A Surfeit of Naturalism

Philosophers have nothing to lose, and much to gain, by paying close attention to developments in the natural sciences. This insight amounts to a case for a tempered, eclectic naturalism. But the case for naturalism is often overstated. We should not overestimate the heuristic benefits of close attention to scientists’ claims, nor should we give up on traditional “armchair” philosophical methods. We should not draw solely on the natural sciences (at the expense of the humanities) when seeking to enrich and discipline our philosophical theorising. Finally, philosophers should not shy away from criticising some scientists’ claims, at the same time as they learn from others.     

An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

Emotion regulation and peer-rated social functioning: A 4-year longitudinal study

Different emotion regulation strategies have been linked to distinct social outcomes, but only concurrently or in the short-term. The present research employed a 4-year longitudinal design with peer-reported measures of social functioning to examine the long-term social effects of emotion regulation. Individual differences in suppression before entering college predicted weaker social connections (e.g., less close relationships) at the end of college, whereas reappraisal predicted stronger social connections and more favorable sociometric standing (e.g., higher social status). These effects of emotion regulation remained intact even when controlling for baseline social functioning and Big Five personality traits. These findings suggest that individual differences in the use of particular emotion regulation strategies have an enduring impact, shaping the individual’s social environment over time.     

La relevancia de las “partes” en el sistema léxico-conceptual. Revisión de la relación conceptual “parte-todo” y “parte-de” en la actual psicología cognitiva y en la semántica léxica

Resumen

Este trabajo pretende llevar a cabo una doble revisión, teórica y empírica, de los problemas que plantea la relación semántico-conceptual “parte-todo” y “parte-de'. Con ella se pretende poner de manifiesto la relevancia “interdisciplinar” de dicha relación, pues no sólo es objeto de estudio a través de consideracion es formales desde la Filosofía y la Lógica, y de acercamientos más naturales e informales desde la Psicología Cognitiva,—en concreto en categorización—, sino que también es objeto de estudio en sus aspectos lingüísticos y antropológicos y desde acercamientos computacionales en percepción visual. El objetivo es analizar cuál es la naturaleza, propiedades y estatus cognitivo de esta relación, que le otorgan su prioridad y saliencia como una de las características o atributos básicos de las categorías naturales y de eventos. Abordaremos también el problema de su carácter invariante, a través de los presupuestos universalistas subyacentes en que esta se fundamenta,—basados en las regularidades de la naturaleza y en la primacía de la percepción visual—y, por tanto, su posible carácter de primitivo semántico. Por último se abordará su organización, estructura y tipología, a través de las jerarquías “partonímicas” que determina, y sus diferencias con otro tipo de jerarquía básica en la organización conceptual: las taxonomías.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.     

Experimental philosophers,conceptual analysts,and the rest of us

Abstract

Theories of personal identity purport to specify truth conditions for sentences of the form ‘x‐at‐t_i is the same person as y‐at‐t_j. Most philosophers nowadays agree that such truth conditions are to be stated in terms of psychological continuity. However; opinions vary as to how the notion of psychological continuity is to be understood. In a recent contribution to this journal, Slors offers an account in which psychological continuity is spelled out in terms of narrative connectedness between mental states.The present paper argues that Slors’ theory either is no theory of personal identity at all or is too weak.Towards the end of the paper, it is indicated how the problem uncovered for Slors’ theory may be avoided.     

中国学生ETPSP误用现象及其与英语学习水平的关系

基于概念整合理论和范畴化原型理论,以对真实语料的统计分析结果为4P-据,探讨了中国英语学习者在1：2语表达过程中的英语单数第三人称代词（ETPSP）误用现象及其原因,结果表明：（1）中国大学生存在普遍的ETPSP误用现象,主要表现为主语he／she、宾语him／her和定语his／her三类间的误用,特别是主语he／she间的误用人数比例高达75％;（2）英语学习水平对ETPSP误用具有重要影响,且主要表现为低水平组对“she”产出的高错误率,主要原因是其对“he（she）”产出错误的认知实时监控能力缺乏。     

Philosophy of Mind,Past and Present

This article attempts to summarize a few criteria of progress in philosophy—clarifying problems; rejecting false theories; opening new perspectives in familiar fields; inventing new arguments or thought experiments; and so on—and to apply them to contemporary philosophy of mind. As a result, the article concludes that while some progress was obvious in the past fifty years, there is much work yet to be done. It then tries to outline a transformation of conceptual analysis needed for further developments in this field. The author argues that conceptual analysis might be revived if it is treated as a clarification of the relations among our natural beliefs.     

What is A Philosophical Question?

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This article introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico‐mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or “science”) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them.