Secondary generalization and categorization in pigeons

In Experiment 1, one group of pigeons learned to classify a set of stimuli into the human language classes cat, flower, car, and chair (categorization); another group learned to classify the same set into arbitrary classes (pseudocategorization). Then, both groups were trained on a new categorization task and their performance compared to that of a control group that had no initial classification training. Hull's (1943) notion of secondary generalization (generalization that is not based on physical similarity but on mediating associations) predicts that categorization experience will facilitate the learning of a new categorization task, whereas pseudocategorization experience will impair it. However, in Experiment 1, performance on the new categorization task was not differently affected by prior experience. In Experiment 2, pigeons initially trained to classify a set of 48 stimuli (original training) were later trained to classify a subset of four of these stimuli using new responses (reassignment training). Then, they were tested on the 44 remaining stimuli. Performance better accorded with original than with reassignment training, indicating that categorization training did not lead to the formation of equivalence classes of stimuli, in which the equivalence relationship is mediated by secondary generalization. The lack of evidence of secondary generalization implies that our pigeons failed to meet Lea's (1984) criterion for conceptual behavior.     

Conceptual and linguistic representations of kinds and classes

We investigate the hypothesis that our conceptual systems provide two formally distinct ways of representing categories by investigating the manner in which lexical nominals (e.g., tree, picnic table) and phrasal nominals (e.g., black bird, birds that like rice) are interpreted. Four experiments found that lexical nominals may be mapped onto kind representations, whereas phrasal nominals map onto class representations but not kind representations. Experiment 1 found that phrasal nominals, unlike lexical nominals, are mapped onto categories whose members need not be of a single kind. Experiments 2 and 3 found that categories named by lexical nominals enter into both class inclusion and kind hierarchies and thus support both class inclusion (is a) and kind specification (kind of) relations, whereas phrasal nominals map onto class representations which support only class inclusion relations. Experiment 4 showed that the two types of nominals represent hierarchical relations in different ways. Phrasal nominals (e.g., white bear) are mapped onto classes that have criteria of membership in addition to those specified by the class picked out by the head noun of the phrase (e.g., bear). In contrast, lexical nominals (e.g., polar bear) specify one way to meet the criteria specified by the more general kind concept (e.g., bear). Implications for the language-conceptual system interface, representation of hierarchical relations, lexicalization, and theories of conceptual combination are discussed.     

Correspondence in parents' and children's concepts of god: Investigating the role of parental values,religious practices and executive functioning

This study examined the extent to which children's concepts of God correspond with their parents' concepts of God. It also examined how parent-context factors and children's executive functioning relate to parent–child conceptual similarity. Parent–child dyads from varied religious and racial backgrounds participated. Dyads had the greatest conceptual similarity concerning God's mind-dependent functions. Though correspondence between parents and children was lowest concerning God's body-dependent functions, dyads were more similar about those functions when parents engaged in more frequent religious practices with their child and thought God was important. Children's concepts of God were unrelated to religious practices, and parent–child conceptual similarity was unrelated to children's age and executive functioning. Simply put, variation among parents' anthropomorphic concepts of God drove variation in parent–child conceptual similarity. Overall, these findings suggest that embodied concepts of God may be most sensitive to cultural input and that socialization practices provide greater insight into parents' anthropomorphic concepts.     

The Five Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale in men in court-mandated treatment for violently abusing their partners

This paper examines the Intimate Partner Violence through the lens of the Moral Foundations Theory in an attempt to better understand the connections between sacredness and violence. Specifically, it aims to explore the usefulness of the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale in a sample of 300 men convicted of domestic violence and to determine the existence of a distinctive profile based on the degree to which they sacralize the five moral foundations. Results show that the sacredness scale presents the hypothesized psychometric properties to be used in such specific sample. They also show that controlling for gender and political orientation men convicted of domestic violence have a clear tendency to sacralize the five moral foundations. The Authority foundation significantly discriminates between violent and non-violent participants while the Purity foundation emerges as a significant predictor of self-reported behaviors and beliefs tapping violence within the violent group.     

