How does knowledge bring one to the state of immortality in early Upaniṣadic philosophy? A new perspective on the ‘Magical’ way of cognition

ABSTRACT

The Upani?adic philosophers believed that acquiring certain knowledge would lead them toward a state of immortality. Merely by obtaining that knowledge, they thought people could surmount the various causes of death of the natural body. How and why did they develop and maintain this belief? To understand this, this article analyzes the difference between our views as modern humans and those of early Upani?adic philosophers, regarding the concepts of knowledge and death. They seem to have believed that knowing a concept meant actualizing that concept in the real world. Therefore, possessing the concept or knowledge of death guaranteed the actualized occurrence of death. This article argues that early Upani?adic philosophers must have thought that replacing the knowledge of death with the true knowledge of immortality would really make people immortal. In other words, to know that one is immortal truly makes one immortal. I also propose a new method of analyzing ancient thoughts.     

A General Setting for Dedekind's Axiomatization of the Positive Integers

A Dedekind algebra is an ordered pair (B, h), where B is a non-empty set and h is a similarity transformation on B. Among the Dedekind algebras is the sequence of the positive integers. From a contemporary perspective, Dedekind established that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable. The purpose here is to show that this seemingly isolated result is a consequence of more general results in the model theory of second-order languages. Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called the configurations of the algebra. There are ?₀ isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on ω called its configuration signature. The configuration signature counts the number of configurations in each isomorphism type that occurs in the decomposition of the algebra. Two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. The second-order theory of any countably infinite Dedekind algebra is categorical, and there are countably infinite Dedekind algebras whose second-order theories are not finitely axiomatizable. It is shown that there is a condition on configuration signatures necessary and sufficient for the second-order theory of a Dedekind algebra to be finitely axiomatizable. It follows that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable.     

Changing Parties,Changing Partisans: The Personalization of Partisan Attachments in Western Europe

This article investigates the effects of the deep transformations in the relationship between West European class‐mass parties and their electorates. Particular attention is paid to the changing nature of individuals' partisan attachments, which are hypothesized to be less rooted in social and ideological identities and more in individual attitudes towards increasingly visible partisan objects. The main objective of this article is to examine the influence of voters' attitudes towards one of these “objects”—the party leaders—in determining psychological attachments with the parties. The analysis concentrates on the two main cleavage‐based parties in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The empirical findings highlight the declining ability of social identities (class and religious) to predict individual feelings of partisan attachment, as well as the growing influence of voters' attitudes towards party leaders. The concluding section points to the crucial role that political psychology can play in our understanding of democratic elections' outcomes.     

Dispositional and comparative optimism interact to predict avoidance of a looming health threat

Research indicates that when confronted with a health threat, individuals high in both dispositional and comparative optimism employ a more avoidant style of coping than individuals high in dispositional but low in comparative optimism. We examined the hypothesis that threat distance moderates this interactive optimism association. In two studies, participants were randomly assigned to a looming or distant threat condition. Study 1 revealed that in the looming threat condition, participants high in both forms of optimism were more likely to minimise the threat and less inclined to seek additional health information relative to participants high in dispositional but low in comparative optimism. In Study 2, the same interaction pattern emerged on a measure of psychological abstraction suggesting these variables combine to alter broad information processing strategies. Implications for considering multiple forms of optimism when delivering health status information are discussed.     

When the risks are low: the impact of absolute and comparative information on disturbance and understanding in US and UK samples

When Klein, W. M. gave participants absolute and comparative risk information (crossed experimentally) they were more disturbed by being above than below average, but not by being at higher rather than lower risk. The current experiment tests whether Klein's findings extend to situations involving lower risk figures more typical of genuine health risks, assesses participants’ understanding of the information, and directly compares responses of US and UK samples. Participants were presented with hypothetical information about comparative and absolute risks of deep vein thrombosis. There was a main effect of absolute risk information on disturbance and precaution intentions in the US sample, but no effects of comparative information on these measures in either sample. Understanding was poor among participants receiving both pieces of risk information. Future studies should include measures of understanding to establish whether people are failing to understand what they are told or failing to respond systematically to what they understand. Practically, the findings caution against providing comparative risk information when communicating low risk figures.     

Future Contradictions

A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ‘indeterminate’—i.e., ‘gappy’ with respect to some claims—and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ‘future contingent’ claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future—one which is ‘glutty’ with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch and briefly explore an alternative glutty-future view, one that is conservative—indeed, entirely classical—with respect to the present.

The structure of the paper runs as follows. §1 briefly sketches the target gap picture of an indeterminate future yielding gappy claims at the present. §2 presents the direct dual idea—a glut picture of an overdeterminate future yielding glutty claims at present. §3 sketches the central idea, a more interesting glut picture in which the future contains contradictory states but the present remains entirely classical. §4 contains a general defence of the idea, leaving it open as to whether the gappy-future view enjoys substantive virtues over the proposed glutty-future view of §3.     

Probabilities on Sentences in an Expressive Logic

Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being true, what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consistent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypotheses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior probability and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or all of the criteria and various (counter)examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic.     

Entailment and Bivalence

My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and preserving non-falsity are one and the same thing. They are not the same in non-bivalent logics however and I will argue that the classical notion of entailment that preserves only truth is not strong enough for such a logic. I will show that if we retain the classical notion of entailment in a logic that has three values, true, false and a third value in between, an inconsistency can be derived that can be resolved only by measures that seriously disable the logic. I will show this for a logic designed to allow for semantic presuppositions, then I will show that we get the same result in any three valued logic with the same value ordering. I will finally suggest how the notion of entailment should be generalized so that this problem may be avoided. The strengthened notion of entailment I am proposing is a conservative extension of the classical notion that preserves not only truth but the order of all values in a logic, so that the value of an entailed statement must alway be at least as great as the value of the sequence of statements entailing it. A notion of entailment this strong or stronger will, I believe, be found to be applicable to non-classical logics generally. In the opinion of Dana Scott, no really workable three valued logic has yet been developed. It is hard to disagree with this. A workable three valued logic however could perhaps be developed however, if we had a notion of entailment suitable to non-bivalent logics.