The Decades of Life: Relocating Erikson's Stages

Erik H. Erikson's life cycle schema consists of eight stages. Three are located in infancy and early childhood (ages 1–5), one in childhood (5–12), one in adolescence, and three in adulthood. This essay proposes a relocation of the stages in terms of decades. The eight psychosocial crises in Erikson's model are retained, but each crisis and its resolution is the central theme of a decade of life. This relocation of Erikson's stages orients the life cycle schema more toward adulthood than to early childhood, as six of the stages now occur in the adult years. It also reflects Erikson's theoretical shift in emphasis from the ego to the sense of I in his later writings. A proposal for how the ninth and tenth decades fit into the schema is also offered.     

A formal model for structuring local perceptions of environmental space

The problem of constructing computational models of space that mimic those found in human spatial reasoning is addressed. This paper extends a formal model that addressed point objects in a 2D world to include the presence of line objects and barriers. The problem consists of determining an appropriate global model for the spatial configuration given a sequence of local views or observations. A formal model is proposed based on constraint network theory. The model leads to the identification of stable regions within which perceptual information about the environment changes slowly, and zones of transition within which the perceptual information changes more quickly. A special case of transition zones is a gateway, which may be viewed as a kind of discontinuity or singularity in the model. It is expected that the model obtained will be used to mimic human mental representations of navigable outdoor environments.     

Perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task in 6.5-month-old infants

In the present research, 6.5-month-old infants perseverated in a violation-of-expectation task designed to examine their reasoning about width information in containment events. After watching a familiarization event in which a ball was lowered into a wide container, the infants failed to detect the violation in a test event in which the same ball was lowered into a container only half as wide as the ball (narrow-container test event). This negative result (which was replicated in another experiment) was interpreted in terms of a recent problem-solving account of infants' perseverative errors in various means-end tasks (Aguiar, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Perseveration and problem solving in infancy. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 27, pp. 135-180). San Diego, CA: Academic Press). It was assumed that the infants in the present experiments (1) did not attend to the relative widths of the ball and container in their initial analysis of the narrow-container test event, (2) categorized the event as similar to the familiarization event shown on the preceding trials, and (3) retrieved the expectation they had formed for that event ("the ball will fit into the container"), resulting in a perseverative error. This interpretation was supported by additional experiments in which different modifications were introduced that led to non-perseverative responding, indicating that 6.5-month-old infants could detect the violation in the narrow-container test event. The present findings are important for several reasons. First, they provide the first demonstration of perseverative responding in a violation-of-expectation task. Second, they make clear the breadth and usefulness of the problem-solving account mentioned above. Finally, they add to the evidence for some degree of continuity between infants' and adults' problem-solving abilities.     

An evidential support accumulation model of subjective probability

A model of cue-based probability judgment is developed within the framework of support theory. Cue diagnosticity is evaluated from experience as represented by error-free frequency counts. When presented with a pattern of cues, the diagnostic implications of each cue are assessed independently and then summed to arrive at an assessment of the support for a hypothesis, with greater weight placed on present than on absent cues. The model can also accommodate adjustment of support in light of the baserate or prior probability of a hypothesis. Support for alternatives packed together in a "residual" hypothesis is discounted; fewer cues are consulted in assessing support for alternatives as support for the focal hypothesis increases. Results of fitting this and several alternative models to data from four new multiple-cue probability learning experiments are reported.     

Reasoning with quantifiers

In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and one of the main topics in psychological studies on deductive reasoning is syllogistic inference, which is just a restricted form of reasoning with quantifiers. But thus far the semantical and psychological enterprises have remained disconnected. This paper aims to show how our understanding of syllogistic reasoning may benefit from semantical research on quantification. I present a very simple logic that pivots on the monotonicity properties of quantified statements--properties that are known to be crucial not only to quantification but to a much wider range of semantical phenomena. This logic is shown to account for the experimental evidence available in the literature as well as for the data from a new experiment with cardinal quantifiers ("at least n" and "at most n"), which cannot be explained by any other theory of syllogistic reasoning.     