The influence of Platonism on mathematics research and theological beliefs

An age-old debate in the philosophy of mathematics is whether mathematics is discovered or invented. There are four popular viewpoints in this debate, namely Platonism, formalism, intuitionism, and logicism. A natural question that arises is whether belief in one of these viewpoints affects the mathematician’s research? In particular, does subscribing to a Platonist or a formalist viewpoint influence how a mathematician conducts research? Does the area of research influence a mathematician’s beliefs on the nature of mathematics? How are the beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics connected to theological beliefs? In order to investigate these questions, five professional research mathematicians were interviewed. The mathematicians worked in diverse areas within analysis, algebra, and within applied mathematics, and had a combined 160 years of research experience. Although none of the mathematicians wanted to be pigeonholed into any one category of beliefs, the study revealed that four of the mathematicians leaned towards Platonism, which runs contrary to the popular notion that Platonism is an exception today. This study revealed that beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics influenced how mathematicians’ conducted research and were deeply connected to their theological beliefs. The findings are presented in the form of vignettes that give an insight into the mathematical and theological belief structures of the mathematicians.     

Sport Psychology Foundations,Organizations, and Related Resources

SUMMARY

The purpose of this article is to introduce psychologists and counselors who work in schools to the field of applied sport psychology. We begin with a brief history of how applied sport psychology developed in North America and other parts of the world. Landmark events such as the development of conferences, professional organizations and scholarly publications are described. This is followed by a discussion of the breadth of services that are typically provided by sport psychologists. The third section examines some of the current issues related to the training of sport psychologists. The final section introduces the reader to organizations, journals, texts, and on-line resources so they may learn more about the theory, research, and practice of Sport psychology.     

文化和情境影响亲属词的概念结构

以摩梭人和汉族的高中生为对象,采用自由分类法,考察在满月酒、结婚和吊唁情境的亲属词概念结构,揭示微观文化情境对亲属关系认知的影响以及与宏观文化情境的交互作用。结果发现:(1)在不同情境下,摩梭人和汉族人对亲属词的分类既有相同之处,又存在差异。两个民族都看重"亲属的亲密程度"和"辈分",但摩梭人还区分"照顾者/被照顾者",汉族人还考虑"性别"和"亲属关系的性质";(2)摩梭人对亲属词的分类体现了母系文化的特征,重视舅舅和外甥在亲属关系中的地位和作用;汉族人对亲属词的分类体现了汉文化的特征,重视媳妇和孙辈在亲属关系中的地位和作用。(3)亲属概念具有核心特征与情境依赖特征。文化和情境通过概念特征的激活和分类标准的采择影响对亲属词的分类。     

Interactions between Learning Sets in Monkeys

Relationships between stage of moral judgment and antecedent social experiences are presented for a non-Western sample of young adults. Cross sectional data are presented for two groups of Kenyan students: 52 University of Nairobi students; and 40 fourth form secondary school Ss. Critical variables are (a) family modernization, (b) attending ethnically pluralistic secondary schools, and (c) living independently away from home. The correlations between moral judgment stage and these three variables are controlled for, and compared to, correlations between stage of moral judgment and age, sex, race, and academic ability (as measured by standardized achievement tests or by grades). The evidence demonstrates associations between moral stage and all three critical variables, though in different ways for the two age levels of Ss.     

I. Kant after Virtue 1

Maclntyre's refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics aims to restore both intelligibility and rationality to moral discourse. In After Virtue he concentrates on showing how intelligible action requires that lives be led within institutional and cultural traditions. But he does not offer a developed account of practical reason which could provide grounds for seeking some rather than other intelligible continuations of lives and traditions. Despite Maclntyre's criticisms of Kant's ethics, a Kantian account of practical reasoning may complement his account of intelligibility. An appropriate interpretation of Kantian ethics is outlined, which escapes Maclntyre's criticisms, allows both for the universal character of basic moral principles and for the historical variability of intelligible action, and which makes moral worth or virtue the centre of the moral life. The refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics may be achieved by a Kantian completion.     

Believing at Will is Possible

There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at will is possible, namely that (1) mind-reading is impossible, (2) in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, (3) in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, (4) TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that (5) if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an important constraint on any version of the thesis that it is psychologically impossible to believe at will. Third, they show us that, contrary to what several philosophers claim or imply, believing at will should not be identified with believing irrespective of—what one considers to be—the truth, nor should believing irrespective of the truth be considered a necessary condition for believing at will.