM）的提出。它通过热情和能力二个维度区分对不同群体的刻板印象。新近的系统模型则将SCM与群际情绪、行为反应相结合,并凸现了道德维度,开创性地提出了群际情绪-刻板印象-行为趋向系统模型（Behaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map, BIAS Map）。这一系统模型是对刻板印象内容模型的有意义延伸,同时二者的有机结合进一步促进了刻板印象内群体与群体间研究的整合性,较之又增添了认知-情绪-行为与刻板印象预测之间的联结。     

网络主体的道德意识培养

为了保证网络社会的健康运行 ,网络道德建设已成为无法回避重要的课题。在网络道德建设中 ,我们必须注重培养网络主体的道德意识 ;在培养网络道德意识的过程中 ,我们既要坚持对网络主体的道德灌输、提高其道德认识能力 ,又要锻炼其道德意志并加强道德修养。     

Social and Cognitive Aspects of the Vulnerability to Political Misinformation

In the last few years, especially after the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. elections, there has been a surge in academic interest for misinformation and disinformation. Social, cognitive, and political scientists' work on these phenomena has focused on two main aspects:

• Individuals' (and by extension societies') vulnerability to misinformation;
• Factors and interventions that can increase individuals' (and societies') resistance to misinformation.

In this article, we offer a critical review of the psychological research pertaining to these two aspects. Drawing on this review, we highlight an emerging tension in the relevant literature. Indeed, the current state of the art of the political misinformation literature reflects the combined operation of two opposing psychological constructs: excess gullibility on the one hand and excess vigilance on the other. We argue that this conceptualization is important in both advancing theories of individuals' and societies' vulnerability to misinformation and in designing prospective research programs. We conclude with proposing what, in our view, are the most promising avenues for future research in the field.     

Remarks on Gregory's “Actually” Operator

In this note we show that the classical modal technology of Sahlqvist formulas gives quick proofs of the completeness theorems in [8] (D. Gregory, Completeness and decidability results for some propositional modal logics containing actually operators, Journal of Philosophical Logic 30(1): 57–78, 2001) and vastly generalizes them. Moreover, as a corollary, interpolation theorems for the logics considered in [8] are obtained. We then compare Gregory's modal language enriched with an actually operator with the work of Arthur Prior now known under the name of hybrid logic. This analysis relates the actually axioms to standard hybrid axioms, yields the decidability results in [8], and provides a number of complexity results. Finally, we use a bisimulation argument to show that the hybrid language is strictly more expressive than Gregory's language.     

Peace and Justice: A Limited Reconciliation

This paper aims to relax the tension between the political requirements of making peace and the moral demands of doing justice, in light of the ‘peace processes’ in South Africa and Northern Ireland. It begins by arguing that criminal justice should be reconceived as consisting primarily in the vindication of victims, both direct and indirect. This is not to deny the retributive punishment of perpetrators any role at all, only to insist that it be largely subservient to the goal of vindication. Why should we take such an account of justice to be true? The paper offers two reasons. First, Christians – and even secularist liberals – have a prima facie reason in the consonance of this account with the Bible's eudaimonistic conception of justice as ordered to the restoration of healthy community. Second, since all concepts of criminal justice share the basic notion of putting right what is wrong, it would be odd if the repair of damage done to victims (i.e., their ‘vindication’) were not prominent among its concerns; and there are reasons to suppose that this vindication should actually predominate in relation to the other principles of justice (the retributive ‘balancing’ of crime and punishment, and the reform of the criminal for his own sake). In its final sections, the paper applies the proposed conception of criminal justice to the ‘peace processes’ in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and concludes that in both cases, notwithstanding concessions to the politics of peace-making, considerable justice has been done.     

A Work in Progress

After expressing gratitude to each contributor, and briefly commenting on each, I probe several main themes of my work, addressing the question of the apparent difference between my earlier philosophical and later clinical writings. Central to both is the reflexivity of the human agent, and that each exhibits a form of practice regardless of the specific aims embedded in each. I then address the theme of narrative writing as my work has developed over the past several decades – at the heart of which are questions of self and integrity.     

Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.     

The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception

Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn Følledal, I believe Husserlian phenomenology can be updated to offer an important contribution to this discussion. On my interpretation, what Husserl calls “hyletic data” may be read as that subjective quality of experience inarticulable as a propositional attitude – and, thus, hyletic data are non-conceptual. In anticipation of the recent conceptualist position, Føllesdal and his adherents argued that what Husserl had called “noema” or representational content is, however, entirely conceptual. A closer inspection of the relevant texts, however, reveals that Husserl admits non-conceptual elements into his characterization of the noema. If that is correct, then Husserl must have been a dualist about non-conceptual content. In turn, I believe what explains this dualism is a non-foundationalist reconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Fordham University on the occasion of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle. I am grateful to Prof. Steven Crowell who, in his capacity as respondent, offered incisive and helpful commentary. I also thank Prof. John J. Drummond for organizing the meeting, and all those present during my talk; as well as two anonymous reviewers for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, who offered helpful questions and comments.     

Some Thoughts about the Origins of ``Greek Ethics'

In this paper, I argue that several of the main issues that became a focus for classical Greek philosophy were initially framed by Homer. In particular, Homer identifies a tension between justice and individual excellence, and problematizes the connection between the heroic conception of excellence and ``eudaimonia' (happiness). The later philosophers address the problems raised in Homer by profoundly transforming the way each of these terms was to be conceived.