Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.     

Experimental philosophers,conceptual analysts,and the rest of us

Abstract

Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form ‘x‐at‐t_i is the same person as y‐at‐t_j. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper argues that Slors’ theory either is no theory of personal identity at all or is too weak.Towards the end of the paper, it is indicated how the problem uncovered for Slors’ theory may be avoided.     

中国学生ETPSP误用现象及其与英语学习水平的关系

基于概念整合理论和范畴化原型理论,以对真实语料的统计分析结果为4P-据,探讨了中国英语学习者在1：2语表达过程中的英语单数第三人称代词（ETPSP）误用现象及其原因,结果表明：（1）中国大学生存在普遍的ETPSP误用现象,主要表现为主语he／she、宾语him／her和定语his／her三类间的误用,特别是主语he／she间的误用人数比例高达75％;（2）英语学习水平对ETPSP误用具有重要影响,且主要表现为低水平组对“she”产出的高错误率,主要原因是其对“he（she）”产出错误的认知实时监控能力缺乏。     

Philosophy of Mind,Past and Present

This article attempts to summarize a few criteria of progress in philosophy—clarifying problems; rejecting false theories; opening new perspectives in familiar fields; inventing new arguments or thought experiments; and so on—and to apply them to contemporary philosophy of mind. As a result, the article concludes that while some progress was obvious in the past fifty years, there is much work yet to be done. It then tries to outline a transformation of conceptual analysis needed for further developments in this field. The author argues that conceptual analysis might be revived if it is treated as a clarification of the relations among our natural beliefs.     

Carnapian explications,experimental philosophy,and fruitful concepts

It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes a novel aspect of what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them.     

Heidegger and the Problem of Idealism

This paper contains a discussion of Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation within the more general thesis that using and understanding a language are to be conceived of as a creative and interpretative‐constructional activity. Indeterminacy is considered to be ineliminable. Three scenarios are distinguished concerning, first, the reasons for indeterminacy, second, the kinds of indeterminacy and, third, different levels of a general notion of recursive interpretation. Translational hypotheses are seen as interpretational constructs. The indeterminacy thesis turns out to be a consequence of the externalizing of language, meaning, and epistemology. By means of a three‐leveled interpretation model one can substantiate the crucial aspects, first, that indeterminacy is not an indeterminacy of facts of the matter and, second, that there is a significant difference between indeterminacy and underdetermination. In addition, the relationship between indeterminacy, interpretation, and charity is elucidated. Indeterminacy is seen not as an obstacle to but as a condition for communication. Charity and empathy in dialogue are conditional upon indeterminacy. All three components reveal the interpretative‐constructional character of the inseparable connection of meaning and experience.     

Shyness:“害羞”还是“羞怯”？ ——基于概念与词源学的分析

在人际交往中羞怯是一种普遍存在的现象,西方关于羞怯的系统研究始于上世纪70年代。中国从上世纪末开始关注这一问题,但对“shyness”这一基本术语的翻译却较为混乱并存在分歧：有的学者将其译为“羞怯”,有的则译作“害羞”,究竟哪种译法更准确、更切合shyness的本意？这不仅是一个简单的翻译问题,更涉及到对概念的准确把握及跨文化比较研究中文化对等的要求。本文通过对西方“shyness”概念的梳理及对“羞怯”、“害羞”等词语的中文词源学考证发现,“羞怯”这一译法更接近“shyness”的本意,达致概念互译上的对等。     

权力感的无意识启动:方法研究*

情境性启动法是对权力感进行内隐社会认知研究的重要方法。本研究首先对权力情境性启动的两种启动方法(概念启动和定势启动)进行介绍,接着通过两个实验对两种启动方法在中文背景下的适用性和有效性进行了验证,认为中文材料的概念启动和定势启动是适用和有效的,可以作为国内权力社会认知研究中启动权力的方法。最后对权力概念启动和定势启动的研究范式、方法差异和内在机制进行了讨论。     

道德概念的黑白隐喻表征及其对道德认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法在不同水平上考察道德概念的黑白隐喻表征, 探讨了黑白视知觉对道德认知的影响。实验1a发现, 在词汇选择任务中被试倾向于判断白色希腊文词汇具有道德意义, 判断黑色希腊文词汇具有不道德意义。实验1b通过词性判断任务表明, 当道德词以白色呈现、不道德词以黑色呈现时被试的判断反应更快。实验2显示, 当将道德两难故事呈现在黑色背景上时, 相比于呈现在白色背景上, 被试会在道德评判任务中将故事中人物的行为判断为更加不道德。实验3通过情境实验发现, 相比明亮环境, 在黑暗环境中完成实验的被试会更倾向于认为他人会不公正地对待自己。研究证明, 黑白颜色概念与道德概念的隐喻联结存在心理现实性, 黑白颜色刺激知觉会对道德判断产生影响作用, 且环境的亮度也会影响到人们对道德相关问题的认知判断。