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141.
    
It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.  相似文献   
142.
    
Although some studies have revealed that traditional filial piety belief is weakening, few have explored whether and how the role of the belief in social life has changed correspondingly. The present study used questionnaires to examine solutions to filial piety dilemmas and the roles of contextual theme, filial piety beliefs, and generation in a sample of 123 young and 92 middle‐aged Chinese adults. With respect to the solutions adopted to solve parent?child conflicts, preferences varied depending on the dilemma themes. Specifically, participants were more likely to select a self‐sacrifice (rather than an ego‐centered) solution for respect dilemmas than for caring dilemmas, and least likely to do so for obedience dilemmas. Participants were also likely to select a balancing (rather than an ego‐centered) solution for respect or caring dilemmas than for obedience dilemmas. In addition, the concordance between beliefs and solutions was exhibited in reciprocal, but not authoritarian, filial piety beliefs. Individuals with stronger reciprocal filial piety beliefs were more likely to select self‐sacrifice or balancing solutions than ego‐centered solutions whereas authoritarian filial piety showed no influence on solutions for either young or middle‐aged adults. Furthermore, the generation effect was not significant, and the solution selection did not differ between young and middle‐aged adults.  相似文献   
143.
Soritic thinking based on reasoning that is involved in the sorites paradox plays a crucial role in some forms of weakness of will. Such soritic reasoning leads to failures of behavior, but cannot be shown to be irrational by standard means. Thus weakness of will appears to be rational, whereas strength of will is irrational when viewed soritically. The puzzle is how to undermine weakness of will and expose it as irrational. Even though such weakness of will is not moral, moral-type reasoning involving the principle of equality can be brought to bear. Weakness of will can also be seen to be analogous to free-rider problems and the prisoner's dilemma.  相似文献   
144.
This study adopted a contextual framework to examine whether an interaction between group culture and economic power influences self-interest in a simulated commons dilemma. Full-time managers enrolled in executive MBA programs in Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, and the United States (US) made decisions in an asymmetric commons dilemma. Relative to managers from the US and Germany, Israeli managers were more likely to follow an individually rational decision-making approach, taking more resources in a high versus low economic power condition. In contrast, managers from Hong Kong in a high economic power condition followed a collectively rational approach, voluntarily taking fewer resources. Egocentrism mediated this interaction effect of group culture and economic power for the Israeli managers who were more egocentric and believed it was fair to harvest more resources in a high power condition. However, egocentrism did not mediate the interaction effect for managers from Hong Kong. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings highlight the importance of studying the proximal effect of group culture on contextual factors, such as economic power asymmetry, that influence cooperation in social dilemmas.  相似文献   
145.
It is widely noted that physicalism, taken as the doctrine that the world contains just what physics says it contains, faces a dilemma which, some like Tim Crane and D.H. Mellor have argued, shows that “physicalism is the wrong answer to an essentially trivial question”. I argue that both problematic horns of this dilemma drop out if one takes physicalism not to be a doctrine of the kind that might be true, false, or trivial, but instead an attitude or oath one takes to formulate one’s ontology solely according to the current posits of physics.  相似文献   
146.
Three studies examined the interrelationship between primed constructs, situation construal, and person perception. Previous research on priming and person perception has generally neglected the situational context. We predicted that when rich situational information is included, primed constructs can lead to assimilation effects on situation construals, which can in turn lead to contrast effects in person perceptions. Study 1 demonstrated that when situation information is included in the experimental context, primes lead to contrast in person perceptions. Study 2, employing a subliminal methodology, demonstrated that these effects could not be accounted for via previous explanations of contrast effects, such as correction-based mechanisms, that require overt recognition of the priming stimuli by the participants. Study 3 demonstrated that the contrastive effects of the priming stimuli on person perception obtained in Studies 1 and 2 are in fact due to the intervening assimilative effects of the priming stimuli on situation construal—that is, the primed constructs led to contrast effects on perceptions of the actor via their assimilative effects on perceptions of the situation in which that actor was embedded. Additionally, moderator variables demonstrated that this effect is most pronounced when the target actor’s behavior is described as relatively unambiguous or situation focus is increased.  相似文献   
147.
Student Evaluations and Moral Hazard   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Most universities solicit feedback from students at the end of a course in order to assess student perceptions of the course. This feedback is used for various objectives, including for evaluating teaching by academic administrators. One would therefore expect faculty to rationally take this into account while formulating their teaching strategy. In certain cases, such strategic considerations can give rise to moral hazard. I have modelled the situation using the well-known Prisoners Dilemma game and found that in equilibrium, the teaching style will be examination-centric, while considerations of societal good would demand that the teaching style be knowledge-centric. I also discuss the policy implications for this finding.  相似文献   
148.
    
We report a study of the behavior of starlings in laboratory situations inspired by the “prisoner's dilemma.” Our purpose is to investigate some possible mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperation by reciprocity and to investigate the process of autoshaping at a trial-by-trial level. In Experiment 1, pairs of starlings housed in adjacent cages played a discrete-trial “game” in which food could be obtained only by “cooperation.” In this game, pecking at a response key eliminated the opportunity to obtain food but produced food for the partner. If neither bird pecked, neither had the opportunity to obtain food in that trial. Some level of cooperation persisted for several sessions whether the birds had been pretrained for a high or low probability of pecking at the key. The probability of a cooperative response was higher after trials in which the partner responded (and a reward was obtained) than after trials in which neither bird responded (and no reward was obtained), but the probability of a response was even higher after trials in which the same bird had responded, even though no reward was obtained by the actor in these trials. This behavior did not require visual presence of another player, because similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 (a replicate of Experiment 1 in which the members of the pair could not see each other) and in Experiment 3, a game in which each starling played with a computer responding with “tit for tat.” Using an omission schedule, in which food was given in all trials in which the bird did not peck, Experiment 4 showed that pecking could be maintained by autoshaping. In this experiment, overall probability of pecking decreased with experience, due to a drop in the tendency to peck in consecutive trials. The probability of pecking in trials following a reinforced trial did not decrease with experience. An implementation of the Rescorla–Wagner model for this situation was capable of reproducing molar, but not molecular, aspects of our results. The results violate the predictions of several game-theoretical models for the evolution of cooperation, including tit for tat, generous tit for tat, and the superior win-stay-lose-shift.  相似文献   
149.
    
Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.  相似文献   
150.
    
Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma.  相似文献   
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