The influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making

People with symptoms of depression show impairments in decision-making. One explanation is that they have difficulty maintaining rich representations of the task environment. We test this hypothesis in the context of exploratory choice. We analyze depressive and non-depressive participants’ exploration strategies by comparing their choices to two computational models: (1) an “Ideal Actor” model that reflectively updates beliefs and plans ahead, employing a rich representation of the environment and (2) a “Naïve Reinforcement Learning” (RL) model that updates beliefs reflexively utilizing a minimal task representation. Relative to non-depressive participants, we find that depressive participants’ choices are better described by the simple RL model. Further, depressive participants were more exploratory than non-depressives in their decision-making. Depressive symptoms appear to influence basic mechanisms supporting choice behavior by reducing use of rich task representations and hindering performance during exploratory decision-making.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

Musical metaphors: Evidence for a spatial grounding of non-literal sentences describing auditory events

This study investigated whether the spatial terms high and low, when used in sentence contexts implying a non-literal interpretation, trigger similar spatial associations as would have been expected from the literal meaning of the words. In three experiments, participants read sentences describing either a high or a low auditory event (e.g., The soprano sings a high aria vs. The pianist plays a low note). In all Experiments, participants were asked to judge (yes/no) whether the sentences were meaningful by means of up/down (Experiments 1 and 2) or left/right (Experiment 3) key press responses. Contrary to previous studies reporting that metaphorical language understanding differs from literal language understanding with regard to simulation effects, the results show compatibility effects between sentence implied pitch height and response location. The results are in line with grounded models of language comprehension proposing that sensory motor experiences are being elicited when processing literal as well as non-literal sentences.     

Explanation versus accommodation: Reply to Bowers (2010)

Bowers (2010) presented a critique of the account of masked priming presented by Norris and Kinoshita (2008) based on the Bayesian Reader model of visual word recognition (Norris, 2006). In this reply, we point out that: (1) Bowers' criticisms are based on his misunderstanding of both the Bayesian or ideal-observer approach, and the theoretical claims made in Norris and Kinoshita, and (2) Bowers' alternative account of the key data presented in Norris and Kinoshita relies on a series of ad hoc assumptions that are combined in different proportions to postdict any pattern of data.     

Expert and “novice” problem solving strategies in chess: Sixty years of citing de Groot (1946)

In a famous study of expert problem solving, de Groot (1946 de Groot, A. D. 1946. Het denken van den schaker, Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche.  [Google Scholar]/1978 de Groot, A. D. 1965. Thought and choice in chess, The Hague: Mouton Publishers.  [Google Scholar]) examined how chess players found the best move. He reported that there was little difference in the way that the best players (Grand Masters) and very good players (Candidate Masters) searched the board. Although this result has been regularly cited in studies of expertise, it is frequently misquoted. It is often claimed that de Groot found no difference in the way that experts and novices investigate a problem. Comparison of expert and novice chess players on de Groot's problem shows that there are clear differences in their search patterns. We discuss the troublesome theoretical and practical consequences of incorrectly reporting de Groot's findings.     

A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: The complexity of mindreading

The aim of this research was to provide an articulated assessment of several different ToM components, namely first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, and first- vs. second-order ToM, in preadolescence and adolescence. Our expectations for the sample of 80 juveniles that participated in the research were that: (1) ToM abilities would improve with age; (2) participants would perform better at first-person than at third-person tasks; (3) participants would perform better at first-order than at second-order tasks; (4) girls will perform systematically better than boys. We also explored possible differences in performance (5) in the allocentric vs. the egocentric perspectives as well as (6) in the comprehension of different types of mental states, namely desires, beliefs and positive and negative emotions. Overall our expectations were confirmed. Our data confirmed that all ToM aspects we investigated keep maturing during preadolescence and adolescence.     

Abstract thinking increases one’s sense of power

One’s subjective sense of power often has greater influence on behavior than the amount of power one actually possesses. We propose that this sense of power may be determined in part by one’s style of information processing. As abstract thought is less constraining than concrete thought, and having power leads to more abstract thought [Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you’re in charge of the trees: Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 578-596.], we predicted that thinking more abstractly would make one feel more powerful. Indeed, in four experiments, abstract thought led to a greater sense of power, greater preference for high-power roles, and more feelings of control over the environment, relative to both a concrete-thought and a control condition. This bidirectional relationship between power and abstract thinking suggests one way in which power hierarchies may be unintentionally perpetuated.     

The differential effects of age and first grade schooling on the development of infralogical and logico-mathematical concrete operations

Using the “between-grade levels” regression discontinuity design, this study examined the hypothesized differential sensitivity of logico-mathematical (LM) and infralogical (IL) operational tasks to the effects of chronological age and first grade schooling in a sample of 580 1st and 2nd grade Israeli children. The results indicate that the development of logico-mathematical operational skills (classification, class inclusion and transitivity) is mainly attributable to schooling. In contrast, the effect of schooling on the development of conservation of mass, liquid quantity and number (clearly an infralogical task) is negligible; acquisition of conservation is almost exclusively due to maturation and out-of-school experiences. The results support the theoretical predictions derived from French-Swiss research of the last two decades and are inconsistent with claims regarding the specificity of schooling effects to tasks that are taught in school.     

Paul Everett Meehl

A brilliant thinker and a gifted teacher, Paul Meehl’s love for and dedication to the philosophy of science did not lead him, as it seems to have led others, to assume that all minds have the same structure and differ only parametrically. One of Meehl’s main interests in the latter part of his career was in taxometric methods for identifying psychological types or taxa. Another taxonomic method seeks traits that are very similar, for genetic reasons, in monozygotic twins, but not in other sib pairs. These emergenic traits may be more common than previously realized. Two examples are briefly discussed.     

The advantage of mentally rotating clockwise

The time taken to decide whether a character is shown in its mirror or normal version has been shown to increase approximately linearly with the angular departure from an up-right position. Additionally, in some studies, decisions took longer for clockwise tilted characters than for counterclockwise tilted ones. Other studies do not report the latter effect. We argue that inconsistencies across studies are caused by variance in participants' strategies. The task employed here was specifically designed to bring these strategies and thereby the direction of rotation under experimental control. From the EEG recorded during the rotation period, we extracted an event-related slow potential whose amplitude is sensitive to the amount of mental rotation. In both strategy conditions, the slow potential's amplitude was lower for clockwise than for counterclockwise rotations. We take this as evidence that mental rotation of alphanumeric characters is easier in a clockwise than in a counterclockwise direction.