In Spite of Indeterminacy Many Common Factor Score Estimates Yield an Identical Reproduced Covariance Matrix

It was investigated whether commonly used factor score estimates lead to the same reproduced covariance matrix of observed variables. This was achieved by means of Schönemann and Steiger’s (1976) regression component analysis, since it is possible to compute the reproduced covariance matrices of the regression components corresponding to different factor score estimates. It was shown that Thurstone’s, Ledermann’s, Bartlett’s, Anderson-Rubin’s, McDonald’s, Krijnen, Wansbeek, and Ten Berge’s, as well as Takeuchi, Yanai, and Mukherjee’s score estimates reproduce the same covariance matrix. In contrast, Harman’s ideal variables score estimates lead to a different reproduced covariance matrix.     

Pooling data versus averaging model fits for some prototypical multinomial processing tree models

For a study with multinomial data where there are n_g individuals and with each person having n_r test trials, the question arises as to how to fit the parameters of a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model. Should each parameter be estimated for each individual and then averaged to obtain a group estimate, or should the frequencies in the multinomial categories be pooled so that the model is fit once for the entire group? This basic question is explored with a series of Monte Carlo simulations for some prototypical MPT models. There is a general finding of a pooling advantage for the case where there is a single experimental condition. Also when there are different experimental conditions, there is reduced bias for detecting condition differences for a method based on the pooled data. Although the focus of the paper is on multinomial models, a general theorem is advanced that establishes a basic condition that determines whether there is or is not a difference between the averaging of individual estimates and the estimate based on the pooled data.     

Expect the Best and Prepare for the Worst: Anticipatory Coping and Preparations for Y2K

The Y2K Bug, the programming glitch expected to derail computerized systems worldwide when the year changed from 1999 to 2000, provided a rich context for examining anticipatory coping and preparatory behaviors. In the last 2 months of 1999, 697 respondents completed an online survey of proactivity, worry about Y2K, dispositional optimism, primary and secondary control-oriented coping efforts, estimates of Y2K-related disruptions, and household preparations. Higher levels of proactivity, worry, and optimism were independently associated with greater self-reported preparations. These predictors were positively associated with greater primary control-oriented coping efforts, but showed differential relations to secondary control efforts, such as accepting the situation or trusting a higher power, especially among participants who thought the damage would be severe and lasting. Implications for understanding multiple ways of coping with potential stressors are discussed.

Percentile Norms and Accompanying Interval Estimates from an Australian General Adult Population Sample for Self‐Report Mood Scales (BAI,BDI, CRSD,CES‐D,DASS, DASS‐21, STAI‐X,STAI‐Y,SRDS, and SRAS)

Despite their widespread use, many self‐report mood scales have very limited normative data. To rectify this, Crawford et al. have recently provided percentile norms for a series of self‐report scales. The present study aimed to extend the work of Crawford et al. by providing percentile norms for additional mood scales based on samples drawn from the general Australian adult population. Participants completed a series of self‐report mood scales. The resultant normative data were incorporated into a computer programme that provides point and interval estimates of the percentile ranks corresponding to raw scores for each of the scales. The programme can be used to obtain point and interval estimates of the percentile ranks of an individual's raw scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Depression Inventory, the Carroll Rating Scale for Depression, the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Rating Scale for Depression, the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS), the short‐form version of the DASS (DASS‐21), the Self‐rating Scale for Anxiety, the Self‐rating Scale for Depression, the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), form X, and the STAI, form Y, based on normative sample sizes ranging from 497 to 769. The interval estimates can be obtained using either classical or Bayesian methods as preferred. The programme (which can be downloaded at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~psy086/dept/MoodScore_Aus.htm ) provides a convenient and reliable means of obtaining the percentile ranks of individuals' raw scores on self‐report mood scales.     

Desire for control and optimistic time predictions

Halkjelsvik, T., Rognaldsen, M. & Teigen, K. H. (2012). Desire for control and optimistic time predictions. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 499–505. Few studies have investigated individual differences in time predictions. We report two experiments that show an interaction between the personality trait Desirability of Control and reward conditions on predictions of performance time. When motivated to perform a task quickly, participants with a strong desire for control produced more optimistic predictions than those with a weaker desire for control. This effect could also be observed for a completely uncontrollable task. The results are discussed in relation to the finding that power produces more optimistic predictions, and extend this work by ruling out some previously suggested explanations.     

Manipulating the reported age in earliest memories

ABSTRACT

Previous work suggests that the estimated age in adults’ earliest autobiographical memories depends on age information implied by the experimental context [e.g., Kingo, O. S., Bohn, A., & Krøjgaard, P. (2013). Warm-up questions on early childhood memories affect the reported age of earliest memories in late adolescence. Memory, 21(2), 280–284. doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.729598] and that the age in decontextualised snippets of memory is younger than in more complete accounts (i.e., event memories [Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L. A., Robinson, J. A., Phillips-Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. C. (2005). Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 567–576. doi:10.3758/BF03195324]). We examined the malleability of the estimated age in undergraduates’ earliest memories and its relation with memory quality. In Study 1 (n?=?141), vignettes referring to events happening at age 2 rendered earlier reported ages than examples referring to age 6. Exploratory analyses suggested that event memories were more sensitive to the age manipulation than memories representing a single, isolated scene (i.e., snapshots). In Study 2 (n?=?162), asking self-relevant and public-event knowledge questions about participants’ preschool years prior to retrieval yielded comparable average estimated ages. Both types of semantic knowledge questions rendered earlier memories than a no-age control task. Overall, the reported age in snapshots was younger than in event memories. However, age-differences between memory types across conditions were not statistically significant. Together, the results add to the growing literature indicating that the average age in earliest memories is not as fixed as previously thought.