From Neo-Kantianism to Logicism: Vvedenskij's Mature Years

In the first two decades of the century Vvedenskij developed and defended what he took to be an original argument in support of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge. This argument, which he hailed as a proof, involved an examination of the four laws of thought alone. As it made no appeal to the highly technical analyses found in Kant's first Critique, Vvedenskij considered it to be more efficient and thereby effective than Kant's own arguments. Although Vvedenskij's estimation of his accomplishment actually increased with the passage of time, the proof rested on highly dubious assumptions.     

Can the Media Create Public Opinion? A Social-Identity Approach

The media remains a powerful presence in U.S. culture. It gives people news of world and local events, it entertains, and it may even function as a companion to children. Because it functions as a window to the outside world, what appears across its landscape actually may become people's reality. Thus, the potential for distorting their view of that world is high if the picture provided is unrepresentative of actual events. For example, the prevalence of violent acts on television has been linked to increased aggression and escalating impressions of a dangerous world, and the overrepresentation of youth and beauty may be a causal factor of eating disorders. In this article, we explore the possibility that the media may also serve as a powerful creator of the very public opinions it seeks to reflect in its news. Subtle nonverbal cues of newscasters have been shown to influence voting behavior, and the media's overrepresentation of the proportion of blacks in poverty may decrease whites' support of welfare. By portraying a world in which people's opinions are based on their ethnic or demographic group membership, the media may also subtly but powerfully create the very opinions they seek to reflect.     

Why Don't People Change? What Stops Them from Changing? An Integrative Commentary on the Special Issue on Resistance

This commentary discusses the four papers from the vantage point of a cognitive-developmental view. Psychotherapeutic change involving changes in core cognitive structures is seen as threatening an individual's personal sense of identity as well as security and safety needs. Core cognitive constructs are laid down early via the principle of covariation of events and form the basis of our tacit knowledge base. Subsequent changes in this tacit knowledge is difficult because the core cognitive constructs act like a mental filter to screen in confirming data and screen out disconfirming data. Ambiguous stimuli tend to be interpreted on the basis of preexisting cognitive constructs, even when the match between event and interpretation is not ideal. Several suggestions are given for increasing the probability of changes occurring in core cognitive constructs.     

The Effects of a Self-Management Program in Reducing Off-Task Behavior

Two adolescents with learning disabilities were taught to use a self-management program to decrease off-task behavior in two general education classes and a study hall class. The self-management program included three components—a checklist, a behavior rating scale, and a self-monitoring form. A multiple baseline design was implemented across settings for each participant. The findings indicated that the self-management program was successful in all three settings in decreasing off-task behaviors. Additionally, the teacher ratings of student behavior were found to increase during self-monitoring, suggesting the overall behavior of the students improved during the self-management program. The results are discussed in terms of the novelty of using teacher ratings of student behavior to demonstrate a relationship between the implementation of the self-management program and teacher reports of changes in other classroom behaviors.     

The National Research Council Report on the Prevention of Reading Difficulties in Young Children and the Process of Dubitation

The author examines two significant issues, the adjudication of evidence and the architecture of instruction in the context of research on beginning reading. In particular, he reflects on his participation as a member of the National Research Council's committee that published the recent report entitled Preventing Reading Difficulties in Young Children (1998). The National Academy of Sciences panel of experts process is contrasted with a more explicit process for codifying scientific evidence and including quantitative experimental research as the primary source of evidence. In addition, the author argues for the importance of attending to the architecture of instruction in beginning reading.     

A Practitioner's Perspective of Preventing Reading Difficulties in Young Children

In this paper, the report by the Committee on the Prevention of Reading Difficulties in Young Children is discussed from a practitioner's perspective. The many and notable strengths are described, including the comprehensive review of the topic, the balanced manner of the report's conclusions, and the way in which the report was written. The weaknesses of the report also are presented.     

Client Advocacy and Collaboration with Insurance and Laboratory Testing Agencies: A Case Study Illustrating Genetic Counselor Roles

Genetic counseling and the many roles a genetic counselor must assume to provide quality genetic health care are becoming increasingly complex, especially when the genetic condition is rare, and DNA testing is costly and not yet routinely used. A case study of a couple with a family history of retinoblastoma and their pursuit of DNA testing for prenatal diagnosis is presented. The case study illustrates the instrumental role of the genetic counselor in advocating for clients for genetic services such as DNA testing and in educating insurance companies in the nature and importance of such services to achieve improved client health care outcomes.     

Changing explanatory frameworks in the U.S. government’s attempt to define research misconduct

Nearly two decades of debate have not settled the definition of research misconduct. The literature provides four explanatory frameworks for misconduct. The paper examines these frameworks and maps them onto efforts by the U.S. Public Health Service to define research misconduct and subsequent responses to these efforts by the scientific community. The changing frameworks suggest that closure will not be achieved without an authoritative effort, which may occur through the Research Integrity Panel’s recent attempt to create a government-wide definition.     

Keeping Up with the Cloneses -- Issues in Human Cloning

The advent of cloning animals has created a maelstrom of social concern about the ethical issues associated with the possibility of cloning humans. When the ethical concerns are clearly examined, however, many of them turn out to be less matters of rational ethics than knee-jerk emotion, religious bias, or fear of that which is not understood. Three categories of real and spurious ethical concerns are presented and discussed: 1) that cloning is intrinsically wrong, 2) that cloning must lead to bad consequences, and 3) that cloning harms the organism generated. The need for a rational ethical framework for discussing biotechnological advances is presented and defended.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.