颜色知觉恒常理论的回顾

本文对早期颜色恒常理论、系数理论、计算理论和 Octant模型作了简要回顾 ,并结合已有的研究成果进行评述。对影响颜色恒常性机制的主要因素进行了探讨。强调了知觉经验、记忆、认知决策等高级意识活动对颜色恒常知觉的作用 ,并尝试性地提出了描述颜色恒常知觉过程的一般参照框架。     

Moving Ahead on Southgate’s Compound Only-Way Evolutionary Theodicy

Southgate offers a remarkable evolutionary theodicy that includes six affirmations and arguments; together they form a unique and very persuasive proposal which he terms a “compound only-way evolutionary theodicy.” Here I summarize the arguments and offer critical reflections on them for further development, with an emphasis on the ambiguity in the goodness of creation; the role of thermodynamics in evolutionary biology; the challenge of horrendous evil in nature; and the theological response to theodicy in terms of eschatology, with its own severe challenge from cosmology. Using a text box, I suggest how the 6 arguments create a unique synthetic whole, and how the removal of any one of them would diminish the argument as a whole. I then suggest how Southgate’s treatment of the key question, “Why not just heaven?” adds a crucial seventh argument to produce an even more splendid and promising whole.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

结核病诊治进展与科技革命

现代科技革命极大地促进了结核病各方面的发展.微生物学和免疫学的发展,揭示了结核病的病因、发病机制、病理生理的本质,分子生物学技术使结核病的基础研究不仅停留在器官、细胞水平,而是深入到蛋白质、核酸、基因的水平;基因治疗的方法可望从根本上治疗结核病.高新技术的产物如X线照片、电子计算机断层扫描、纤维支气管镜检查和新药的出现等极大地提高了临床诊治的能力.借助于各种先进的医疗设备而进行精确的诊断,基因治疗将成为一种崭新的治疗手段.     

Children’s scale errors are a natural consequence of learning to associate objects with actions: A computational model

Young children sometimes attempt an action on an object, which is inappropriate because of the object size—they make scale errors. Existing theories suggest that scale errors may result from immaturities in children's action planning system, which might be overpowered by increased complexity of object representations or developing teleofunctional bias. We used computational modelling to emulate children's learning to associate objects with actions and to select appropriate actions, given object shape and size. A computational Developmental Deep Model of Action and Naming (DDMAN) was built on the dual‐route theory of action selection, in which actions on objects are selected via a direct (nonsemantic or visual) route or an indirect (semantic) route. As in case of children, DDMAN produced scale errors: the number of errors was high at the beginning of training and decreased linearly but did not disappear completely. Inspection of emerging object–action associations revealed that these were coarsely organized by shape, hence leading DDMAN to initially select actions based on shape rather than size. With experience, DDMAN gradually learned to use size in addition to shape when selecting actions. Overall, our simulations demonstrate that children's scale errors are a natural consequence of learning to associate objects with actions.     

Integrating a cognitive computational model of planning and decision-making considering affective information

Planning and decision-making are two of the cognitive functions involved in the solution of problems. These functions, among others, have been studied from the point of view of a new field known as cognitive informatics focused on the development of cognitive architectures, autonomous agents, and human robots that are capable of showing human-like behavior. We present an exhaustive study of current biological and computational models proposed in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive informatics. Also, we present a deep review of the brain areas involved in planning, decision-making, and affection. However, the majority of the proposed computational models are seeking to mimic human external behavior. This paper aims to contribute to the cognitive informatics field with an innovative cognitive computational model of planning and decision-making. The two main differences of our model with respect to the current models in the literature are: (i) our model considers affective and motivational information as a basic and essential trigger in planning and decision-making processes; (ii) our model attempts to mimic both the internal human brain as well as the external human behavior. We developed a computational model capable of offering a direct mapping from human brain areas to computational modules of our model. Thus, in this paper we present our model from a conceptual, formal, and computational approach in order to show how our proposal must be implemented. Finally, a set of tests were conducted in order to validate our proposal. These tests show an interesting comparison between the behavior of our prototype and the behavior exhibited by some people involved in a case study.     

Intuitive biological thought: Developmental changes and effects of biology education in late adolescence

A large body of cognitive research has shown that people intuitively and effortlessly reason about the biological world in complex and systematic ways. We addressed two questions about the nature of intuitive biological reasoning: How does intuitive biological thinking change during adolescence and early adulthood? How does increasing biology education influence intuitive biological thinking? To do so, we developed a battery of measures to systematically test three components of intuitive biological thought: anthropocentric thinking, teleological thinking and essentialist thinking, and tested 8th graders and university students (both biology majors, and non-biology majors). Results reveal clear evidence of persistent intuitive reasoning among all populations studied, consistent but surprisingly small differences between 8th graders and college students on measures of intuitive biological thought, and consistent but again surprisingly small influence of increasing biology education on intuitive biological reasoning. Results speak to the persistence of intuitive reasoning, the importance of taking intuitive knowledge into account in science classrooms, and the necessity of interdisciplinary research to advance biology education. Further studies are necessary to investigate how cultural context and continued acquisition of expertise impact intuitive biology thinking.     

Virtual personalities: Using computational modeling to understand within-person variability

How can the same underlying psychological/neurobiological system result in both stable between-individual differences and high levels of within-individual variability in personality states over time and situations? We argue that both types of variability result from a psychological system based on structured, chronic motivations, where behavior at a specific point in time is a joint function of the current availability of motive affordances in the situation, current motivationally relevant bodily or interoceptive states, and the result of the competition among alternative active motives. Here we present a biologically-based theoretical framework, embodied in two different computational models, that shows how individuals with stable personality characteristics, can nevertheless exhibit considerable within-person variability in personality states across time and situations.