Does Arguing from Coherence Make Sense?

In this paper the argument from coherence is submitted to a critical analysis. First, it is argued to be a complex form of coordinative argumentation, structured on various argumentative levels. Then, using the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation a distinction is brought out between two basic forms of the argument from coherence: in one use this argument occurs as a sequence of two symptomatic arguments; in the other use we have a main symptomatic argument supported by a subordinate pragmatic argument. Finally, from an evaluative point of view it is assessed whether the argument from coherence can be found acceptable as a tool for settling disputes. It is claimed that in general, we can welcome this argumentative structure as sound and fully acceptable provided that we are aware of the interpretative discretion its use implies. A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the symposium organised by the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdamon the 27/02/04. I wish to express my indebtedness to Dora Achourioti, Francesco Belvisi, Frans van Eemeren, Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen, Jean Wagemans, Peter Houtlosser, and Henrike Jansen for their helpful remarks. Needless to say, the responsibility for the views expressed herein as well as for any errors of form or content rests solely with me.     

E Contrario Reasoning: The Dilemma of the Silent Legislator

Summary This contribution offers an evaluation of e contrario reasoning in which the interpretation of a legal rule is based on the context of the law system (contextual e contrario reasoning). A model is presented which will show all the explicit and implicit elements of the argument at work and will also point out how these distinct parts are interrelated. By questioning the content and justificatory power of these elements, the weak spots in the argument can be laid bare. It will be argued that e contrario reasoning inevitably requires a dubious argumentative step, which renders the argument intrinsically weak. The model is applied to a European lawsuit on French cheese.     

Rhetorical Argumentation in Italian Academic Discourse

The recent trend in institutional communication research seems to foster the image of the University as a private organization significantly oriented towards a policy of customer satisfaction. Following the concept of organizational culture, institutional settings too are conceived as organizational contexts, where discourse is a privileged vehicle to convey and spread values, traditions and artifacts, both through internal and external communication practices. Thus, within academic discourse organizational culture is shaped and perpetuated by specific devices of rhetorical argumentation. The corpus of data consists of two different examples of academic discourse: the self promotional endorsement letters of the academic candidates to the chancellor’s position on occasion of the elections and the inaugural speeches proclaimed by the chancellors in charge during the opening celebration of the academic year. The first kind of academic discourse could be meant as an example of political discourse since the candidates use communication strategically and manipulate their academic membership as a rhetorical device to support their aims. On the other hand, the second example is a mere celebration of academic culture which through linguistic rituals recalls and perpetuates the basic values of this microcosm. The data have been analysed with the critical discourse analysis and diatextual analysis which pay particular attention to the context of speech. Moreover, attention has been focused on the metaphors and on the meta-discursive cues. The results show that although with different purposes academic discourse use similar discursive and rhetorical strategies as both belong to the same organization.     

Public Debate – An Act of Hostility?

This paper focuses on eristic in political debate of the forensic, or confrontational, type. First, some findings on the enactment and persuasiveness of hostility in a series of Danish TV-debates 1975–85 are presented, including a list of the clearly hostile debater's characteristics and a subdivision of conspiracy arguments. This presentation serves to illustrate that hostility is less persuasive than argumentation practitioners and theorists tend to assume. Next, the widespread notion of debate as a genre half-way between the quarrel and the critical discussion is challenged in a discussion of Douglas N. Walton's distinction between types of dialogue. It is maintained that the normative model of confrontational debate excludes the quarrel and that debate should not be perceived as second-rate critical discussion.     

Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of accusing and proposing reveals important differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison has theoretically important implication regarding the norms governing persuasive argumentation. The paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts.     

Empiricism,judgment, and argument; Toward an informal logic of science

In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms.     

Justifying My Position in Your Terms: Cross-cultural Argumentation in a Globalized World

A community of minds has long been presumed to be a condition of possibility for genuine argumentative interactions. In part because of this disciplinary presupposition, argumentation scholars tend to exclude from their scope of inquiry conflict resolution among culturally heterogeneous and ideologically incompatible formations. Such a stance needs to be reexamined in view of recent developments in the on-going process of globalization. The unprecedented worldwide economic and financial integration has created for the first time a generalized interest across national and continental boundaries. The need to countercheck global market forces has given rise to calls for a global legal/ethical system or even a transnational public sphere. Non-Western interlocutors in general are willing to debate cross-cultural issues in Western terms. Increasingly, Western interlocutors are also seeking to justify Western positions in non-Western terms. This emerging situation renders it both necessary and possible to argue across the boundaries of communities that do not share the same cultural or rhetorical tradition. It also poses a host of theoretical and practical issues whose exploration and analysis should become a new focus of argumentation studies.     

Rethinking the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization

This paper makes a case for a refined look at the so- called fallacy of hasty generalization by arguing that this expression is an umbrella term for two fallacies already distinguished by Aristotle. One is the fallacy of generalizing in an inappropriate way from a particular instance to a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification. The other is the secundum quid (in a certain respect) fallacy of moving to a conclusion that is supposed to be a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification while overlooking qualifications that have to be added to the more limited kind of generalization expressed in the premise. It is shown that these two fallacies relate to two different kinds of generalization.The classification of fallacious generalizations is based on a new theory of generalization that distinguishes three kinds of generalizations – the universal generalization of the for all x type, used in classical deductive logic, the inductive generalization, based on probability, and the presumptive generalization, which is defeasible, and allows for exceptions to a general rule. The resulting classification goes beyond a logic-oriented analysis by taking into account how a respondent may oppose a potentially fallacious generalizing move by falsifying it. Using a dialectical interpretation of premise-conclusion complexes, the paper outline a richer concept of generalizing argument moves embedded in a communicational reconstruction of the strategic uses of such moves in which two parties take part in an orderly dialectical exchange of viewpoints.