Undecidability and intuitionistic incompleteness

Let S be a deductive system such that S-derivability (s) is arithmetic and sound with respect to structures of class K. From simple conditions on K and s, it follows constructively that the K-completeness of s implies MP(S), a form of Markov's Principle. If s is undecidable then MP(S) is independent of first-order Heyting arithmetic. Also, if s is undecidable and the S proof relation is decidable, then MP(S) is independent of second-order Heyting arithmetic, HAS. Lastly, when s is many-one complete, MP(S) implies the usual Markov's Principle MP.An immediate corollary is that the Tarski, Beth and Kripke weak completeness theorems for the negative fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic are unobtainable in HAS. Second, each of these: weak completeness for classical predicate logic, weak completeness for the negative fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic and strong completeness for sentential logic implics MP. Beth and Kripke completeness for intuitionistic predicate or sentential logic also entail MP.These results give extensions of the theorem of Gödel and Kreisel (in [4]) that completeness for pure intuitionistic predicate logic requires MP. The assumptions of Gödel and Kreisel's original proof included the Axiom of Dependent Choice and Herbrand's Theorem, no use of which is explicit in the present article.     

On maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics

We extend to the predicate frame a previous characterization of the maximal intermediate propositional constructive logics. This provides a technique to get maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics starting from suitable sets of classically valid predicate formulae we call maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logics. As an example of this technique, we exhibit two maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics, yet leaving open the problem of stating whether the two logics are distinct. Further properties of these logics will be also investigated.Presented by H. Ono     

Contrary-to-duty obligations

We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of possible adjustments, including an alternative treatment in terms of a preference-based semantics, reveals difficulties that are reminiscent of problems in defeasible reasoning and intensional accounts of defeasible conditionals.     

Quantum MV algebras

We introduce the notion of quantum MV algebra (QMV algebra) as a generalization of MV algebras and we show that the class of all effects of any Hilbert space gives rise to an example of such a structure. We investigate some properties of QMV algebras and we prove that QMV algebras represent non-idempotent extensions of orthomodular lattices.I should like to thank Prof. M.L. Dalla Chiara and Dr. P. Minari for many interesting comments and remarks. Daniele Mundici     

Prima facie obligation

This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unconditional notions of prima facie obligation in terms of the conditional notions.     

Detachment and defeasibility in deontic logic

The purpose of the paper is to present a logical framework that allow to formalize a kind of prima facie duties, defeasible conditional duties, indefeasible conditional duties and actual (indefeasible) duties, as well as to show their logical interconnections.     

Parallel lives: Community psychology in Latin America and the United States

Comparing the history of community psychology as it developed in the U.S. during the 1960s with the community psychology that developed 10 years later in Latin America, one is reminded of the title of Plutarch’s masterpice,Parallel Lives. Although there was very little contact or communication between the first community psychologists in these regions, very similar principles and orientations evolved. These similarities are particularly striking given the many ways in which the U.S. and Latin American contexts and histories differ. Since most readers are expected to be familiar with the history of community psychology as it developed in the U.S., this paper focuses primarily on the development of community psychology in Latin America in order to highlight areas of convergence as well as divergence from the U.S. experience. This paper is based on an address presented at the Fourth Biennial Conference, Society for Community Research and Action, Division 27 of the American Psychological Association, William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1993. The author acknowledges the valuable help received from J. R. Newbrough and from the referees in the revision of this paper.     

The second offspring of General Process Learning Theory: Overt behavior as the ambassador of the mind

Wasserman suggested in a recent book review that the study of intervening cognitive processes represents a current focus of interest in animal learning and that this has led to a revitalization of comparative psychology. An examination of the volume reviewed suggests that he may have overstated the case. Most of the authors to whom he refers expressed dissatisfaction with traditional stimulus-response associationism but few argued for the extreme (information processing) sort of cognitive approach described by Wasserman.