Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010 Perner, J. and Rafetseder, E. 2010. “Counterfactual and other forms of conditional reasoning: Children lost in the nearest possible world”. In Understanding counterfactuals/Understanding causation, Edited by: Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Beck, S. R. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar]). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers.     

A Comparison of Multilevel Imputation Schemes for Random Coefficient Models: Fully Conditional Specification and Joint Model Imputation with Random Covariance Matrices

Abstract

Literature addressing missing data handling for random coefficient models is particularly scant, and the few studies to date have focused on the fully conditional specification framework and “reverse random coefficient” imputation. Although it has not received much attention in the literature, a joint modeling strategy that uses random within-cluster covariance matrices to preserve cluster-specific associations is a promising alternative for random coefficient analyses. This study is apparently the first to directly compare these procedures. Analytic results suggest that both imputation procedures can introduce bias-inducing incompatibilities with a random coefficient analysis model. Problems with fully conditional specification result from an incorrect distributional assumption, whereas joint imputation uses an underparameterized model that assumes uncorrelated intercepts and slopes. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that biases from these issues are tolerable if the missing data rate is 10% or lower and the sample is composed of at least 30 clusters with 15 observations per group. Furthermore, fully conditional specification tends to be superior with intraclass correlations that are typical of crosssectional data (e.g., ICC?=?.10), whereas the joint model is preferable with high values typical of longitudinal designs (e.g., ICC?=?.50).     

Reflections on stimulus control

The topic of stimulus control is too broad and complex to be traceable here. It would probably take a two-semester course to cover just the highlights of that field's evolution. The more restricted topic of equivalence relations has itself become so broad that even an introductory summary requires more time than we have available. An examination of relations between equivalence and the more general topic of stimulus control, however, may reveal characteristics of both the larger and the more limited field that have not been generally discussed. Consideration of these features may in turn foster future developments within each area. I speak, of course, about aspects of stimulus control that my own experiences have made salient to me; others would surely emphasize different characteristics of the field. It is my hope that cooperative interactions among researchers and theorists who approach stimulus control from different directions will become more common than is currently typical.     

Beyond Language: Using Logic to Introduce New Philosophical Distinctions

Philosophy has to be communicable in language, and therefore, whatever it has to say must be expressible in (some) language. But in order to make progress, philosophy has to gradually extend and improve its terminological apparatus. It is argued that logical formalization is a highly useful tool for discovering and confirming distinctions that are not present in ordinary language or in pre-existing philosophical terminology. In particular, it is proposed that if two usages of a word require different logical formalizations, then that is a strong reason to distinguish between them also in informal philosophy. The distinction between two types of normative conditionals, conditional veritable norms and conditional normative rules, is used as an example to corroborate this proposal.     

What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Three experiments explored what is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment. The task was a simulated medical decision‐making task with each patient having one of two test results and one of two diseases. The test result was highly predictive of the disease for all participants. The base rate of the test result was varied between participants to produce different inverse conditional probabilities of the test result given the disease across conditions. Participants trained using feedback to predict a patient's disease from a test result showed the classic confusion of the inverse error, substituting the forward conditional probability for the inverse conditional probability when tested on it. Additional training on the base rate of the test result did little to improve performance. Training on the joint probabilities, however, produced good performance on either conditional probability. The pattern of results demonstrated that experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance. That natural sampling leads to good performance was not supported. Further, because participants not trained on joint probabilities did, however, know them but still committed the confusion of the inverse error, the hypothesis that having joint probabilities would facilitate performance was not supported. The pattern of results supported the conclusion that people learn all the necessary information from experience in a probabilistic environment, but depending upon what the experience was, it may interfere with their ability to recall to memory the appropriate sample set necessary for estimating or using the inverse conditional probability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informative Aboutness

Pretheoretically, (B) ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but (1) B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, (M) ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but (2) M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by (2), they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting (1). If one responds by giving up (1), is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue that there is. B is uninformative about unbelievers but informative about believers, in the following sense: for any object o, the information that B provides only about o—namely, ‘o is a believer only if o is immortal’—is entailed (and thus rendered redundant) by ‘o is an unbeliever’ but not by ‘o is a believer’.     

Aerobic Fitness Is Associated With Cognitive Control Strategy in Preadolescent Children

The authors used a conditional accuracy function (CAF) method to compute the mean accuracy of multiple reaction time ranges, to investigate the association between aerobic fitness and the utilization of cognitive control strategy during preadolescence. Thirty-eight higher- and lower-fit children were grouped according to their cardiorespiratory capacity (VO_2max) and completed a modified flanker task. Seventeen young adults were recruited as a reference group of maturation. The results showed that higher-fit children exhibited an adult-like performance pattern, and demonstrated increased overall response accuracy compared to lower-fit children, with a disproportionally larger increase in individual responses when the time allowed for discriminative processing was constrained. These findings suggest that aerobic fitness is associated with enhanced cognitive control and development of a more proactive control strategy during flanker task in preadolescent children.     

认知诊断中基于条件期望的距离判别方法

分类是认知诊断评估的一个核心问题。基于观察反应模式与理想反应模式之间的距离的判别方法, 以确定性的理想反应模式为类中心, 而这没有考虑误差, 故未充分利用总体分布信息。为了更充分地利用总体分布信息、提高诊断分类效果和拓展诊断评估的适用性, 本研究提出给定知识状态条件下项目反应模式的条件期望向量为类中心的欧氏距离判别方法, 同时提出认知诊断模型下项目反应函数估计方法以获得这个条件期望向量。模拟研究表明：认知诊断模型下的项目反应函数估计方法得到的条件期望向量返真性较高, 获得的分布信息较准确; 在观察反应模式与理想反应模式差异大的情形下, 基于条件期望向量为类中心的欧氏距离判别方法优于基于理想反应模式为类中心的分类方法(广义距离方法和非参数方法）。研究可为认知诊断分类和等值方法提供一个参考。     

命题内容对青少年条件推理的影响

选取3个具体内容的条件命题作为实验材料,以小四、初一、高一、大三的学生为被试,探讨了命题内容对青少年条件推理的影响机制及其发展特点。结果表明:(1)对同一年级而言,不同内容的条件命题的相同推理(MP、MT、DA、AC)之间表现出显著的差异;对不同年级而言,相同内容的条件命题的四种推理之间也存在显著的差异。(2)青少年的条件推理过程似乎是一种基于对事件发生概率估计的直觉判断,这一判断过程主要取决于个体知识经验的增长和主体认知水平的提高,而用形式逻辑的标准来衡量个体条件推理能力的高低似乎并不妥当。     

A comparison of methods for teaching receptive labeling to children with autism spectrum disorders

Many early intervention curricular manuals recommend teaching auditory-visual conditional discriminations (i.e., receptive labeling) using the simple-conditional method in which component simple discriminations are taught in isolation and in the presence of a distracter stimulus before the learner is required to respond conditionally. Some have argued that this procedure might be susceptible to faulty stimulus control such as stimulus overselectivity (Green, 2001). Consequently, there has been a call for the use of alternative teaching procedures such as the conditional-only method, which involves conditional discrimination training from the onset of intervention. The purpose of the present study was to compare the simple-conditional and conditional-only methods for teaching receptive labeling to 3 young children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders. The data indicated that the conditional-only method was a more reliable and efficient teaching procedure. In addition, several error patterns emerged during training using the simple-conditional method. The implications of the results with respect to current teaching practices in early intervention programs are discussed.