A mechanism for biasing the appraisal process in affective agents

In this paper we present a mechanism to model the influence of agents’ internal and external factors on the emotional evaluation of stimuli in computational models of emotions. We propose the modification of configurable appraisal dimensions (such as desirability and pleasure) based on influencing factors. As part of the presented mechanism, we introduce influencing models to define the relationship between a given influencing factor and a given set of configurable appraisal dimensions utilized in the emotional evaluation phase. Influencing models translate factors’ influences (on the emotional evaluation) into fuzzy logic adjustments (e.g., a shift in the limits of fuzzy membership functions), which allow biasing the emotional evaluation of stimuli. We implemented a proof-of-concept computational model of emotions based on real-world data about individuals’ emotions. The obtained empirical evidence indicates that the proposed mechanism can properly affect the emotional evaluation of stimuli while preserving the overall behavior of the model of emotions.     

In defence of modal essentialism

Kit Fine’s arguments in Essence and Modality are widely accepted as being a decisive blow against modal essentialism. A selection of replies exist that have done little to counter the general view that modally construed essence is out of touch with what we really mean when we make essentialist claims. I argue that Fine’s arguments fail to strike a decisive blow, and I suggest a new interpretation of the debate that shows why Fine’s arguments fall short of achieving their goal.     

The Square Circle

This article shows that there are square circles (or equivalently, round squares) in the sense that there are mathematical objects that are at the same time both perfectly circular and perfectly square. The philosophical significance of this is discussed, especially in view of philosophy's widespread use of “square circle” as a typical example of an impossibility. In particular, the focus is on what the existence of square circles means for the possibility of conceptual analysis, and more generally what we can learn about the nature of non‐formal concepts and their use in philosophy.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying

According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies (consistent bald-faced lies, conflicting bald-faced lies, and indifferent lies). Then we asked participants to judge whether the scenario at hand was a lie, whether the speaker intended to deceive somebody, and how they would judge the behavior in terms of morality. As expected, our results indicate that the intention to deceive is not a necessary condition for lying. Participants rated indifferent lies to be lies and judged that no intention to deceive was involved in these cases. In addition, all bald-faced lies were evaluated as lies. However, participants widely ascribed an intention to deceive to bald-faced lies, which thus might not apply as counterexamples against the traditional definition of lying. Besides, lies are judged as morally wrong regardless of an intention to deceive.     

我对卒中单元的体会

卒中单元作为卒中治疗的最佳模式,逐渐被临床医生所接受,就卒中单元的概念、特点及我国卒中的现状等多数人所关心的问题进行了分析和探讨,以助于更好的理解。     

中-英双语语义通达机制的启动效应实验

采用不同加工水平的词汇判断任务,考察了启动刺激对目标刺激的启动效应,来探讨中英双语的语义通达机制。被试为大学生38名。结果发现：当启动刺激（英）和目标刺激（英）之间存在语义联想关系,得到了显著的启动效应（实验一）;当启动刺激（中）和目标刺激（英）之间存在语义联想关系,也得到了显著的跨语言启动效应（实验二）;当启动刺激（中）的翻译对等词和目标刺激（英）之间存在语音相同或相近关系时,采用基于语音的词汇判断任务,也得到了显著的跨语言启动效应。这一结果表明,对于中英双语者来说,第二语言的词汇表征既直接通达语义概念表征,又可以借助第一语言的词汇表征为中介再通达语义概念表征。     

文本阅读中概念提取的研究进展

文章对文本阅读中概念提取的研究进行了系统的介绍,虽然研究者得出了不同的结论,但都力图揭示文本阅读中概念提取的信息加工机制。文章在此基础上对影响文本阅读中概念提取的因素进行初步分析．发现文本类型、文本中心确定方式和抑制是主要因素。其中,文本中心确定方式是最主要的影响因素。     

不熟练汉英双语学习者第二语言词汇和概念表征的特点

本研究采用翻译识别任务探查了不同熟练程度的汉英双语儿童的词汇和概念表征的特点。被试为从一年级开始学习英语的小学三、五年级和初中一年级儿童共50名,结果发现．各组被试在进行翻译识别时．反应错误率随着熟练程度的提高逐渐降低,且各组被试都产生了显著的正字法干扰效应和语义干扰效应。这一结果表明,不熟练的汉英双语儿童可以通过词汇联系和概念联系加工第二语言中的词。     

幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征及其与心理理论水平的关系

研究探讨了3～4岁幼儿说谎认知的年龄特征,并在此基础上考察了说谎的概念理解水平与道德评价之问的关系,及说谎认知与心理理论水平的关系。结果表明：3岁和4岁幼儿在说谎和说真话概念的判断上年龄差异显著,在对说谎的道德评价上,年龄差异不显著;幼儿心理理论与说谎概念的相关显著,4岁组的心理理论与道德评价的相关显著。