A common ground in clinical discussion groups: Intersubjective resonance and implicit operational theories

Clinical discussion groups based on the Three‐Level Model for Observing Patient Transformations (3‐LM) enable us to reflect on the clinical common ground shared by psychoanalysts who have different theoretical frameworks. The very existence of this common ground is controversial. While analysts such as Wallerstein support it, others, like Green, think it is just a myth. In their 2005 controversy Wallerstein and Green proposed an observation procedure that might clarify this matter. This procedure bears great similarity to the one used by clinical discussion groups that apply the 3‐LM. The study of numerous theoretically heterogeneous groups that use this model shows that communication is possible in crucial areas. We may thus conclude that a partial and dynamic common ground exists. At a phenomenological level, certain fragments of material produce a shared resonance that enriches clinical understanding for the whole group. Communication is also possible with regard to the conceptualization of patient changes, although some controversial issues persist at this level. Finally, at the level of theoretical explanations, divergences concerning abstract theories do not prevent a fertile interaction among ‘in vivo’ personal implicit theories. The latter give rise to the actual operational frameworks underlying participants' approach to clinical problems.     

Explicit and implicit shame aversion predict symptoms of avoidant and borderline personality disorders

Research on the connections between shame and personality disorders (PDs) has focused predominantly on shame proneness. We examined the relationships of shame aversion, or experiencing shame as painful and unbearable, with avoidant and borderline personality disorders. Participants completed self-report measures assessing avoidant and borderline PDs, shame aversion, shame proneness and general experiential avoidance, as well as the recently developed questionnaire-based implicit association test that assessed shame aversion. Self-reported and implicit shame aversion correlated with both PDs, and hierarchical regression models showed that shame aversion incrementally predicted these PDs over and above shame proneness and general experiential avoidance. These findings suggest that individuals who perceive shame as particularly aversive tend to resort to maladaptive behavioral patterns that may impair personality functioning.     

Matching between oral inward–outward movements of object names and oral movements associated with denoted objects

In eight experiments, we explored matching effects between oral approach–avoidance movements triggered by word articulation and meaning of the objects the words denoted. Participants (total N?=?1264) rated their liking for words that featured consonantal muscle stricture spots either wandering inwards (e.g., BODIKA, resembling ingestion movements) or outwards (e.g., KODIBA, resembling expectoration movements). These words were labelled as names for various objects. For objects the use of which entails ingestive oral actions (lemonade and mouthwash) inward words were preferred over outward words. For objects that trigger expectorative oral actions (toxical chemical, pill, and bubble gum) this preference was attenuated or even reversed (outward words were liked more than inward). Valence of the denoted object did not play a role in these modulations. Thus, the sagittal direction of mouth movements during silent reading meaningfully interacted with direction of oral actions associated with the denoted objects.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.     

Defining agency after implicit bias

Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic processes can be thus used to achieve deliberatively, reflectively endorsed goals, agency should be defined as the ability to act in line with reflectively endorsed goals, whether by deliberative or automatic processes.     

Divided attention enhances explicit but not implicit conceptual memory: an item-specific account of the attentional boost effect

The Attentional Boost Effect (ABE) refers to the counterintuitive finding that words encoded with to-be-responded targets in a divided-attention condition are remembered better than words encoded with distractors. Previous studies suggested that the ABE-related enhancement of verbal memory depends upon the activation of abstract lexical representations. In the present study, we extend this hypothesis by embedding it in the context of a broader perspective, which proposes that divided attention in the ABE paradigm affects item-specific, but not relational, processing. To this purpose, we examined the ABE in the matched tasks of category-cued recall (CCRT: explicit memory) and category exemplar generation (CEGT: implicit memory). In addition, study time was varied (500, 1500 or 4000?ms), to further determine whether the attentional boost manipulation could influence late-phase elaborative processing. In agreement with the predictions of the item-specific account, the results showed that exemplars encoded with targets were recalled better than exemplars encoded with distractors in the CCRT, but not in the CEGT. Moreover, performance in the CCRT increased with study time, whereas the size of the ABE-related enhancement tended to decrease, further confirming that this effect hinges upon early phase encoding processes.     

The effect of presentation rate on implicit sequence learning in aging

Implicit sequence learning is thought to be preserved in aging when the to-be learned associations are first-order; however, when associations are second-order, older adults (OAs) tend to experience deficits as compared to young adults (YAs). Two experiments were conducted using a first (Experiment 1) and second-order (Experiment 2) serial-reaction time task. Stimuli were presented at a constant rate of either 800 milliseconds (fast) or 1200 milliseconds (slow). Results indicate that both age groups learned first-order dependencies equally in both conditions. OAs and YAs also learned second-order dependencies, but the learning of lag-2 information was significantly impacted by the rate of presentation for both groups. OAs showed significant lag-2 learning in slow condition while YAs showed significant lag-2 learning in the fast condition. The sensitivity of implicit sequence learning to the rate of presentation supports the idea that OAs and YAs different processing speeds impact the ability to build complex associations across time and intervening events.     

What Contributes to College Students’ Cheating? A Study of Individual Factors

To better understand the multiple individual factors that contribute to college cheating, we undertook a multivariate analysis of a national sample of 2,503 college students. Our findings indicated that demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, socioeconomic status, and year in college), character qualities (e.g., lack of self-control, others-oriented life purpose), college experience (e.g., academic preparation, extracurricular activities involvement, and working), and student perceptions and attitudes (e.g., attitude toward academic cheating, perception of faculty’s actions against cheating and cheating environment) are all significantly associated with academic cheating.     

基于自我决定视角的动机结构与主观幸福感的关系*

从自我决定的视角,探讨了内隐和外显成就动机的不一致性对主观幸福感产生影响的可能机制。分别以成就动机量表和内隐联想测验作为成就动机的外显和内隐测量方式,同时采用自我决定量表和总体幸福感指数量表对303名大学生进行了施测。结果表明:（1）大学生内隐成就动机和外显成就动机没有显著相关;（2）外显成就动机与主观幸福感呈显著正相关,内隐成就动机调节了外显成就动机与主观幸福感的关系;（3）不一致性成就动机结构对主观幸福感有显著的负向预测,自我决定在不一致性成就动机结构对主观幸福感的预测效应中起着部分中介作用。