What response times tell of children's behavior on the balance scale task

Analysis of accuracy of responses to balance scale problems gives a global idea of the cognitive processes that underlie problem-solving behavior on this task. We show that response times (RTs) provide additional detailed information about the kind and duration of these processes. We derive predictions about the RTs from Siegler's (1981) model for the balance scale task, including the counterintuitive prediction that young adults are slower than children in solving particular balance scale problems. The predictions were tested in a study in which 191 6- to 22-year-old participants were presented with a computerized balance scale task. RTs were analyzed with regression models. In addition to qualitative differences between items, we also modeled quantitative differences between items in the regression models. Analyses supported the predictions and provided additional knowledge on the rules. Rule II was reformulated as a rule that always involves the encoding, but not always the correct application of the distance cue. RTs provided evidence for the use of a buggy-rule and not an addition-rule. Finally, a relation between rule inconsistency and increased RT was found.     

Doing Pentecostal Civic Engagement in the Squatter Area of Lower Rock Quarry,Baguio City,Philippines

Pentecostals are frequently placed on the sidelines of civic engagement, seen as participating less in public life because of their preoccupation with other‐worldly eschatology and their one‐way‐ticket evangelistic efforts. This study does not share the above view, but argues that Pentecostal civic engagement 1 has been increasingly recognized as resource capital that empowers the lives of the poor. This paper investigates the impact of Pentecostal/charismatic religion on civil society, asking what contribution the study of “spirit empowered” religion can make to our understanding of the role of religion in human society. Using a quantitative and qualitative approach to flesh out empirical evidence, this study reveals what Filipino Pentecostals believe and practise with regard to civic engagement. It provides a case study of findings to further point out that Pentecostals in the Philippines are not on the sidelines of civic engagement, but are one of the religious players in the creation of a just and loving society.     

The Powerful Other: How Divine Control Shapes the Relationship Between Personal Control and Psychological Distress

In the sociological study of mental health, the sense of personal control represents a core psychological resource, but some studies document a curvilinear association between personal control and depressive symptoms. This body of research is largely secular in orientation, even though research also demonstrates that some individuals believe in an involved and engaged Powerful Other (e.g., God). We evaluate if such beliefs moderate the relationship between personal control and depression. Using data from the 2005 Work, Stress, and Health Study in the United States (N = 1,791), we first demonstrate that the sense of personal control has an overall curvilinear association with depression, in line with previous research. Then, we document that divine control beliefs modify this association such that the curvilinear association is found primarily among individuals with low levels of divine control. By contrast, among those who more strongly endorse divine control, we observe no relationship between personal control and depression. We situate our findings in the differing and complicated perspectives on the implications of religious beliefs for psychological resources and well‐being.     

The Treatment Planning of Experienced Counselors: A Qualitative Examination

Using consensual qualitative research, the authors examined the treatment planning process of experienced counselors (N = 9). The data analysis resulted in 4 domains: assessment steps, clinical impressions, treatment factors, and treatment strategies. These domains describe the process used by experienced counselors in making clinical decisions and offer insight into the nature of clinical expertise and the need for further research on treatment planning.     

Delusion‐proneness or miscomprehension? A re‐examination of the jumping‐to‐conclusions bias

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping‐to‐conclusions (JTC) bias when administrated the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads task’ (i.e., decisions made on limited evidence and/or decisions over‐adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence). However, recent work in this area has indicated that a lack of comprehension of the task may be confounding this finding. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the influence of task administration, delusion‐proneness, and miscomprehension on the elucidation of the JTC bias. A total of 92 undergraduate university students were divided into one of two task conditions (i.e., non‐computerised and computerised) and were further identified as either delusion‐prone or non‐delusion‐prone and as comprehending or non‐comprehending the task. Overall, 25% of the sample demonstrated a JTC bias, and just over half made illogical responses consistent with a failure to comprehend the task. Qualitative evidence of comprehension revealed that these ‘illogical responses’ were being driven by a misunderstanding of task instructions. The way the task was administrated and levels of delusion‐proneness did not significantly influence JTC. However, miscomprehending participants were significantly more likely to exhibit the bias than those who did comprehend. These results suggest that miscomprehension rather than delusion‐proneness may be driving the JTC bias, and that future research should include measures of miscomprehension.