McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens,colours and cardinals

McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of argument and show that it rests on the assumption that a specific model of justification, the Comparison Model, must apply to all cases of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. We then show that the Comparison Model cannot be applied to McDowell’s new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. As a consequence, McDowell is in need of an alternative model of justification and an alternative argument for conceptualism. We propose such an alternative model of justification based on McDowell’s reading of Sellars, but argue that the model only serves to make the need for an alternative motivation for conceptualism more urgent.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.     

Prosocial behavior increases perceptions of meaning in life

Finding meaning in life is a fundamental personal need, and motivating prosocial behavior is a fundamental societal need. The present research tests whether the two are connected – whether helping other people can increase helpers’ perceptions of meaning in life. Evidence from a nationally representative data-set and two experiments support this hypothesis. Participants who engaged in prosocial behaviors – volunteering and spending money to benefit others – reported experiencing greater meaning in their lives (Studies 1–3). Study 3 also identifies increased self-worth as the mechanism – participants who spent money to benefit other people felt higher personal worth and self-esteem, and this mediated the effect of prosocial behavior on meaningfulness. The present results join other findings in suggesting that the incentives for helping others do not necessarily depend on the prospect of others’ reciprocity. Prosocial behavior can be incentivized through the psychological benefits it creates for prosocial actors.     

Four meanings of “categorization”: A conceptual analysis of research on person perception

It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people. However, the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different underlying definitions in the person perception literature. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle four existing definitions: (a) categorization as representing, (b) categorization as dichotomizing, (c) categorization as organizing, and (d) categorization as grouping. Subsequently, we show that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping stone for more differentiated models of person perception.     

“一”人代言的魅力：品牌代言人数如何影响消费者的品牌态度

有的品牌仅邀请一位名人代言, 而有的品牌由多位名人代言, 那么一人代言还是多人代言会更有效?为了回答该问题, 研究基于形象转移视角和单人积极偏差, 深入探究了品牌代言人数因素(一位代言人vs.多位代言人)对品牌态度的影响机制和边界条件。研究发现：相比品牌多人代言, 品牌单人代言使消费者的品牌态度更高。原因在于消费者与一位(vs.多位)品牌代言人的自我-品牌联结更紧密, 进而促进品牌态度。该品牌代言人效应仅局限于象征型产品, 而对于非身份象征型产品, 品牌单人代言(vs.品牌多人代言)对品牌态度无显著差异。此外, 当多位品牌代言人为一个团体时, 品牌代言人数效应将被逆转, 即品牌多人代言(vs.品牌单人代言)对品牌态度的影响更高。     

直立、蜷曲姿势对情绪概念加工的影响

以133名大学生为被试,采用“姿势-认知”双任务范式,通过两个实验探讨直立、蜷曲姿势对情绪概念加工的影响。实验1采用情绪词效价判断任务（浅加工）,发现无论是判断积极词语还是消极词语,姿势间的差异均不显著;实验2采用情绪词效价评定任务（深加工）,发现蜷曲比直立条件下对消极词语的评分更低,两种姿势在积极词语的评分上差异不显著。研究显示,在情绪概念加工中能够出现“蜷曲-消极”具身效应,该效应仅在认知加工程度较深的任务中出现。     

成为自己的掌舵者：个体自我领导的多层次驱动机制

在信息化、数字化、智能化的新经济背景下,自我领导对组织和个人都有更为积极的价值。然而,已有的自我领导概念与研究局限于控制理论,实证考察多限于单一层次,且未能充分揭示自我领导的驱动机制。首先拓展自我领导的概念内涵,并开发新的测量工具。在此基础上,分别构建个体自我领导的跨层次驱动机制和多层次垂滴模型,并尝试探究个体特征、领导因素、组织情境因素和工作特征等对于个体自我领导的影响。由此,有望为自我领导提供更为丰富、准确、更新的内涵与测量,深化个体自我领导形成的驱动机制及边界条件,也有助于组织实践中有效激发自我领导。     

Reasoning with Slippery Predicates

It is a commonplace that the extensions of most, perhaps all, vague predicates vary with such features as comparison class and paradigm and contrasting cases. My view proposes another, more pervasive contextual parameter. Vague predicates exhibit what I call open texture: in some circumstances, competent speakers can go either way in the borderline region. The shifting extension and anti-extensions of vague predicates are tracked by what David Lewis calls the “conversational score”, and are regulated by what Kit Fine calls penumbral connections, including a principle of tolerance. As I see it, vague predicates are response-dependent, or, better, judgement-dependent, at least in their borderline regions. This raises questions concerning how one reasons with such predicates. In this paper, I present a model theory for vague predicates, so construed. It is based on an overall supervaluationist-style framework, and it invokes analogues of Kripke structures for intuitionistic logic. I argue that the system captures, or at least nicely models, how one ought to reason with the shifting extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague predicates, as borderline cases are called and retracted in the course of a conversation. The model theory is illustrated with a forced march sorites series, and also with a thought experiment in which vague predicates interact with so-called future contingents. I show how to define various connectives and quantifiers in the language of the system, and how to express various penumbral connections and the principle of tolerance. The project fits into one of the topics of this special issue. In the course of reasoning, even with the external context held fixed, it is uncertain what the future extension of the vague predicates will be. Yet we still manage to reason with them. The system is based on that developed, more fully, in my Vagueness in Context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, but some criticisms and replies to critics are incorporated.