EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE

Abstract. The last century has witnessed a succession of revolutionary transformations in the discipline of biology. However, the rapid expansion of our understanding of life and its nature has had curiously little impact on the way that questions about life and its significance have been discussed by philosophers. This paper explores the answers that biology provides to central questions about our existence, and it examines why the substitution of causal explanations for teleological ones appears natural and satisfying in the case of physical theory but meets widespread resistance in the case of biology.     

EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MORALITY AND THE MANIPULATIVE USE OF SIGNALS

Abstract. Several attempts have recently been made to explain moral systems and moral sentiments in light of evolutionary biological theory. It may be helpful to modify and extend this project with the help of a theory of communication developed by ethologists. The core of this approach is the idea that signals are best seen as attempts to manipulate others rather than as attempts to inform them. This addition helps to clarify some problematic areas in the evolutionary study of morals, and it generates new, testable predictions about moral statements.     

Deterministic Chaos and Computational Complexity: the Case of Methodological Complexity Reductions

Some problems rarely discussed in traditional philosophy of science are mentioned: The empirical sciences using mathematico-quantitative theoretical models are frequently confronted with several types of computational problems posing primarily methodological limitations on explanatory and prognostic matters. Such limitations may arise from the appearances of deterministic chaos and (too) high computational complexity in general. In many cases, however, scientists circumvent such limitations by utilizing reductional approximations or complexity reductions for intractable problem formulations, thus constructing new models which are computationally tractable. Such activities are compared with reduction types (more) established in philosophy of science. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Evolutionary Psychology: The Wheat and the Chaff

Evolutionary approaches are on the rise in the social sciences and have the potential to bring an all–encompassing conceptual framework to the study of human behavior. Together with neuroscience, which is digging the grave of mind–body dualism, evolutionary psychology is bound to undermine the still reigning human–animal dualism. If a Darwinian reshaping of the social sciences seems inevitable, even desirable, this should not be looked at as a hostile takeover. The underlying theme of this essay is that it is time for psychologists to join the Darwinian revolution, yet the essay also critically reviews current evolutionary psychology. It questions the loose application of adaptationist thinking and the fragmentation of the genome, behavior, and the brain. From biology we learn that not every species–typical trait is necessarily advantageous, and from neuroscience we learn that not every psychological ability or tendency necessarily needs to have its own specialized brain circuitry. But even if the concept of adaptation is hard to apply, psychologists would do well to start looking at human behavior in the light of evolution.     

The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design

Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual representation, namely, the nature of the perceptual encoding. One of the drawbacks of inverse-optics approaches has been the difficulty in defining the constraints needed to make the inference computationally tractable (e.g. regularity assumptions, Bayesian priors, etc.). These constraints, thought to be learned assumptions about the nature of the physical and optical structures of the external world, have to be incorporated into any workable computational model in the inverse-optics paradigm. But inference models that employ an inverse optics plus structural assumptions approach inevitably result in a naïve realist theory of perceptual representation. Another drawback of inference models for theories of perceptual representation is their inability to explain central features of the visual experience. The one most evident in the process and visual understanding of design is the fact that some visual configurations appear, often spontaneously, as perceptually more coherent than others. The epistemological consequences of inferential approaches to vision indicate that they fail to capture enduring aspects of our visual experience. Therefore they may not be suited to a theory of perceptual representation, or useful for an understanding of the role of perception in the design process and product.     

The relation between essentialist beliefs and evolutionary reasoning

Historians of science have pointed to essentialist beliefs about species as major impediments to the discovery of natural selection. The present study investigated whether such beliefs are impediments to learning this concept as well. Participants (43 children aged 4–9 and 34 adults) were asked to judge the variability of various behavioral and anatomical properties across different members of the same species. Adults who accepted within-species variation—both actual and potential—were significantly more likely to demonstrate a selection-based understanding of evolution than adults who denied within-species variation. The latter demonstrated an alternative, incorrect understanding of evolution and produced response patterns that were both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those produced by preschool-aged children. Overall, it is argued that psychological essentialism, although a useful bias for drawing species-wide inductions, leads individuals to devalue within-species variation and, consequently, to fail to understand natural selection.     

Bewitchment, biology, or both: the co-existence of natural and supernatural explanatory frameworks across development

Three studies examined the co-existence of natural and supernatural explanations for illness and disease transmission, from a developmental perspective. The participants (5-, 7-, 11-, and 15-year-olds and adults; N = 366) were drawn from 2 Sesotho-speaking South African communities, where Western biomedical and traditional healing frameworks were both available. Results indicated that, although biological explanations for illness were endorsed at high levels, witchcraft was also often endorsed. More important, bewitchment explanations were neither the result of ignorance nor replaced by biological explanations. Instead, both natural and supernatural explanations were used to explain the same phenomena, and bewitchment explanations were highest among adults. Taken together, these data provide insight into how diverse, culturally constructed belief systems about illness co-exist across development.     

A BIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF THE SCIENCE‐RELIGION DIALOGUE IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY

In recent issues of Zygon, numerous reflections have been published commenting on where the field of science‐and‐religion has been, where it presently stands, and where it should move in the future. These reflections touch on the importance of the dialogue and raise questions as to what audience the dialogue addresses and whom it should address. Some scholars see the dialogue as prospering, while others point out that much work needs to be done to make the dialogue more accessible to a larger audience and more successful at tackling the provocative questions before us. Other academics view the questions themselves as needing further consideration and focus before answers to them can even be explored. In this article I provide a general overview of these essays by outlining some general categories of thought that seem to emerge from the contributors. I then present some of my own opinions concerning the future of the science‐religion field and emphasize that the dialogue, in addition to its traditional roles, must further the philosophical framework that can aid humanity in resolving the most pressing global concerns of our time.     

Multiple Systems in Decision Making: A Neurocomputational Perspective

ABSTRACT— Various psychological models posit the existence of two systems that contribute to decision making. The first system is bottom-up, automatic, intuitive, emotional, and implicit, while the second system is top-down, controlled, deliberative, and explicit. It has become increasingly evident that this dichotomy is both too simplistic and too vague. Here we consider insights gained from a different approach, one that considers the multiple computational demands of the decision-making system in the context of neural mechanisms specialized to accomplish some of that system's more basic functions. The use of explicit computational models has led to (a) identification of core trade-offs imposed by a single-system solution to cognitive problems that are solved by having multiple neural systems, and (b) novel predictions that can be tested empirically and that serve to further refine the models.     

学前儿童对疾病的认知

通过三个研究分别探查了教育条件不同的两组学前儿童能否以疾病这一生命现象为指标做出生物和非生物的本体区分;他们是否理解疾病的产生和康复不受心理意图控制;以及他们对疾病原因的认识。结果显示,3、4、5岁学前儿童在分类作业中的认知成绩随年龄逐渐提高,他们能够认识疾病不受意图控制。其对疾病原因的解释既不用意图也不用道德准则,而主要是从行为水平,表现出“朴素生物学”的认知,但其认知与成人的认知和科学的生物学概念有明显差距。教育条件影响儿童的疾病认知成绩