Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Attraction and social coordination: mutual entrainment of vocal activity rhythms

To investigate factors that affect the mutual entrainment of vocal activity rhythms, female general psychology students paired according to attitude similarity questionnaires engaged in 40-minute introductory conversations. Fourier analyses performed on speakers' on-off vocal activity demonstrated periodic oscillations in talkativeness. Although some dyads coordinated their vocal activity rhythms, speech accommodation was not predicted by attitude similarity or attraction and did not affect ratings of conversation quality. These rhythms of dialogue appear resistant to change, their behavioral momentum rooted perhaps in an underlying chronobiology.     

Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise

This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narvesons claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narvesons claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere handouts, and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutralreasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narvesons portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narvesons contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narvesons doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narvesons meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narvesons view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narvesons discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter.     

What makes words sound similar?

Although similarity plays an important role in accounts of language processing, there are surprisingly few direct empirical studies of the phonological similarity between words, and it is therefore not clear whether similarity comparisons between words involve processes similar to those involved in other cognitive domains. In five experiments, participants chose which of two monosyllabic pseudo-words sounded more similar to a target pseudo-word. Our results are generally consistent with the structural alignment theory of comparisons between complex mental representations, suggesting that phonological word similarity parallels similarity involving other kinds of information including visual objects and scenes, events, and word meanings. We use our results to test new metrics of word similarity, and identify predictions for future similarity research both in the domain of word sounds and in other cognitive domains.     

Validity and Necessity

In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke’s formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke’s three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap’s PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related notion of validity: they are dictated by merely formal considerations, not interpretive concerns. I conclude that Kripke’s model theoretic semantics does not induce a metaphysical reading of necessity, and is formally adequate independently of the specific interpretation of the modal operators.     

比较基因组学研究与应用中的辩证思维

比较基因组学是人类基因组计划的重要组成部分.它利用人类基因组与模式生物基因组之间编码顺序上和组织结构上的同源性,发现和克隆人类基因,揭示基因功能,从而阐明物种的进化关系及基因组的内在结构.比较基因组学的创立、内容及应用都充分体现着辩证思维的哲学观点.     

Etsi Deus Daretur: Lutheranism Faces the World's Religions

Abstract :  Interreligious dialogue is to be preferred over a clash of civilizations. One product of dialogue ought to be, not a bland and blended world religion but a global theology clear and sturdy enough to undergird efforts toward peace and justice. Lutherans have resources in their confessional tradition on which to draw and which can equip them to encounter other people of faith unafraid, confident and hopeful.     

Future Directions for the Zygon Center

Abstract. A brief comparison of the Zygon Center for Religion and Science and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences is given. The work and emphases of the two Centers overlap but also differ in significant ways. Without neglecting the physical sciences or the Christian tradition, ZCRS would do well to continue to give high priority to the biological sciences and the dialogue with the major world religions.     

易学视域下的象山心学

象山心学有着深层易学根基之支撑。基于易学的天人之学,他敞开了以大中至正之道、之理为根基根据的整体宇宙图景。认为人的本心存在的敞开着宇宙大千世界中的一切。《易》的"穷理尽性以至于命"的价值期许,遂具体落实为人人之开显对于本心的高度明觉,挺立个我生命的主体性,积极构建基于此心的属于自己的意义的世界。