Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences

Kim’s model of ‘functional reduction’ of properties is shown to fail in a class of cases from physics involving properties at different spatial levels. The diagnosis of this failure leads to a non-reductive account of the relation of micro and macro properties.     

冠状动脉分流术后再狭窄研究中的科学理念

随着冠状动脉分流术(CoronaryArteryBypassGrafting,CABG)的广泛开展,CABG术后再狭窄(Restenosis,RS)成为我们面对的一个重要问题。CABG术后RS的研究需要遵循综合、全面、均衡的科学理念。只有在综合、全面、均衡的科学理念指导下,才能加深人们对该问题的认识,增进研究的科学性,取得更佳的研究成果。     

Mereological nihilism: quantum atomism and the impossibility of material constitution

Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are partless fundamental particles, such as the true atoms (also called philosophical atoms) theorized to exist by some ancient philosophers, some contemporary physicists, and some contemporary philosophers. With several novel arguments I show that mereological nihilism is the correct theory of reality. I will also discuss strong similarities that mereological nihilism has with empirical results in quantum physics. And I will discuss how mereological nihilism vindicates a few other theories, such as a very specific theory of philosophical atomism, which I will call quantum abstract atomism. I will show that mereological nihilism also is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations, such as the widely known, metaphysically generated, quantum paradoxes of quantum physics, which ironically are typically accepted as facts about reality. I will also show why it is very surprising that mereological nihilism is not a widely held theory, and not the premier theory in philosophy.     

On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation

This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the First Answer to the question. In Foundations of Ethics Ross repudiated the Objective View in favor of the Subjective View, from which he inferred a Second Answer. In this paper each of the Objective and Subjective Views and the First and Second Answers are rejected in favor of the Prospective View and a Third Answer. The implications of the Prospective View for another question closely related to the original question are then investigated: what precisely is your right regarding my returning the book and what constitutes its satisfaction?     

我国大学生在关爱价值观者特征上的公众观

在开放式预调查基础上,对452名大学各专业学生进行调查研究。结果表明:我国大学生认为善良、真诚、有爱心、不歧视残障者、宽容、设身处地、尊重7项是关爱价值观者最应该具有的特征;个人修养、利他助人、处事交往、外表印象、内在气质、尊重宽容、奉献与责任是关爱价值观者的7个品质因素,其中个人修养的品质因素最为突出;对这些品质因素,男女大学生看法没有明显差异,对某些品质因素城乡大学生、不同专业大学生有明显不同的看法。     

社会智力研究视角和方法的转变——从社会智力的测量观到人格的社会智力观

在社会智力研究的早期,研究者们运用测量观的视角和方法对社会智力进行了研究,取得了不少的成果。但是随着研究的进行,传统测量观的发展却遇到了极大的困难,如不能对社会智力和学业智力进行有效的区分等。人格的社会智力观强调社会行为的背景具体化和行为的主观意义,主张探询人的一般化的社会认知机制,为社会智力的研究展开了一个新的视角。     

驳"王弼以老解《易》论"

本文反对王弼以老庄思想解释<周易>这一传统观点,因为他除了用老庄道家思想解释<周易>之外,王弼也运用儒家思想来解释<周易>,而且运用儒家思想解释的内容大于运用道家思想解释的内容.本文分析了王弼为何同时运用儒家和道家思想解易的原因,并提出<周易注>的绝大多数内容是以<易传>的思想和汉代的注易方法来解释<周易>.     

关于弗洛伊德与皮亚杰心理发展观的比较分析

弗洛伊德和皮亚杰都是心理学的大师,他们关于心理发展的阶段、过程、结构等方面的思想既有关联,也存在不同。揭示两位大师心理观的关联和异同不仅有助于认清心理学思想的发展逻辑,而且对心理学理论的建构和研究也有裨益。     

Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value

Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as person-affecting in a weaker sense. Thirdly, it is possible to construct a Relational version of the Priority View which incorporates the Egalitarian value of just equality in this sense. Two reasons are given for why this Relational View and Egalitarianism are superior to the Parfitian Absolute Priority View. However, no attempt is made to abjudicate between the first two views, the main point being that they both accept the value of just equality in the same sense.