Impact of Social Determinants on Parent Sense of Competence in Mothers Who are Homeless or Poor Housed

Unfavorable social determinants can impact mothering of young children who are homeless or poor housed and parent sense of competence. Social determinants influence on mothers’ parent sense of competence parent self-efficacy and satisfaction was investigated. Homeless mothers reported worse scores than poor housed mothers on 5 of 10 social determinants including: mother moves, abuse, un/underemployment, less stable partner relationships and student roles. Homeless mothers scored lower than poor housed mothers on parent sense of competence satisfaction and parent sense of competence total, but not on parent sense of competence efficacy. No one social determinant predicted parent sense of competence. Results underscore the need to address social determinants of health in occupational therapy community-based practice.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles

The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.     

Die‐by Framing both Lengthens and Shortens Life: Further Evidence on Constructed Beliefs in Life Expectancy

Decisions regarding consumption over the lifespan require some estimate of how long that lifespan is likely to be. Payne et al. (2013) found that respondents' estimates of their own life expectancy are on average 8.6 years shorter when elicited using a die‐by frame than when elicited by a live‐to frame. If decision makers act on these life expectancies, then an arbitrary detail of framing will lead to drastically different choices. We propose that the framing effect is sensitive to the iterative probabilistic elicitation procedure employed by the previous literature. Study 1 compares the framing effect across the iterative probabilistic procedure and a point estimate procedure that simply asks respondents the age they will live to/die by. The iterative probabilistic procedure implies a life expectancy six years shorter in the die‐by frame than in the live‐to frame, replicating the results of Payne et al. (2013). With the point estimate procedure, however, the framing effect reverses: the die‐by frame increases life expectancy by three years. In Study 2, we test for the framing effect using a point estimate procedure on a representative sample of 2000 Britons. Again, and in contrast with the previous literature, we find that the die‐by frame implies longer life. Our results reinforce the previous literature that beliefs around life expectancy are constructed. We recommend caution when attempting to debias life expectancy estimates or using life expectancies in choice architecture. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Categories of Large Numbers in Line Estimation

How do people stretch their understanding of magnitude from the experiential range to the very large quantities and ranges important in science, geopolitics, and mathematics? This paper empirically evaluates how and whether people make use of numerical categories when estimating relative magnitudes of numbers across many orders of magnitude. We hypothesize that people use scale words—thousand, million, billion—to carve the large number line into categories, stretching linear responses across items within each category. If so, discontinuities in position and response time are expected near the boundaries between categories. In contrast to previous work (Landy, Silbert, & Goldin, 2013) that suggested only that a minority of college undergraduates employed categorical boundaries, we find that discontinuities near category boundaries occur in most or all participants, but that accurate and inaccurate participants respond in opposite ways to category boundaries. Accurate participants highlight contrasts within a category, whereas inaccurate participants adjust their responses toward category centers.     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paranormal belief and errors of probabilistic reasoning: The role of constituent conditional relatedness in believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research are discussed.     

The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis

We report the results of three experimental tests of the "hot cognition" hypothesis, which posits that all sociopolitical concepts that have been evaluated in the past are affectively charged and that this affective charge is automatically activated within milliseconds on mere exposure to the concept, appreciably faster than conscious appraisal of the object.
We find support for the automaticity of affect toward political leaders, groups, and issues; specifically:

• • 

  Most Ss show significantly faster reaction times to affectively congruent political concepts and significantly slower response times to affectively incongruent concepts;

       

Proportional reasoning,framing effects,and affirmative action: Is six of one really half a dozen of another in university admissions?

People often reason proportionally, perceiving fixed outcomes as larger or smaller depending upon the reference condition. Thus, for policies affecting individuals, presenting data as percentages rather than frequencies can alter perceived effects on high versus low base rate group members, even though identical numbers of individuals in each group are affected. Such numerical framing effects were explored through a case analysis of public debates over race-conscious selection policies and through experimental manipulations employing a race-conscious university admissions scenario. Undergraduates (N = 193) received data reporting the expected impact on black and white student enrollment resulting from a university shift to race-neutral admissions. Compared to those encountering percentages or proportions, participants receiving identical information expressed as frequencies revealed a predicted greater preference for race-neutral or “race blind” admissions. Structural equation analysis supported a model in which perceived impact and fairness mediated the relationship between format and endorsement of race-neutral admissions.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.