7～11岁儿童失言理解及与母亲教养方式的关系

采用失言任务和改编后的教养方式问卷探讨7~11岁儿童心理理论的发展及其与母亲教养方式的相关。结果表明,在学龄期,儿童在不同层面上对失言的理解能力仍在提高,高年级时已超出单一维度。7岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"过度偏爱"显著负相关;8岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"惩罚和严厉"显著负相关。结果提示在某些年龄阶段,儿童心理理论的发展可能与母亲特定的教养方式有关。     

胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管的博弈思考

规范化的胃癌根治术是我国胃癌治疗的发展方向,本文回顾性分析胃癌根治术中常规放置空肠营养管和术后早期肠内营养在胃癌规范化治疗中的作用。结果表明空肠营养管置入和对照组术后并发症率无显著性差异（P=0.501）,早期联合肠内营养可有效缩短住院时间（P=0.0115）。结合博弈论的观点分析,胃癌根治术中放置空肠营养管在并发症预防和治疗中有重要作用,可能避免不必要的二次开腹手术,因此是一种对于医患双方都最为有利的策略选择。     

Conditionals Right and Left: Probabilities for the Whole Family

The fact that the standard probabilistic calculus does not define probabilities for sentences with embedded conditionals is a fundamental problem for the probabilistic theory of conditionals. Several authors have explored ways to assign probabilities to such sentences, but those proposals have come under criticism for making counterintuitive predictions. This paper examines the source of the problematic predictions and proposes an amendment which corrects them in a principled way. The account brings intuitions about counterfactual conditionals to bear on the interpretation of indicatives and relies on the notion of causal (in)dependence.     

The dynamics of the stream of behavior

Motivational psychology and ethology conceive of behavior as a continuous stream of activities, a conceptualization that is taken up formally in the present paper. Modeling the stream of behavior, unlike modeling an individual activity selected out of the stream, requires processes of data generation that govern the repeated overt appearances of activities through time. To this end the motivation theory of the dynamics of action, with its self-contained data generating process, is employed as a mathematical framework. The resulting theory, modeled as a continuous succession of mutually exclusive and exhaustive activities driven by the countdown of activation times, yields expectations for the relative frequencies of transitions and the distributions of transition times in a stream segment. Results supporting the theory were obtained in a series of critical tests using a unique data set provided by the artist Morgan O’Hara who has made extensive recordings of her stream of behavior.     

Perceived organizational support, organizational commitment and psychological well-being: A longitudinal study

Using longitudinal data (N = 220), we examined the contribution of perceived organizational support and four mindsets of organizational commitment (affective, normative, perceived sacrifice associated with leaving and perceived lack of alternatives) to employee psychological well-being. In order to assess the contribution of support and commitment independently from workplace stressors, we controlled for the effects of role ambiguity, role conflict and role overload. Analyses showed affective organizational commitment to mediate a positive relationship between perceived organizational support and well-being. In addition, perceived organizational support negatively related to perceived lack of employment alternatives which, in turn, was negatively related to well-being. Normative commitment and perceived sacrifice associated with leaving were unrelated to well-being. The implications of these findings are discussed under the lenses of social exchange and conservation of resources theories.     

Trauma and Grace: Psychology and Theology in Conversation

This paper explores the contours of a conversation between recent developments in trauma theory and Christian systematic theology. Toward this end, I examine three levels of theological discourse in a linear progression and responses based on the work of some trauma theorists: (a) twentieth century conceptualizations of divine revelation using the metaphor of a “bridge,” (b) configurations of evil, sin, redemption, and theodicies, and (c) the use of sacraments and iconography as vehicles of solidarity and flourishing. As a burgeoning area of inquiry in academic circles, trauma theory both resists and is in need of the discipline of theology. I conclude that trauma theory and theology are not antithetical disciplines, and a consideration of both brings greater insights than the disciplines considered alone.     

Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

On three arguments against categorical structuralism

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory.     

Counting distinctions: on the conceptual foundations of Shannon’s information theory

Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|² pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.” The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.” This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend.     

Indeterminacy,identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered

In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.