大学生的认知风格与逻辑推理的关系

以大学生为被试,探讨认知风格与逻辑推理的关系。结果表明：（1）在三段论推理中,场依存型学生和场独立型学生推理成绩不存在显著差异,学过和未学过逻辑学的学生推理成绩也不存在显著差异,但男生和女生推理成绩差异显著,女生比男生更易受“气氛”的影响。（2）在命题推理中,对抽象材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理存在显著差异,场独立型学生表现出更强的证伪倾向,场依存型学生表现出更强的换位倾向;对具体材料构成的命题,场独立型学生和场依存型学生的推理不存在显著差异。     

东西方医学伦理思维之共通性

从中国古代医者的行医事迹、著作来探寻中国的医者是否在行医过程当中勤守医者的本份,也即类似原则思维的表现。虽然中国古代并没有"医学伦理"这个名词,但从历代具有代表性之医者身上发现,其实在中国古代医者的行医事迹当中,就表现出类似的医学伦理情操。因之,医学伦理原则是俱普世价值的,也即世界上有所谓的共同道德存在。     

The public's probabilistic numeracy: How tasks,education and exposure to games of chance shape it

As we navigate a world full of uncertainties and risks, dominated by statistics, we need to be able to think statistically. Very few studies investigating people's ability to understand simple concepts and rules from probability theory have drawn representative samples from the public. For this reason we investigated a representative sample of 1000 Swiss citizens, using six probabilistic problems. Most reasoned appropriately in problems representing pure applications of probability theory, but failed to do so in approximations of real‐world scenarios – a disparity we replicated in a sample of first‐year psychology students. Additionally, education is associated with probabilistic numeracy in the former but not the latter type of problems. We discuss possible reasons for these task disparities and suggest that gaining a comprehensive picture of citizens' probabilistic competence and its determinants requires using both types of tasks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delusion‐proneness or miscomprehension? A re‐examination of the jumping‐to‐conclusions bias

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping‐to‐conclusions (JTC) bias when administrated the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads task’ (i.e., decisions made on limited evidence and/or decisions over‐adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence). However, recent work in this area has indicated that a lack of comprehension of the task may be confounding this finding. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the influence of task administration, delusion‐proneness, and miscomprehension on the elucidation of the JTC bias. A total of 92 undergraduate university students were divided into one of two task conditions (i.e., non‐computerised and computerised) and were further identified as either delusion‐prone or non‐delusion‐prone and as comprehending or non‐comprehending the task. Overall, 25% of the sample demonstrated a JTC bias, and just over half made illogical responses consistent with a failure to comprehend the task. Qualitative evidence of comprehension revealed that these ‘illogical responses’ were being driven by a misunderstanding of task instructions. The way the task was administrated and levels of delusion‐proneness did not significantly influence JTC. However, miscomprehending participants were significantly more likely to exhibit the bias than those who did comprehend. These results suggest that miscomprehension rather than delusion‐proneness may be driving the JTC bias, and that future research should include measures of miscomprehension.     

Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in.     

公平感对社会认知的影响:经济因素的调节作用

目的及方法:基于中国综合社会调查2010年数据,采用多层结构方程模型,探究中国民众公平感对社会认知的作用,及经济因素在其中的调节效应。研究结果:第一,公平感越高,则社会冲突感越低,外在政治效能感越高,越倾向于对社会不平等进行内部归因,即对于社会的整体认知更加积极; 第二,经济因素能调节公平感与社会不平等内归因的关系,具体而言,经济水平越低,则公平感对于社会不平等的内部归因正向预测作用越大。     

3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下的类比推理

本研究采用经典类比任务,考察了3～5岁幼儿在主题-规则冲突条件下类比推理发展的水平与特点.结果表明:(1)在无主题联想条件下,幼儿的单维类比推理在3～4岁迅速发展,4～5岁发展较为平缓,而双维类比推理在3～5岁仍处于较低水平.(2)在主题—规则冲突条件下,幼儿在单维类比推理中表现出一定的主题联想优势反应;幼儿在双维类比推理中表现出较强的主题联想优势反应,年龄特点为:3岁幼儿有较强的主题联想优势反应,4岁幼儿的主题联想优势反应明显下降,而5岁幼儿又表现出较强的主题联想优势反应.     

Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

How do investors make predictions? Insights from analogical reasoning research

Previous work on investor decision making has focused almost exclusively on information specific to the company being judged. Consequently, every decision is viewed as a novel event, disconnected from the investor's existing knowledge. In this study, the analogical reasoning literature provides the theoretical support for arguing that investors frequently utilize existing knowledge as a basis for generating predictions about a company's future. The specific proposal is that investors transfer their existing knowledge via two different forms of analogical reasoning. The first, relational reasoning, is based primarily on structural correspondence between a novel company and an existing schema. The second, literal similarity reasoning, is based primarily on surface correspondence of a novel company and a previously encountered company. Our theoretical framework is tested in a study in which experienced investors predict the outcome of a novel company's strategy after reading about the experiences of other companies who implemented a similar strategy. The results are consistent with the occurrence of both relational and literal similarity reasoning, with relational reasoning emerging as the dominant approach to generating investors' predictions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rational Comprehension of Arguments in Theoretical Texts: A Program for an Argumentative-Linguistic Approach

A method of linguistically-oriented reasoning comprehension is proposed. It is based on semiological principles of text comprehension. Both content and form are essential for comprehending argumentative texts. A text recipient is viewed as a rational judge trying to detect all the components of the argument he/she considers and thus to see if the argument is consistent. Elementary and higher level argumentative units of the text are discovered by applying a modified S. Toulmin's model of argumentative functions. Validity and correctness of arguments are established by means of a new – linguistic – interpretation of traditional syllogistic.