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271.
272.
Eduard Glas 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(1):37-58
A philosophically comprehended account is given of the genesis and evolution of the concept of protein. Characteristic of
this development were not shifts in theory in response to new experimental data, but shifts in the range of questions that
the available experimental resources were fit to cope with effectively. Apart from explanatory success with regard to its
own range of questions, various other selecting factors acted on a conceptual variant, some stemming from a competing set
of research questions, others from an altogether different field of inquiry, and still others from the external environment.
These results are best explained on, hence support, an evolutionary model of the progress of experimental investigation, whose
outlines are briefly discussed.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
273.
In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities. 相似文献