Why Not Now? Karlstadt's Whether We Should Proceed Slowly and Avoid Offending the Weak in Matters that Concern God's Will (1524)

Abstract

Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt's Whether We Should Proceed Slowly [Ob man gemach faren soll] in 1524 was no best seller, and the work is often overlooked today. However, its author was a prolific publisher, especially of German tracts, in the early sixteenth century. His influence upon other so-called radical reformers remains yet to be measured adequately. Despite the fact that Gemach was written shortly before Karlstadt's expulsion from Electoral Saxony, its thesis resonated strongly with other writers who were disenchanted with the trajectory of reforms in Wittenberg after 1522. A careful analysis of Karlstadt's argumentation reveals a rigorous reliance upon Old Testament texts, and it represents the development of a position that holds the Christian congregation responsible for implementing reforms in worship that are mandated in God's commands. As Karlstadt's response to Luther's Invocavit Sermons (preached in March 1522 and published outside Wittenberg in 1523), Gemach shows what Gordon Rupp called Karlstadt's ‘best polemical writing.'     

From consulting room to institution to society

Abstract

An examination of the links between clinical work and the context in which it takes place. The article will explore how the dynamics of the staff group can spill over into the consulting room and how unresolved issues in the consulting room can spill over into the staff group. It will also explore how the dynamics of both can be affected by broader social and political attitudes.     

Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Arguing at Cross-Purposes: Discharging the Dialectical Obligations of the Coalescent Model of Argumentation

The paper addresses the manner in which the theory of Coalescent Argumentation [CA] has been received by the Argumentation Theory community. I begin (section 2) by providing a theoretical overview of the Coalescent model of argumentation as developed by Michael A. Gilbert (1997). I next engage the several objections that have been raised against CA (section 3). I contend that objectors to the Coalescent model are not properly sensitive to the theoretical consequences of the genuinely situated nature of argument. I conclude (section 4) by suggesting that the resolution to the dispute between Gilbert and his objectors hinges on the outcome of several foundational theoretical questions identified over the course of the paper.     

The Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach to Argumentation

This paper describes the development of pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentative discourse. First the development of the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is explained, with the rules that are to be complied with in order to avoid fallacies from occurring. Then the integration is discussed of rhetorical insight in the dialectical framework. In this endeavour, the concept of strategic manoeuvring is explained that allows for a more refined and more profoundly justified analysis of argumentative discourse and a better identification of fallacies. The paper ends with a brief overview of current research projects.     

Argumentational Integrity: A Training Program for Dealing with Unfair Argumentative Contributions

In this article we present a training program based on the empirical research conducted in the project 'argumentational integrity'. After a brief sketch of the problem dimensions concerning unfair argumentation we give an overview of the training concept and the underlying empirical research. Exemplification of the instructional design is given for the second and the fifth training dimension (standards of argumentational integrity and reactions to unfair contributions). Finally we indicate how the training is to be evaluated and present initial results demonstrating that in comparison with an untrained control group participants in the training significantly improve their skills in identifying and naming argumentative rule violations.     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.     

Experiences of Healing Touch and Counseling on a Bereaved Population: A Grounded Theory

Grounded theory was selected as a way to develop a theory about the potential adjunctive use of energy healing in the form of healing touch (HT) along with counseling on a bereaved population. Semi-structured interviews were conducted twice with clients and once with the counselors and HT practitioners. Results indicated that the participants agreed that both counseling and HT operated well together to provide bereavement support. The themes of trust, openness, intention, and spirituality within the holistic context seemed to make this model possible. Potential ethical concerns are discussed, as well as areas for future research and clinical applications.     

Learning words and learning sounds: Advances in language development

Phonological development is sometimes seen as a process of learning sounds, or forming phonological categories, and then combining sounds to build words, with the evidence taken largely from studies demonstrating ‘perceptual narrowing’ in infant speech perception over the first year of life. In contrast, studies of early word production have long provided evidence that holistic word learning may precede the formation of phonological categories. In that account, children begin by matching their existing vocal patterns to adult words, with knowledge of the phonological system emerging from the network of related word forms. Here I review evidence from production and then consider how the implicit and explicit learning mechanisms assumed by the complementary memory systems model might be understood as reconciling the two approaches.