Evolutionary policy contexts and policies in preparation for the twenty‐first century

The importance of preparing now for the next century is emphasized. The author's field and Kondratiev theories as a basis for long‐range policymaking over periods of dynamic, recon‐figurational change are briefly reviewed, and a number of assumptions relevant to this kind of policymaking are provided.. Equilibrium and nonequilibrium structures and thinking are contrasted. Limitations to control associated with limits to knowledge and knowability are discussed. The possibility is considered that continuation of present policies and practices may accelerate movement along a trajectory to nowhere. Problem solutions are considered within the context of what is meant by a civilized society, and some 15 characteristics of a civilized society are proposed. The theoretical basis for preparation for the Twenty‐First Century is advanced. Deficiencies in the present dominant politicoeconomic theories of Western Capitalistic Democracy and Marxism are discussed, and the need for a new set of “founding fathers” is proposed. The importance of developing and implementing a replacement theory of similar magnitude to present theories is emphasized, and the nature of this theory is briefly sketched. Some recommendations for guided paradigm change are offered.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: The complexity of mindreading

The aim of this research was to provide an articulated assessment of several different ToM components, namely first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, and first- vs. second-order ToM, in preadolescence and adolescence. Our expectations for the sample of 80 juveniles that participated in the research were that: (1) ToM abilities would improve with age; (2) participants would perform better at first-person than at third-person tasks; (3) participants would perform better at first-order than at second-order tasks; (4) girls will perform systematically better than boys. We also explored possible differences in performance (5) in the allocentric vs. the egocentric perspectives as well as (6) in the comprehension of different types of mental states, namely desires, beliefs and positive and negative emotions. Overall our expectations were confirmed. Our data confirmed that all ToM aspects we investigated keep maturing during preadolescence and adolescence.     

Abstract thinking increases one’s sense of power

One’s subjective sense of power often has greater influence on behavior than the amount of power one actually possesses. We propose that this sense of power may be determined in part by one’s style of information processing. As abstract thought is less constraining than concrete thought, and having power leads to more abstract thought [Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you’re in charge of the trees: Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 578-596.], we predicted that thinking more abstractly would make one feel more powerful. Indeed, in four experiments, abstract thought led to a greater sense of power, greater preference for high-power roles, and more feelings of control over the environment, relative to both a concrete-thought and a control condition. This bidirectional relationship between power and abstract thinking suggests one way in which power hierarchies may be unintentionally perpetuated.     

The differential effects of age and first grade schooling on the development of infralogical and logico-mathematical concrete operations

Using the “between-grade levels” regression discontinuity design, this study examined the hypothesized differential sensitivity of logico-mathematical (LM) and infralogical (IL) operational tasks to the effects of chronological age and first grade schooling in a sample of 580 1st and 2nd grade Israeli children. The results indicate that the development of logico-mathematical operational skills (classification, class inclusion and transitivity) is mainly attributable to schooling. In contrast, the effect of schooling on the development of conservation of mass, liquid quantity and number (clearly an infralogical task) is negligible; acquisition of conservation is almost exclusively due to maturation and out-of-school experiences. The results support the theoretical predictions derived from French-Swiss research of the last two decades and are inconsistent with claims regarding the specificity of schooling effects to tasks that are taught in school.