FRAMES OF COMPARISON Anthropology and Inheriting Traditional Practices

This essay seeks to develop and illustrate an approach to comparison based on ad hoc frames. A frame is defined by a question, to which different thinkers can be seen as offering complementary and/or competing responses. Pursuing a middle ground between universalist conceptions of comparison and particularist rejections of comparison, this approach brings various positions into dialogue in a manner that is not inherently totalizing. The article draws extensively on Hegel's philosophy of religion to articulate this approach to comparison and its presuppositions. The second section of the essay seeks to illustrate the value of this approach by using the question of how traditional practices are inherited to frame a comparison of Hegel on habit and the Confucian thinker Xunzi on ritual. This comparison functions principally to indicate the process of comparison and suggest the value of pursuing this comparison in greater depth.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justices scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the worlds community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the worlds needy.     

Psychology and the End of History: A Critique and a Proposal for the Psychology of Social Categorization

This paper suggests that self-categories provide the basis for political action, that those who wish to organize political activity do so through the ways in which they construct self-categories, and that political domination may be achieved through reifying social categories and therefore denying alternative ways of social being. Hence, the way in which social psychology approaches the matter of self-categorization provides a touchstone for its politics. To the extent that we too take categories for granted, we are in danger of supporting conservative and undemocratic politics. The only way to eschew tendencies toward reification within social psychology is to add a historical dimension to our own analysis of self-categorical processes.     

What Does the Right to Education Mean? A Look at an International Debate from Legal,Ethical, and Pedagogical Points of View

Working from a concept of politics of education that encompasses legal,ethical and pedagogical levels of analysis, this paper presents theresults of a field work project on the meaning and current state of theright to education with a larger philosophical discourse. Talk ofeducation as a human right presupposes taking part in a horizon ofinterpretation. Projected is a view of person as a subject, i.e., assomeone not only placed in a specific context, but also as someone whois capable of distancing him/herself from local and culturalconditioning.     

Is Democratic Toleration a Rubber Duck?

Democratic politicians face pressures unknown to the prerogative rulers of the early modern period when toleration was first formulated as a political ideal. These pressures are less often expressed as demands by groups or individuals for the permission of practices they dislike than for their restraint or outright prohibition; tolerant dispositions are less politically clamorous. The executive structure of toleration as a virtue, together with the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’, make conflicts over toleration peculiarly intractable. Political conflicts are apt to take the form of mutual allegations ofintolerance; indeed, the problem of ‘tolerating the intolerant’, far from being a marginal case, is central to the theory and practice of toleration. Toleration thus exemplifies a category mistake committed in much contemporary political theory, particularly in its contractualist versions: the threshold of the political lies precisely where rational agreement proves impossible. The main prospects for democratic toleration are thus pre-emptive. The main way in which this can happen is by cultivating executive dispositions: in other words, encouraging people to detach themselves from strong evaluative commitments, so that toleration does not become politically contentious to start with. But this involves losses as well as gains. The gains in civil harmony and peace are obvious. The cost for tolerant political actors is alienation from what they have good reason to value. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When Likeness Goes with Liking: The Case of Political Preference

Three studies show that people tend to vote for politicians (i.e., either Romano Prodi or Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or George W. Bush or John Kerry in the United States) whose traits they rate as being most similar to their own. People perceived higher similarity between themselves and political figures with respect to traits that were most distinctive of each platform and their respective leaders. These findings, while corroborating the similarity-attraction relationship, further attest to the role that personal characteristics of both voters and candidates play in orienting political preference.     

年龄相关性黄斑变性治疗的比较分析

从治疗原理、费用、疗效、不良反应等方面对年龄相关性黄斑变性的不同治疗方法进行比较和分析,为患者进行治疗上的选择提供帮助,同时指导和规范该类疾病治疗的临床决策,以期能在目前条件下不仅提高病人的治疗效果和生活质量同时又达到降低医疗费用的目的。     

Optimistic and pessimistic biases and comparative judgmental processes in Japan: Do people really compare themselves to their peers?

Studies on above-average and unrealistic-optimism effects have recently claimed that they are the consequence of an over-utilization of self-relevant and under-utilization of peer-relevant information, despite the assumption that people would refer to both themselves and their average peer to make a comparative judgment. However, there is a possibility that these tendencies are prevalent only in Western cultures. The present paper reports on three studies of comparative self-other judgments conducted with Japanese university students. The results consistently showed that participants tended to focus simply on their own abilities, traits, or the likelihood of experiencing future life events, without paying much attention to their peers. These findings suggest first that there is a consistent tendency for people to place a greater weight on the self than normative standards when considering their comparative position in a group, and that this tendency is independent of the size or direction of comparative biases.     

Ambiguous comparative judgment: Fuzzy set model and data analysis

Abstract:  This paper proposed two types of fuzzy set models for ambiguous comparative judgments, which did not always hold transitivity and comparability properties. The first type of model was a fuzzy theoretical extension of the additive difference model for preference that was used to explain ambiguous preference strength. The second was a fuzzy logic model for explaining ambiguous preference in which preference strength was bounded, such as a probability measure. In both models, multi-attribute weighting parameters and all attribute values were assumed to be asymmetric fuzzy L-R numbers. For each model, a method of parameter estimation using fuzzy regression analysis was proposed. Numerical examples were also provided for comparison. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the proposed models were discussed.