Animal research in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis

This review summarizes the 6 studies with nonhuman animal subjects that have appeared in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis and offers suggestions for future research in this area. Two of the reviewed articles described translational research in which pigeons were used to illustrate and examine behavioral phenomena of applied significance (say-do correspondence and fluency), 3 described interventions that changed animals' behavior (self-injury by a baboon, feces throwing and spitting by a chimpanzee, and unsafe trailer entry by horses) in ways that benefited the animals and the people in charge of them, and 1 described the use of trained rats that performed a service to humans (land-mine detection). We suggest that each of these general research areas merits further attention and that the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis is an appropriate outlet for some of these publications.     

Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self‐awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body‐ness” or “mine‐ness” but not a sense of “I‐ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self‐awareness have wide‐ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.     

Minding Animals, Minding Earth: Old Brains, New Bottlenecks

Abstract. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth.     

CHRM3基因与孤独症谱系障碍

孤独症谱系障碍是一类具有遗传基础的儿童发展障碍疾病。近些年, 研究者们从分子病理学层面发现中枢胆碱能神经系统异常与孤独症患者认知和行为异常存在相关性。尸检研究、临床案例、动物模型研究均发现毒蕈碱型(M型)乙酰胆碱受体异常和孤独症的发生有着密切的关系。在以小鼠为模型的行为学研究中, 编码毒蕈碱型乙酰胆碱受体Ⅲ亚型的CHRM3基因突变会导致小鼠出现认知障碍、刻板行为等孤独症样表现。深入了解CHRM3基因的功能将能够帮助研究者进一步解释孤独症的相关行为特征, 为孤独症儿童教育方案的制定提供新的思路和方法。     

DETECTION OF THE VELOCITY OF MOVEMENT OF VISUAL STIMULI BY PIGEONS

Nine pigeons were trained to discriminate a moving stimulus from a stationary stimulus. In one experiment, the stimulus was a rotating disc with radial stripes. In a second experiment, the stimulus was a vertically moving film strip with horizontal bars. Several psychophysical procedures were used to determine the minimal detectable velocity of movement. The detection thresholds for most of the pigeons fell in the range of 4.4 to 6.5 millimeters per second, corresponding to a retinal velocity of 4.1 to 6.01 degrees per second. A signal detection analysis of the psychophysical data indicated systematic changes in response bias that were related to the ordinal position of the stimulus velocity in the sequence.     

A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism

Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.     

ANIMAL SUFFERING,EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF EVIL: TOWARD A “FREE CREATURES” DEFENSE

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability.     

动物面孔的识别优势:一项基于快速扫视任务的研究

为了检验视觉注意分配的类别性偏好,采用快速扫视任务,以首次扫视的正确率和反应时作为指标,探寻动物是否有和面孔类似的注意捕获优势; 如果有,则该优势发生在基本类别层次还是上位类别层次。结果发现:(1)相对于非动物而言,动物更容易捕获观察者注意;(2)当动物(狗)作为目标刺激,匹配同领域基本层次的动物(猫)作为分心刺激时,注意捕获优势消失;(3)动物的注意优势是领域间效应。     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.