善的两种冲突

冲突一词在语言表达中其实有两个很不相同的意义和用法。一种用法是：冲突的命题不能同时为真的逻辑真理性冲突;另一种用法是：冲突的价值欲望不能同时满足的现实选择性冲突。本文对冲突的两种意义及用法进行了区别,分析了这两种冲突的意义和用法在道德善恶判断中的联系和混用,并对道德相对主义与道德多元主义提出了批评。     

The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Confusion and a Clarification

This discussion note deals with Jurriaan de Haan's paper The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4(3), 2001, pp. 267–284). In the first, critical part I will point out a confusion in the logical analysis of the paper in question. In the second, constructive part I will indicate how the analysis of moral dilemmas should proceed within the framework of a possible world semantics.     

Contingencies of reinforcement in a five-person prisoner's dilemma

As in studies of self-control, a tit-for-tat contingency in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game creates a conflict between maximization of local and global reinforcement. The present experiments examine this conflict in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma game. Versus tit for tat, cooperation corresponds to self-control; defection, always immediately reinforced, corresponds to impulsiveness. Three experiments examined sensitivity of behavior to the global reinforcement contingency imposed by tit for tat. Undergraduates played a five-player prisoner's dilemma game against four dummy players programmed to play tit for tat or randomly. With tit for tat, a player's cooperation (or defection) increased dummy players' cooperation (or defection) on subsequent trials-reinforcing cooperation and punishing defection in the long run. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when the dummy players played tit for tat than when the dummy players played randomly. These results are consistent with findings in corresponding studies of self-control. Some participants, caught in a trap of mutual defection with the tit-for-tat playing dummy players, came to cooperate when the tit-for-tat contingency was reset ("forgiving" participants' previous defections) during a pause in the game. This increase was a result of the combined effects of a pause and reset; neither pausing nor resetting independently resulted in an increase in cooperation.     

Effects of dilemma type,language, and emotion arousal on utilitarian vs deontological choice to moral dilemmas in Chinese–English bilinguals

The present study examines how dilemma type (personal or impersonal moral dilemma), language (native or foreign) and emotion arousal to a dilemma could affect Chinese–English bilinguals' deontological vs utilitarian moral choices regarding 39 moral dilemmas. How emotion arousal plays a mediating role in the effects of dilemma type and language on moral choices is also investigated. As shown in multilevel analyses, participants made fewer utilitarian choices for personal dilemmas than impersonal dilemmas. Although emotion arousal of dilemmas significantly mediated this effect of dilemma type, the indirect effect of dilemma type through arousal on moral choices was inconsistent with the direct effect of dilemma type on moral choices. For the effect of language, participants made more utilitarian choices in the Footbridge (personal) dilemma that was presented in foreign language than in native language. However, this effect was not mediated by arousal, suggesting that it could not be attributed to the emotion‐reducing effect of foreign language. Moreover, there was no language effect on moral choices in analyses that included all 39 dilemmas or only 22 personal dilemmas, indicating the need in future research for further identifying the potential mediators that trigger the foreign language effect on moral choices.     

帕金森病神经保护治疗的困境与思考

帕金森病(PD)神经保护策略存在的困惑,是迄今还未找到一种药能确切的保护神经元,推迟发病或延缓疾病的进展。因此,有学者提出“多重靶标治疗神经退行性疾病的多功能药物”的设想。同理,中医复方通过多种有效成分对人体有多环节、多层次、多靶点的整合调节作用,可能对PD神经保护治疗有一定的优势。最后,从现代医学在高度分化的基础上呈现高度综合的发展趋势,对PD的神经保护治疗进行哲学思考并提供方法论。     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.     

西方社会价值取向的研究历程与发展趋势

作为一种相对稳定的人格特质,社会价值取向指个体对于自己和他人结果分配的特定偏好。西方社会价值取向的研究经历了从双维模型到整合模型的发展。这些研究证实了实验室情境以及现实情境下社会价值取向对个体的行为决策和社会认知的影响。人际取向命题的提出是该领域的最新理论进展,情境因素和平等取向在未来研究中将得到更多的关注     

Cooperation and coordination across cultures and contexts: Individual,sociocultural, and contextual factors jointly influence decision making in the volunteer's dilemma game

What factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (N_total = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination.     

Commitment and self-control in a prisoner's dilemma game

Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.     

Larger reward values alone are not enough to entice more cooperation

Two experiments using an iterated prisoner's dilemma game examined under which conditions participants' cooperation rates would either change due to monetary value changes (e.g., 3 cents to 3 dollars) or not change due to numeric value changes (e.g., 3 dollars to 300 cents). A total of 102 university students played the game against a computer that employed one of four strategies across blocks. Results showed high rates of cooperation when participants played against a tit-for-tat strategy and low rates of cooperation against a random strategy. There was no change in cooperation rates due to changes in numeric value alone and a decrease in cooperation rates when large monetary values were at stake. Cooperation rates were higher and cooperation responses slower at earlier stages of the game. I argue that people's ability to strategize plays a key role in the changing rates and speed of cooperative behaviour in the prisoner's dilemma.